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OF BODIES POLITIC AND PECUNIARY:
A BRIEF HISTORY OF 
CORPORATE PURPOSE
David B. Guenther∗
These artificial persons are called bodies politic, bodies corporate (corpora corpo-
rata) or corporations: of which there is a great variety subsisting, for the advance-
ment of religion, of learning, and of commerce.
— William Blackstone, 
Commentaries on the Laws of England1
ABSTRACT
American corporate law has long drawn a bright line between for-profit 
and non-profit corporations. In recent years, hybrid or social enterprises have 
increasingly put this bright-line distinction to the test. This Article asks what 
we can learn about the purpose of the American business corporation by 
examining its history and development in the United States in its formative 
period from roughly 1780-1860.  This brief history of corporate purpose 
suggests that the duty to maximize profits in the for-profit corporation is a 
relatively recent development. Historically, the American business corporation 
grew out of an earlier form of corporation that was neither for-profit nor non-
profit in today’s parlance but rather, served a multitude of municipal, 
religious, charitable, educational, and eventually business purposes in early 
nineteenth-century New England.  The purposes of early American business 
corporations—rather than maximization of profit to private shareholders—
were often overtly public, involving development of local transportation, 
finance, and other much-needed economic infrastructure. With the rise of 
factory-based manufacturing, railroads, and other capital-intensive industries 
in the middle decades of the nineteenth century and the advent of general 
incorporation statutes, the purpose of the American business corporation 
shifted fundamentally from public to private. By 1860, the stage was set for the 
modern firm.
This Article concludes that the corporation has no intrinsic purpose. The 
corporation’s defining features are separate legal personality and the ability 
to aggregate capital toward any otherwise lawful end, whether for-profit or 
nonprofit. Social enterprises today more closely resemble the early American 
business corporation than the profit-maximizing modern firm. Social 
enterprise should be seen less as a legally uncertain novelty than a return to 
∗
Clinical Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School.
1. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *467.
2 Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review [Vol. 9:1
the business corporation’s nineteenth-century American roots.  Finally, this 
Article suggests potential limitations for social enterprise.
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I. INTRODUCTION
American corporate law has long drawn a bright line between for-profit and 
non-profit corporations.  For-profits and non-profits generally have different 
purposes, different organizing statutes, different regulatory regimes, and differ-
ent governance.  For-profits typically seek to earn revenues and to maximize 
profits to their shareholders, while non-profits are customarily expected to solic-
it grants and contributions in pursuit of a charitable public mission and to ab-
Fall 2019] A Brief History of Corporate Purpose 3
stain from private inurement.2 Some courts have held and commentators have 
suggested that these differences are inherent in the for-profit corporate form.3
In recent years, hybrid or social enterprises have increasingly put this 
bright-line distinction to the test.4 Many social enterprises are essentially for-
profits with a non-profit mission; others are non-profits that seek to use for-
profit tools to earn revenues to be sustainable; still others are tandem structures 
aimed at combining desirable features of both for-profit and non-profit entities.5
New forms of legal entity, such as the benefit corporation and the low-profit 
limited liability company or L3C, have attempted to unite basic non-profit and 
2. On the duty of for-profit corporations to maximize profits, see, e.g., Dodge v. Ford, 170 
N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919); eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010). On 
the obligation of non-profit corporations to abstain from private inurement, see, e.g., I.R.C. 
§501(c)(3) (1986).
3. See, e.g., eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010) 
(“The ‘Inc.’ after the company name has to mean at least that.”); Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of 
Denial: The Need for a Clear-Eyed Understanding of the Power and Accountability Structure Es-
tablished by the Delaware General Corporation Law, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761, 776-77 (2015) 
(“Dodge v. Ford and eBay are hornbook law because they make clear that if a fiduciary admits that 
he is treating an interest other than stockholder wealth as an end in itself, rather than an instrument 
to stockholder wealth, he is committing a breach of fiduciary duty.”); but see David B. Guenther, 
The Strange Case of the Missing Doctrine and the “Odd Exercise” of eBay: Why Exactly Must 
Corporations Maximize Profits to Shareholders?, 12 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 427, 479 (2018). The ben-
efit corporation movement, which since 2010 has led to the adoption of benefit corporation statutes 
in more than thirty U.S. jurisdictions, is premised on the notion that a non-profit-maximizing mis-
sion cannot lawfully be pursued in a for-profit corporate form without legislative sanction. See, e.g.,
WILLIAM H. CLARK, JR. & LARRY VRANKA, WHITE PAPER: THE NEED AND RATIONALE FOR THE 
BENEFIT CORPORATION: WHY IT IS THE LEGAL FORM THAT BEST ADDRESSES THE NEEDS OF 
SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURS, INVESTORS, AND, ULTIMATELY, THE PUBLIC 5-6 (2013), 
http://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/Benefit_Corporation_White_Paper.pdf; William H. Clark, 
Jr. & Elizabeth K. Babson, How Benefit Corporations are Redefining the Purpose of Business Cor-
porations, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. R. 817, 838 (2012).
4. While there is no single accepted definition, the term “social enterprise” may be defined 
for purposes of this Article as a for-profit enterprise with a social, environmental, or other non-
financial purpose in addition to profit.  For a discussion of the definition of “social enterprise,” see,
e.g., Alicia E. Plerhoples, Representing Social Enterprise, 20 CLINICAL L. REV. 215, 223 (2013). 
See also Alicia E. Plerhoples, Nonprofit Displacement and the Pursuit of Charity through Public 
Benefit Corporations, 21 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 525, 526 (2017) (“Charity is increasingly being 
conducted through for-profit entities”); Dana Brakman Reiser, Blended Enterprise and the Dual 
Mission Dilemma, 35 VERMONT L. REV. 105, 105 (2010) (noting that “the boundary between charity 
and business has become a moving target” and that nonprofits, social enterprises and philanthropy 
divisions of for-profits “all attempt to use business models and practices to pursue charitable objec-
tives.”).
5. For purposes of this Article, a “tandem structure” may be defined as a structure in which 
a non-profit entity and a for-profit entity cooperate, by means of cross-ownership, contract, or oth-
erwise, to achieve a common goal. See, e.g., Ingrid Mittermaier & Joey Neugart, Operating in Two 
Worlds: Tandem Structures in Social Enterprise, THE PRACTICAL TAX LAWYER, Fall 2011, at 1; 
Marya Besharov, Jean-Baptiste Litrico & Susanna Kislenko, The Many Roads to Revenue Genera-
tion, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV. 35-39 (Fall 2019).
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for-profit features in a single legal entity.6 Various other hybrids have arisen in 
the increasingly murky no-man’s-land in between.7
In this Article, I ask what, if anything, we can learn about the purpose of the 
American business corporation by examining its history and development in the 
United States in its formative period from roughly 1780-1860.8 This brief his-
6. On benefit corporations and social enterprise generally, see, e.g. J. Haskell Murray, 
Choose Your Own Master: Social Enterprise, Certifications, and Benefit Corporation Statutes, 2 
AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 1, 10 (2012). On the L3C, see, e.g., John E. Tyler, Negating the Legal Problem 
of Having Two Masters: A Framework for L3C Duties and Accountability, 35 VT. L. REV. 117 
(2010).
7. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 2500 – 2517 (Deering 2011) (the flexible purpose corpo-
ration in California) and WASH. REV. CODE §§ 23.B.25.150 (2012) (the social purpose corporation 
in Washington).
8. On the utility of corporation history, see, e.g., Harwell Wells, The Rise of the Close Cor-
poration and the Making of Corporate Law, 5 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 263, 266, n.11 (2008) [hereinaf-
ter Wells, Close Corporation] (“[t]he history of corporation law is in general under-studied . . . .”); 
Douglas Arner, Development of the American Law of Corporations to 1832, 55 SMU L. REV. 23, 23-
24 (2002) (“[L]ittle study has been devoted to the development of corporate law in the United States 
and the United Kingdom.”). See infra note 9 for a definition of the term “business corporation” as 
used in this Article. Sources most useful for this Article include JOSEPH STANCLIFFE DAVIS, ESSAYS 
IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF CORPORATIONS I, III, IV (1917); E. MERRICK DODD, AMERICAN 
BUSINESS CORPORATIONS UNTIL 1860 WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO MASSACHUSETTS (Harvard 
Univ. Press 1954); RONALD E. SEAVOY, THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATION 
1784-1855 (1982) [hereinafter, SEAVOY, ORIGINS]; Ronald E. Seavoy, The Public Service Origins 
of the American Business Corporation, 52 BUS. HIST. REV. 30 (1978) [hereinafter, Seavoy, Public 
Service Origins]; Ronald E. Seavoy, Laws to Encourage Manufacturing: New York Policy and the 
1811 General Incorporation Statute, 46 BUS. HIST. REV. 85 (1972) [hereinafter, Seavoy, Laws to 
Encourage Manufacturing]; Pauline Maier, The Revolutionary Origins of the Business Corporation,
50 WM. & MARY Q. 51 (1993); Oscar Handlin & Mary F. Handlin, Origins of the American Busi-
ness Corporation, 5 J. ECON. HIST. 1 (1945); Henry Hansmann & Mariana Pargendler, The Evolu-
tion of Shareholder Voting Rights: Separation of Ownership and Consumption, 123 YALE L.J. 948 
(2014); Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business Organ-
izers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REV. 387 (2003) [hereinafter Blair, Locking in Capital]; 
Margaret M. Blair, Reforming Corporate Governance: What History Can Teach Us, (Georgetown 
University Law Center, Bus., Econ. and Regulatory Policy Working Paper No. 485663, 2003) [here-
inafter Blair, Reforming Corporate Governance]; Richard Sylla & Robert E. Wright, Corporation 
Formation in the Antebellum United States in Comparative Context, 55 BUS. HIST. REV. 653 
(2013); JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF 
THE UNITED STATES, 1780–1790 (The Univ. Press of Va. 1970); WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S
WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (Univ. of N.C. Press 1996) 
[hereinafter NOVAK, PEOPLE’S WELFARE]; Susan Pace Hamill, From Special Privilege to General 
Utility: A Continuation of Willard Hurst’s Study of Corporations, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 81 (1999); Eric 
Hilt, Early American Corporations and the State, in CORPORATIONS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 
37 (Naomi R. Lamoreaux and William J. Novak, Eds., (Harvard Univ. Press, 2017) [hereinafter 
Hilt, Early American Corporations]; Eric Hilt, Corporation Law and the Shift Toward Open Access 
in the United States, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 21195 2015) [hereinafter 
Hilt, Open Access); Eric Hilt, Corporate Governance and the Development of Manufacturing En-
terprises in Nineteenth-Century Massachusetts, in ENTERPRISING AMERICA: BUSINESSES, BANKS,
AND CREDIT MARKETS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 73 (William J. Collins & Robert A. Margo, 
eds., Univ. Chicago Press, 2015) [hereinafter Hilt, Corporate Governance]; Eric Hilt & Jacqueline 
Valentine, Democratic Dividends: Stockholding, Wealth and Politics in New York, 1791-1826,
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 17147, 2011) [hereinafter Hilt & Valentine, Dem-
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tory of corporate purpose suggests that the ostensible duty to maximize profits 
in the for-profit corporation is a relatively recent juridical development.  Histor-
ically, the for-profit or business corporation grew out of an earlier form of cor-
poration that was neither for-profit nor non-profit in today’s parlance but rather, 
served a multitude of municipal, religious, charitable, educational, and eventual-
ly business purposes in early nineteenth-century New England.  The purposes of 
early American business corporations—rather than maximization of profit to 
private shareholders—were often overtly public, involving development of local 
transportation, finance, and other much-needed economic infrastructure and 
even the delegation to business corporations of public powers such as eminent 
domain, at a time when local governments lacked the resources to build such 
infrastructure.  The doctrine of profit maximization did not develop until nearly 
a century later, after the rise of factory-based manufacturing and other capital-
intensive industries in what I will call private “pecuniary” corporations over the 
course of the nineteenth century.9
ocratic Dividends]; Eric Hilt, When Did Ownership Separate from Control? Corporate Governance 
in the Early Nineteenth Century, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 13093, 2007) 
[hereinafter Hilt, Ownership and Control]; MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
AMERICAN LAW, 1790-1869 (Harvard Univ. Press 1977); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF 
AMERICAN LAW (2d ed. Simon and Schuster 1985); Harwell Wells, A Long View of Shareholder 
Power: From the Antebellum Corporation to the Twenty-First Century, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1033 
(2015) [hereinafter Wells, Shareholder Power]; Douglas Arner, Development of the American Law 
of Corporations to 1832, 55 SMU L. REV. 23 (2002); Simeon Baldwin, American Business Corpo-
rations Before 1789, in 1 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE 
YEAR 1902, 449 (Gov’t Printing Office 1903); and COLIN MAYER, PROSPERITY (Oxford Univ. Press 
2018).
9. In this Article, when referring to business corporations, I avoid using the terms “for-
profit,” “nonprofit,” and to some extent “public” and “private,” since these terms and the concepts 
underlying them were not generally current in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. See, 
e.g., Handlin & Handlin, supra note 8 at 19 (“[N]either the division into public and private laws nor 
the distinction between public and private corporations was accepted by eighteen-century law.”); 
NOVAK, PEOPLE’S WELFARE, supra note 8 at 84 (“The first hurdle blocking a reconstruction of the 
notion of public economy in nineteenth-century America is a twentieth-century perspective that 
separates public and private. . . .”); Wells, Shareholder Power, supra note 8 at 1042 (“The earliest 
discussions of ‘corporations’ often made little distinction between for-profit and not-for-profit or-
ganizations, perhaps because all corporations, even those for profit, were assumed to provide some 
public benefit.”). See also the discussion infra accompanying notes 203 to 218. Instead, I propose –
admittedly somewhat arbitrarily – to use the term “corporation” to refer to the all-purpose corpora-
tion of the first period of this history prior to 1780; the term “business corporation” to refer to the 
internal improvement companies and other primarily publicly-oriented business enterprises of the 
second period from 1780 to roughly 1830; and the term “pecuniary corporation” to refer to the pri-
marily profit-oriented business corporations of the third period from roughly the 1820s forward.) I 
consider each of these terms to be a subset of its predecessor. The term “pecuniary corporation” (or 
“monied corporation”) occurs with some regularity from at least the late eighteenth century through 
the early twentieth to describe primarily profit-oriented enterprises. See, e.g., State ex rel. Kilbourn 
v. Tudor, 5 Day 329, 333 (Conn. 1812) (hereinafter State v. Tudor) (distinguishing “a corporation 
instituted for the public good” from a “monied corporation”); Congregational Society v. Ashley, 10 
Vt. 241, 244 (Vt. 1838) (distinguishing an ecclesiastical corporation from “mere pecuniary corpora-
tions for private emolument”); Town of West Hartford v. Bd. of Water Comm’rs, 44 Conn. 360, 370 
(Sup. Ct. of Errors of Ct. 1877) (opining on claim that “a municipality holding property for the pub-
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Part I of this Article surveys the landscape of early English and early Amer-
ican corporation law.10 In 1780, few American corporations, and hardly any 
business corporations, had been organized.  Little or no American corporation 
law existed, and the few available English precedents were concerned primarily 
with what we would today call charities or non-profits.  American law and prac-
tice drew no meaningful distinction between business and municipal, religious, 
educational, or charitable corporations; the business corporation was not a 
meaningful legal concept; and early American lawyers, jurists, and legislators 
were accordingly obliged to invent the law of the American business corpora-
tion more or less from scratch.
Part II traces the first of two historic transformations in corporate purpose, 
namely the emergence of the early American business corporation from its all-
purpose colonial predecessor.11 After the American Revolution, particularly 
after 1800, great numbers of turnpikes, toll-bridges, canals, and other “internal
improvement companies,” along with railroads, banks, and insurance companies 
were rapidly organized.  Specially chartered by an act of the state legislature, 
the business corporation was the entity of choice.  The purposes of these early 
business corporations were avowedly public.  State governments—poor in both 
cash and expertise but in desperate need of local infrastructure—provided cor-
porations with grants of eminent domain, immunity from taxes, monopoly, and 
direct investment, and some charters provided for the enterprise to revert to the 
State.  Shareholders in many of these early business corporations did not expect 
an economic return on their shares;12 rather, their purpose was often to take ad-
vantage of the economic infrastructure—what one might call the public or 
community benefit—that these enterprises were organized to provide.  Farmers, 
for example, wanted a nearby road or canal to transport their produce to market, 
while merchants needed a local bank from which they could borrow.  In most of 
these developments, New England, and particularly Massachusetts, took promi-
nence, due in part to the presence of a larger merchant class in the towns, but 
more fundamentally, to a long prior experience of organizing new municipali-
ties, congregations, and schools and a widespread spirit of association and en-
terprise—in other words, an existing entrepreneurial culture that quickly 
lic good . . . has descended to the level of a pecuniary corporation using property for profit”); 
Tweedy v. Bogart, 15 A. 374, 375 (Sup. Ct. of Errors of Ct. 1887) (“During the lapse of time, pri-
vate pecuniary corporations have greatly increased in number.”); Bray v. Town of Wallingford, 20 
Conn. 416, 418 (Conn. 1887) (distinguishing “pecuniary corporations”); Read v. Tidewater Coal 
Exch., Inc., 116 A. 898, 904 (Del. Ch. 1922) (citing 1 CLARK & MARSHALL ON PRIVATE 
CORPORATIONS, 83 (1st ed. 1902) and 1 FLETCHER’S CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS, 92 (1919) 
on “corporations for pecuniary profit”); Maier, supra note 8 at 64-65 (citing one eighteenth-century 
essayist on “pecuniary” corporations) (citation omitted).
10. See infra discussion accompanying notes 20 to 166.
11. See infra discussion accompanying notes 167 to 421.
12. See discussion infra Section II.A.
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adapted from its all-purpose corporate origins to the business-oriented corporate 
form.13
Part III of this Article briefly outlines the second great transformation of the 
early American corporation.  Beginning in the second and third decades of the 
nineteenth century with the rise of factory-based manufacturing and other com-
paratively more capital-intensive industries, the purpose of the business corpo-
ration shifted fundamentally from public to private.14 Massachusetts and other 
states chartered great numbers of manufacturing corporations; railroads gradual-
ly replaced turnpikes and canals as the primary means of inland transport; and 
the chartering of publicly oriented internal improvement companies declined.15
Based initially on religious precedents, to keep up with growing demand, states 
adopted general incorporation statutes that no longer required an action of the 
state legislature.  By 1860, state corporation statutes had become largely ena-
bling rather than prescriptive, the purpose of the business corporation was wide-
ly understood to be private pecuniary gain, and the early American business 
corporation gradually took its familiar “pecuniary” or profit-maximizing mod-
ern form.  The stage had been set for the advent of the modern firm.
In Part IV of this Article, based on this brief history of corporate purpose, I 
draw conclusions about the corporation and the implications for social enter-
prise.16 I conclude that the corporation as such has no intrinsic purpose; the 
corporation’s defining features are separate legal personality and the ability to 
aggregate capital toward any otherwise lawful end, whether for-profit or non-
profit; and the profit-maximizing imperative of the modern for-profit corpora-
tion is a historical development rather than anything intrinsic to the corporate 
form.17 The “pecuniary” or profit-oriented corporation emerged from the “body 
13. Arner, supra note 8 at 44; Seavoy, Public Service Origins, supra note 8 at 60. See also
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, (George Lawrence, trans., J.P. Mayer ed.)
(1969) (“Americans of all ages, all stations in life, and all types of dispositions are forever forming 
associations. There are not only commercial and industrial associations in which all take part, but 
others of a thousand different types – religious, moral, serious, futile, very general and very limited, 
immensely large and very minute. . . . In every case, at the head of any new undertaking, where in 
France you would find the government or in England some territorial magnate, in the United States 
you are sure to find an association.”).
14. See discussion infra accompanying notes 422 to 516.
15. See, e.g., Dodd, supra note 8, at 314 (stating that in Massachusetts, by 1848, the average 
annual number of manufacturing company charters had come to be greatly in excess of that of any 
other type of business company) and at 134 (discussing the substitution of railroads for turnpikes 
and canals as the principal arteries of inland transportation); SEAVOY, ORIGINS, supra note 8, at 213 
(discussing the comparative advantages of railroads over canals and the role of railroads in the 
transformation of New York’s economy by 1855).
16. See discussion infra accompanying notes 517 to 547.
17. On the profit maximization doctrine, I have argued elsewhere that (i) the Michigan Su-
preme Court in Dodge v. Ford based its holding that directors had a fiduciary duty to maximize 
profits to shareholders on the then-declining doctrine of ultra vires and shareholders’ equitable right 
to a dividend, which is to say, based on reasonable shareholder expectations arising from the partic-
ular provisions of Ford’s corporate charter, and (ii) eBay ultimately should be understood as an ultra 
vires case. See Guenther, supra note 3.
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politic,” and there is nothing inherent in the corporation to separate the two, on-
ly a different orientation of purpose.  I also conclude that social enterprises to-
day much more closely resemble the early American business corporation than 
the profit-maximizing modern firm;18 that social entrepreneurs and investors 
operating in developing economies today frequently use for-profit corporations 
in much the same way, for the same reasons, and to accomplish the same objec-
tives as early American corporations, namely, to build economic and financial
infrastructure where other means are not available—to use business to improve 
society,19 in addition to obtaining a financial return on their capital.  Social en-
terprise should be seen less as a legally uncertain novelty than an operational 
return to the business corporation’s nineteenth-century American roots.  Finally, 
based on this brief history, I suggest potential limitations for social enterprise 
today.
II. EARLY ENGLISH AND AMERICAN CORPORATION LAW
A. England.
Historically, while the corporate form had long existed in England, the or-
dinary business corporation was practically unknown.20 English corporations 
had been used almost exclusively for municipal, ecclesiastical, charitable, and 
educational purposes.21 Only a small number of ordinary business corporations 
18. On the modern firm, see generally A. BERLE JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN 
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
19. See, e.g., Antony Page & Robert A. Katz, Freezing Out Ben & Jerry: Corporate Law 
and the Sale of a Social Enterprise Icon, 35 VT. L. REV. 211, 217 (citing Ben Cohen describing Ben 
& Jerry’s as “an experiment to see if it was possible to use the tools of business to repair society.”)
(citation omitted).
20. See SEAVOY, ORIGINS, supra note 8, at 47 (noting that the English Parliament passed 
very few individual charters for business enterprises and no general incorporation statutes for busi-
ness until 1844); Maier, supra note 8, at  83 (observing that the corporation was an “all-but-
moribund institution” in eighteenth-century England); Dodd, supra note 8, at 195 (explaining that 
English courts prior to the American Revolution had very little opportunity to develop legal princi-
ples relating to corporate problems peculiar to joint-stock companies); Handlin & Handlin, supra
note 8, at 3 (noting that the whole of eighteenth-century England chartered a half-dozen corpora-
tions for manufacturing purposes and hardly more in any other business sphere; not until the Com-
panies Act of 1844 did the corporation become common); Philip I. Blumberg, Accountability of 
Multinational Corporations: The Barriers Presented by Concepts of the Corporate Juridical Entity,
24 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 297, 300 (stating that Coke wrote “at a time when there were 
virtually no business corporations in England”). But cf. Dodd, supra note 8, at 14 (referring to the 
substantial number of English business corporation cases decided before 1800); Davis, supra note 8, 
at 3 (noting that the corporation, including for trading and business purposes, was well-matured in 
England during American colonial period).
21. See, e.g., SEAVOY, ORIGINS, supra note 8 at 46-47.
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appear to have been chartered in England in the whole of the eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries.22 Corporate charters were difficult to obtain.23
The rules for organizing an English corporation were first summarized in 
1612 by Sir Edward Coke in The Case of Sutton’s Hospital, perhaps the first 
significant case in the common law of corporations.24 An English corporation 
could be created in one of four ways: by the common law; by prescription; by 
an act of the English Parliament; or by a charter or “letters patent” from the 
King, though the first three routes were generally deemed to require, or to have 
already received, the implicit or explicit assent of the monarch.25
The predominant forms of association for early English business enterprises 
were the general partnership and the joint-stock company.26 Both suffered from 
significant disadvantages.  At common law, the general partnership was an un-
incorporated association that lacked separate legal personality, could not sue or 
be sued, and dissolved automatically upon the death or involuntary withdrawal 
of any member; partnership interests were not freely transferable.27 Partners 
were jointly and severally liable for the partnership’s debts and any actions tak-
en by any other partner on behalf of the partnership.28 Due to their uncertain 
lifespan and non-transferable interests, partnerships usually consisted of a small 
number of people, often family members, and generally engaged in commercial 
trading or land-based or other activities that did not require significant pooling 
of capital.29
For larger ventures that required greater aggregation of capital, the joint-
stock company was preferred.  Initially, English joint-stock companies were an 
unincorporated contractual form created by articles of association among the 
company’s members without reference to a charter or statute.30 Through the 
22. See SEAVOY, ORIGINS, supra note 8, at 47; Handlin & Handlin, Origins of the American 
Business Corporation, supra note 8, at 3.
23. JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS
§ 1:14 (3d ed. 2018).
24. See, e.g., Case of Sutton’s Hospital (1612) 77 Eng. Rep. 960(K.B.); Arner, Development 
of the American Law of Corporations to 1832, supra note 8, at 28; W.S. Holdsworth, English Cor-
poration Law in the 16th and 17th Centuries, 31 YALE L. J. 382, 382 (1922).
25. Case of Sutton’s Hospital (1612) 77 Eng. Rep. 960, 975 (K.B.) (“[N]one but the King 
alone can create or make a corporation . . . .”); cf. EDWARD COKE, FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES 
OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND; OR, A COMMENTARY UPON LITTLETON *250a [hereinafter, COKE ON 
LITTLETON] (recognizing only three ways to incorporate: by prescription, by letters patents, or by 
act of Parliament); BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at *472, *474 (“[T]he king’s consent is absolutely 
necessary . . . none but the king can make a corporation. . . .”); STEWART KYD, A TREATISE ON THE 
LAW OF CORPORATIONS 40-41 (noting that it had been “long established that the king’s consent is 
absolutely necessary” to create a corporation); Holdsworth supra note 23, at 382 (citations omitted).
26. See, e.g., SEAVOY, ORIGINS supra note 8, at 47.
27. See, e.g., Wells, Close Corporation, supra note 8, at 276, 306 (citation omitted).
28. BLAIR, supra note 8, at 410.
29. BLAIR, supra note 8, at 409, n.68 (citing ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE 
HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS 8 (1970)).
30. COX & HAZEN, supra note 23, at § 2:2.
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articles of association, joint-stock companies were able to provide for quasi-
corporate characteristics, including continuity of existence, free transferability 
of shares, and centralized management by a board of directors, and for real as-
sets to be held by a trustee rather than jointly by the members.31 The company 
did not dissolve upon the death of a member or other changes in membership, 
and members were not authorized to act as agents on behalf of the company.32
Due to the defects of the general partnership and the difficulty of obtaining cor-
poration charters, unincorporated joint-stock companies came into wide use in 
England in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.33 The unincorporated 
joint-stock company suffered from the same basic defect as the general partner-
ship, however, in that courts applied rules of general partnership liability, so 
that each company member was jointly and severally liable for all of the com-
pany’s debts.34 In addition, in suits against the company, courts applied the rule 
of joinder, requiring all members of the company to be named in the suit, and 
the common law rule prohibiting partners from suing the partnership (i.e., them-
selves) with the result that members could not bring suit against the company.35
In the early 1600s, the English Crown and Parliament began granting corpo-
rate charters to joint-stock companies.  As corporations, chartered joint-stock 
companies had true separate legal personality and free transferability of shares.  
Charters were generally granted, however, only to large-scale enterprises that 
required significant pooling of capital and were seen as advancing important 
state interests overseas.36  As privileged ventures with quasi-state powers, in-
corporated joint-stock companies were instrumental in the developing English 
mercantile economy.  The East India Company was a typical example.  Granted 
a royal charter by Queen Elizabeth in 1600, the company had not only a mo-
nopoly on trade, but the right to maintain an army, control territory, wage war 
and conduct diplomacy, make and enforce laws through its own courts, and 
maintain a “massive bureaucracy” of civil servants.37 The East India Company 
became the foundation for the British Empire in India.38 As one historian has 
noted, “the ambiguous and flexible relationship between the Company’s status 
as a public and private actor was in many ways part of its constitution from the 
very beginning.”39
31. Id. at § 1:14.
32. Id.
33. See id. at § 2:2; § 1:14.
34. Id. at § 2:2.
35. Id.
36. See, e.g., Samuel Williston, History of the Law of Business Corporations Before 1800 I,
2 HARV. L. REV. 105, 110 (1888).
37. Philip J. Stern, The English East India Company and the Modern Corporation: Legacies, 
Lessons and Limitations, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 423, 433 (2016).
38. Id. at 426.
39. Id. at 435.
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Any nascent development of the English business corporation through the 
joint-stock company, however, was soon cut short.  In the late seventeenth cen-
tury, the proliferation of unincorporated joint-stock companies and a boom in 
trading of company shares led to a speculative bubble.40 One of the most noto-
rious speculators, the South Sea Company, inspired Parliament to enact the 
Bubble Act of 1720, ostensibly to protect unwary investors against fraud.41
Though poorly drafted and its basic terms ill-defined, the Act was understood to 
make illegal, under severe penalty, the formation of new joint-stock companies 
with transferable shares except by royal or parliamentary charter.42 The direct 
impact of the Act was uncertain, and in any event it was repealed in 1825, but if 
nothing else, the Bubble Act created a century of uncertainty and doubt about 
the legality of transferable shares issued by unincorporated companies.43  To-
gether with the relative rarity of royal and parliamentary charters, the Bubble 
Act “drastically limited the development of business corporations in Britain.”44
As one scholar put it, the business corporation in late eighteenth-century Eng-
land was “an all-but-moribund institution.”45
In English law, then, and in the eyes of English courts and legal commenta-
tors, the corporation was originally—and until at least the mid-nineteenth centu-
ry largely remained—a non-business form.  English courts did not generally 
even distinguish between non-business and business corporations.46 Instead, 
40. COX & HAZEN, supra note 23, at § 2:2; Seavoy, Public Service Origins, supra note 8, at 
31; L. C. B. Gower, Some Contrasts Between British and American Corporation Law, 69 HARV. L.
REV. 1369, 1370 (1956).
41. COX & HAZEN, CORPORATIONS § 2:2; Seavoy, Public Service Origins, supra note 8 at 
31.
42. Arner, Development of the American Law of Corporations to 1832, supra note 8, at 33; 
Blair, Locking in Capital, supra note 8, at 415 (citations omitted); Paul G. Mahoney, Contract or 
Concession? An Essay on the History of Corporate Law, 34 GA. L. REV. 873, 887 (2000).
43. COX & HAZEN, supra note 23, at § 2:2.
44. Seavoy, Public Service Origins, supra note 8, at 32; Arner, Development of the Ameri-
can Law of Corporations to 1832, supra note 8, at 33 (the Bubble Act “retarded the development of 
the private business corporation in England for over one hundred years”); Blair, Locking in Capital,
supra note 8, at 415 (the Bubble Act “slowed the development of this organizational form in Eng-
land for more than one hundred years”) (citations omitted) and note 88 (noting that England did not 
pass an effective general incorporation act until 1844); Mahoney, Contract or Concession?, supra
note 42 at 888 (“the real impact of the Bubble Act was to cut off any possibility of further develop-
ment of a common law of joint-stock companies.”); Gower, Some Contrasts Between British and 
American Corporation Law, supra note 42, at 1371-1372 (“Hence the modern English business cor-
poration has evolved from the unincorporated partnership, based on mutual agreement, rather than 
from the corporation, based on a grant from the state, and owes more to partnership principles than 
to rules based on corporate personality.”).
45. Maier, supra note 8, at 83 (referring to corporations generally). See also Handlin & 
Handlin, supra note 8, at 3 (“Throughout the whole of the eighteenth century England chartered 
some half-dozen corporations for manufacturing purposes, and hardly more in any other business 
sphere.”).
46. Dodd, supra note 8, at 13, 18, 195; id. at 18, note 6 (noting that the first English case to 
put an incorporated trading company in a separate category from an incorporated borough was de-
cided in 1819).
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they developed rules that purported to apply to all corporations alike.47 Not 
surprisingly, English precedents, while purporting to establish rules that applied 
to all corporations, were ill-suited to business enterprises.48
As noted above, the first major case in English corporation law—The Case 
of Sutton’s Hospital in 1612—involved a charity.49 Sir Edward Coke does not 
restrict his opinion to charitable corporations or even distinguish between chari-
table and non-charitable corporations. Among the five things he describes as “of 
the essence of a Corporation,” Coke does not mention corporate purpose.50
Similarly, in his subsequent Institutes of the Laws of England, first pub-
lished in 1628, Coke does not appear to acknowledge the existence of business 
corporations.51 Coke defines a corporation or “body politike” as
. . .a body to take in succession, framed (as to that capacity) by policie, and there-
upon it is called here by Littleton a body politike; and it is also called a corporation, 
or a body incorporate, because the persons are made into a body, and are of capaci-
ty to take and grant, etc.”
52
By this account, the distinguishing characteristics of the corporation appear to 
be only two: separate legal personality and the ability to aggregate capital.53
Coke’s ensuing discussion of corporations, while brief, are concerned only with 
ecclesiastical and municipal organizations, without mentioning trade or busi-
ness:
Every body politike, or corporate, is either ecclesiasticall or lay: ecclesiastical, ei-
ther regular as abbots, priors, etc., or secular, as bishops, deans, archdeacons, par-
sons, vicars, etc.; lay, as maior and communaltie, baylifes and burgesses, etc. Also 
every body politike is either elective, presentative, collative or donative. And in the 
case of these againe it is either sole, or aggregate of many . . . . And this body poli-
47. Id. at 195.
48. Id. at 195; HURST, supra note 8, at 7.
49. Arner, supra note 8, at 28 (Sutton’s Hospital “is generally regarded as one of the most 
important early cases on corporations.”). See also Holdsworth, supra note 23, at 382, n. 1 (“The 
legal sense of the word hospital is a corporate foundation, endowed for the perpetual distribution of
the founder’s charity, in the lodging and maintenance of a certain number of poor persons, accord-
ing to the regulation and statutes of the founder. Such institutions are not necessarily connected with 
medicine or surgery, and in their original establishment had no necessary reference to sickness of 
accident.”) (citation omitted).
50. Case of Sutton’s Hospital (1612) 77 Eng. Rep. 960, 968-969 (KB). These five things are 
(i) lawful authority of incorporation; (ii) persons to be incorporated; (iii) a name; (iv) a place; and 
(v) words sufficient in law to indicate the intent to form a corporation. See also Arner, supra note 8, 
at 29.
51. See Blumberg, Accountability of Multinational Corporations, supra note 20 at 300 (stat-
ing that Coke wrote “at a time when there were virtually no business corporations in England”); see 
also Arner, Development of the American Law of Corporations to 1832, supra note 8 at 29.
52. COKE ON LITTLETON, supra note 25, at *250a.
53. See infra discussion accompanying notes 518 to 525.
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tike, corporate, aggregate of many, is by the civilians called collegium or universi-
tas.
54
Other early English commentators paid similarly scant attention to business 
corporations. William Blackstone, in his Commentaries on the Laws of Eng-
land, first published in 1765, also identifies five “powers, rights, capacities, and 
incapacities,”55 which are “necessarily and inseparably incident to every corpo-
ration,”56 but like Coke, he does not mention corporate purpose. With respect to 
the types of corporations, Blackstone follows a schema similar, but not identi-
cal, to that of Coke: corporations may be sole or aggregate, ecclesiastical or lay, 
but within the latter category, Blackstone distinguishes between eleemosynary 
and civil.57 Eleemosynary corporations are charities “constituted for the perpet-
ual distribution of the free alms, or bounty, of the founder of them, to such per-
sons as he has directed.”58 Civil corporations “are such as are erected for a vari-
ety of temporal purposes.”59 As examples of civil corporations, Blackstone lists 
the King; “corporations erected for the good government of a town or particular 
district”; church wardens; the college of physicians and company of surgeons in 
London; the royal society of antiquarians; the universities of Oxford and Cam-
bridge; and most significantly for our purposes, corporations “for the advance-
ment and regulation of manufactures and commerce; as the trading companies 
of London and other towns.”60 Blackstone may thus be the first English com-
mentator to mention business corporations as such, though it should be noted 
that, rather than putting them in a separate category, he still includes them with 
municipal, educational, and other non-business corporations in the broad cate-
gory of civil corporations established for some “temporal purpose.”61
Perhaps the first English treatise devoted specifically to corporation law was 
published in 1793.62 Stewart Kyd, in his Treatise on the Law of Corporations,
defines a corporation, or “body politic,” as
54. COKE ON LITTLETON, supra note 25, at *250a; see the very similar language in Case of 
Sutton’s Hospital, (1612) 77 Eng. Rep. 960, 968 (KB) (“That every Corporation or Incorporation, or 
body Politick and Incorporate, who are all one, either stand upon one sole person, as the King, 
Bishop, Parson, &c. or aggregate of many, as Mayor and Commonalty, Dean and Chapter, &c., and 
these are in the Civil Law are [sic] called Universitas sive Collegium.”).
55. BLACKSTONE, supra note 25, at *475; see also Arner, supra note 8, at 37.
56. BLACKSTONE, supra note 25, at *475. The five essential powers or rights are (i) to have 
perpetual succession; (ii) to sue or be sued; (iii) to purchase and hold lands “for the benefit of them-
selves and their successors”; (iv) to have a common seal; and (v) to make by-laws or private statutes 
for the better governance of the corporation. Id. at *475-76.
57. BLACKSTONE, supra note 25, at *469-471.
58. Id. at *471.
59. Id. at *470.
60. Id. at *471.
61. Id. at *470; but see the restriction Blackstone notes on trading company bylaws at *476.
62. JOSEPH K. ANGELL & SAMUEL AMES, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE 
CORPORATIONS AGGREGATE 1, vi (1832); but see Arner, supra note 8, at 42. See also WILLIAM 
SHEPPARD, OF CORPORATIONS, FRATERNITIES AND GUILDS (Garland Pub., Inc. 1978) (1659) (cited 
in Arner, supra note 8, at 31-33, n. 45) (discussing Sheppard as potentially the first English book on 
14 Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review [Vol. 9:1
. . .a collection of many individuals, united into one body, under a special denomi-
nation, having perpetual succession under an artificial form, and vested, by the pol-
icy of the law, with the capacity of acting, in several respects, as an individual, par-
ticularly of taking and granting property, of contracting obligations, and of suing 
and being sued, of enjoying privileges and immunities in common, and exercising a 
variety of political rights, more or less extensive, according to the design of its in-
stitution, or the powers conferred on it, either at the time of its creation, or at any 
subsequent period of its existence.
63
Like Coke and Blackstone, Kyd enumerates the “essential characteristics”64 of 
the corporation.65 Consistent with Coke and Blackstone, Kyd identifies sepa-
rate legal personality, or perpetual succession, and the ability to aggregate prop-
erty as two key attributes of the corporate form, regardless of the nature of the 
corporate activity.  Kyd’s types of corporation are otherwise much the same as
Blackstone’s.66 Unlike Coke and Blackstone, however, Kyd specifically dis-
cusses corporate purpose as the criterion that distinguishes one category of cor-
poration from another: “It is not the description of the persons who are the 
members of a corporation, but the purpose of its institution which characterises 
it to be a lay or a spiritual foundation.”67 Civil corporations are, as with Black-
stone, those established “for a variety of temporal purposes.”68 This category 
includes the King; cities, towns, and other local government; “the two universi-
ties”;69 corporations for “the maintenance and regulation of some particular ob-
ject of public policy,”70 such as regulating navigation, “the Bank,” and insur-
ance companies in London;71 the College of Physicians, the Company of 
Surgeons in London, the Royal Society, the Society of Antiquarians, the Royal 
Academy of Arts, and others for the advancement of science and the arts; and 
corporations for “the regulation of trade, manufactures, and commerce, such as 
the East India Company, and the companies of trades in London and other 
towns.”72
Two points may be noted. First, while Kyd’s list of civil corporations ap-
pears to rely on Blackstone’s, the number, variety, and specificity of description 
the law of corporations but noting that Sheppard did not advance much beyond Coke in Sutton’s
Hospital).
63. KYD, supra note 25, at 13 (emphasis in original).
64. Id. at 6.
65. See id. at 6-10. These “essential characteristics” are: (i) perpetual succession; (ii) pos-
sessing and transmitting property; (iii) “common burthens,” as examples of which Kyd cites certain 
taxes, customs and duties; (iv) “some peculiar privileges,” such as exemption from tolls and duties; 
and (v) the ability to sue and be sued.
66. See id. at 20-32.
67. Id. at 23.
68. Id. at 27.
69. Id. at 28.
70. Id. at 28.
71. Id. at 28-29.
72. Id. at 29.
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of business-like corporations have grown.  While the East India Company exist-
ed during Coke’s and Blackstone’s lifetimes, Kyd appears to be the first to men-
tion it by name, perhaps reflecting its rise to prominence, along with other mer-
cantilist joint-stock corporations, in the eighteenth century.73 It would also not 
appear coincidental that Kyd mentions corporations engaged in transportation 
and finance.74 The second point, however, is that Kyd nonetheless continues to 
group business enterprises with municipal, educational, and other non-business 
organization in the category of corporations pursuing some “temporal purpose.”
Prior to the American Revolution, then, and even for some decades thereaf-
ter, the ordinary business corporation cannot be said to have had a meaningful 
existence in English law. Few English business corporations existed; those that 
did exist, such as the East India Company, often were not ordinary; and English 
courts and legal commentators such as Coke, Blackstone, and Kyd did not typi-
cally consider the business corporation to exist as a distinct legal form.75 To the 
contrary, English corporation law taught that all organizations, business and 
non-business like, used essentially the same form of corporation with the same 
essential features, and to the extent such organizations pursued some “civil”
purpose, there was no significant difference between them.
B. The American Colonies.
Early American corporation law was based on available English precedent 
and, as might be expected, largely resembled English law. Corporations in the 
American colonies required a special charter from the King or the English par-
liament, directly or by delegated authority.76 As in England, corporations were 
few, and business corporations even fewer.77 The purposes of most corpora-
tions, to the extent clearly set forth in their charters, were municipal, religious, 
educational, or charitable, or in the case of incorporated joint-stock companies, 
often one or more of the foregoing intertwined with commercial or trade-related 
73. See also id. at 61(mentioning the East India Company’s exclusive right of trading).
74. See infra discussion accompanying notes 219 to 349 on the importance of the transporta-
tion and finance sectors for internal improvement companies in the former colonies after the Revo-
lution.
75. The notion of the business corporation as a distinct form of legal entity does not appear 
to have occurred to Blackstone or Kyd; Blackstone made no mention of the few existing English 
decisions relating to business corporations, and Kyd cited very few of them in his two-volume trea-
tise. See, e.g., DODD, supra note 8, at 14, 196; SEAVOY, ORIGINS, supra note 8, at 46 (“Blackstone 
had not clearly distinguished between municipal corporations, benevolent public service corpora-
tions, and business corporations, and the other classes of English corporations he discussed did not 
exist in the legal and social structure of the United States.”).
76. DAVIS, Corporations in the American Colonies, supra note 8, at 7-8; Hamill, supra note 
8, at 88-89.
77. DAVIS, Eighteenth Century Business Corporations in the United States, supra note 8, at 
329; Hamill, supra note 8, at 84.
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aims.78 As in England, most colonial business associations remained partner-
ships or unincorporated joint-stock companies.79
1.  Mixed Trade and Municipal Corporations.
The earliest English corporate charter for a primarily American enterprise 
appears to have been granted in 1587 by Sir Walter Raleigh, by royal letters pa-
tent the Governor of Virginia, to John White and twelve other “Gentlemen” of 
London, who were constituted a body corporate with the title, “Gouernour and 
Assistants of the Citie of Ralegh in Virginia.”80 Whether the “Citie of Ralegh”
was intended to be a trade or municipal corporation is difficult to determine,81 a
difficulty compounded by John White’s return to England in 1591 with the 
news that the colonists had disappeared.82 The Virginia Company, established 
by charters granted in 1606, 1609, and 1612 with the company title, “The 
Treasurer and Company of Adventurers and Planters of the City of London, for 
the first Colony in Virginia,” seems to have been primarily a business corpora-
tion modeled on the East India Company, with many of the same shareholders, 
but again, as an intended colony, the corporation’s municipal aspect seems im-
plicit, and fundraising for the new venture also appealed to religious motives.83
The “Councill established at Plymouth, in the County of Devon, for the plant-
78. Blair, supra note 8, at 423 (citations omitted). Regarding early corporate charters, sever-
al challenges should be noted. Determining whether a given colonial enterprise was indeed a corpo-
ration is often difficult. Records were sketchy and poorly kept; whether a legislative body or official 
had lawful authority to charter a corporation was frequently unclear; the terms “corporation” and 
“body politic” were used very loosely in the eighteenth century; some corporations were chartered 
multiple times, with uncertain effect, under different circumstances; and many purported colonial 
corporations never got off the ground or were short-lived and ineffectual. See DAVIS, Corporations 
in the American Colonies supra note 8, at 60 ff.; William B. Stoebuck, Reception of English Com-
mon Law in the American Colonies, 10 WM. & MARY L. REV. 393, 395 (1968). Dissensus among 
legal scholars and historians as to the actual roster of colonial American business corporations ac-
cordingly persists. See infra discussion infra accompanying notes 117 to 149. In addition, while 
early American corporate charters often set forth in their charters “only a relatively narrow and spe-
cific set of corporate purposes,” (Hansmann & Pargendler, supra note 8, at 139), there was no 
standard format, and drafting conventions were sometimes dramatically different. Legal concepts 
and categories such as nonprofit versus for-profit, charitable versus business, and public versus pri-
vate did not exist. See infra discussion accompanying notes 203 to 218. See also Hilt, supra note 8, 
at 52, on the problem of enforcement of charter provisions (“‘Not even the finest administrative 
system could have enforced’ the charters ‘welter of variety and inconsistency.’”)(citation omitted).
79. SEAVOY, ORIGINS supra note 8, at 47 (regarding English law); Blair, supra note 8, at 
404.
80. DAVIS, Corporations in the American Colonies, supra note 8, at 30 (citations omitted); 
see COX & HAZEN, supra note 23, at § 2:2 n.2 (“Cumbersome names such as this seem to go back to 
the quaint, obsolete, old concept ‘that a corporation consists of a head and members, that, if for a 
while it is headless, it is capable of no act save that of electing a new head. . . .’”) (citation omitted).
81. DAVIS, Corporations in the American Colonies, supra note 8, at 30-32.
82. DAVIS, Corporations in the American Colonies, supra note 8, at 32, but cf. 32-33.
83. Id. at 33-35. See also Stoebuck, supra note 78, at 396 (noting that the quarterly court, or 
council, had the power to make laws).
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ing, ruling and gouerning of New-England, in America,” established in 1620 by 
a Crown charter, was organized as a business corporation to promote the fishing 
industry.84 The “body corporate” consisted of a council of forty persons rather 
than stockholders, however, and the establishment of settlements and the em-
phasis on governing of New England would again seem to constitute a munici-
pal rather than business purpose.85 The Massachusetts Bay Company, incorpo-
rated in 1629 as “The Governor and Company of the Massachusetts Bay in 
Newe-England,” was similarly organized as a business corporation like the East 
India and Virginia companies, but “soon lost what little financial character it 
originally possessed.  It was rather dominated by the desire to establish in the 
New World a colony in which certain ways of living and thinking might find 
unhampered expression.”86 The Massachusetts Bay Company eventually lost 
its private corporate character altogether and evolved into the government of the 
colony of Massachusetts, being granted a “province charter” in 1691.87 Nor 
was Massachusetts an exception in this regard; the colonies of Connecticut and 
Rhode Island were originally organized as corporations with Crown charters, 
Connecticut in 1662 and Rhode Island perhaps in 1643 or more definitively in 
1663.88 According to Joseph S. Davis, the corporate charters of Connecticut 
and Rhode Island were the source of their legislative powers, even “the funda-
mental law in these two colonies down to the Revolution.”89 Indeed, Rhode Is-
land’s corporate charter was not replaced by a state constitution until 1842.90
Other more clearly municipal corporations in the colonies included char-
tered boroughs, cities, and towns.  The first of these appears to have been incor-
porated in 1641 in Maine by the proprietor of the newly chartered province, Sir 
Fernando Gorges, who organized “the Planters and Inhabitants of Acomenticus”
into “one bodie politique and corporate” to be known as the “Towne of 
Acomenticus,” which a year later was supplanted by the “Cittie” of Gorgeana, 
the first formally established American city.91  The second of these was New 
York.92 In 1665, after taking possession of the city, then known as New Am-
sterdam, from the Dutch authorities, the English governor declared that city of-
ficials would henceforth be known as mayor, alderman, and sheriff, “according 
to the Custome of England in other his Majesties Corporacons,” and that the in-
habitants of Manhattan would thenceforth “bee for ever accounted, nominated 
and Established, as one Body Politique and Corporate.”93 A total of seven mu-
84. Id. at 34.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 39. See also Maier, supra note 8, at 56.
87. DAVIS, Corporations in the American Colonies, supra note 8, at 40.
88. Id. at 20, 40-41.
89. Id. at 41
90. Id.
91. Id. at 50-51.
92. Id. at 51.
93. Id. at 51-52.
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nicipalities in the seventeenth century, and more than double that number in the 
eighteenth century prior to the Revolution, were incorporated in the colonies.94
2.  Ecclesiastical Corporations.
The most numerous corporations in the early American colonies were reli-
gious or ecclesiastical in nature.95 Several colonies codified the common law 
principle that the parson of the established church was a variety of corpora-
tion.96 In 1755, for example, the Massachusetts legislature passed an act 
providing that deacons, church wardens, and other governing bodies of 
Protestant churches should be
. . .deemed so far as bodies corporate, as to take in succession all grants and dona-
tions, whether real or personal, made either to their several churches, the poor of
their churches, or to them and their successors, and to sue and defend in all actions 
touching the same.
97
The same principle may have been recognized generally in the colonies.98 Oth-
er colonies granted churches more typical corporate charters.  The earliest of 
these appear to include the charters granted in New York, first in 1696 to the 
“Minister Elders and Deacons of the Dutch Protestant Congregation in the City 
of New York,” and again in 1697 to Trinity Church (Episcopal) of New York.99
New Jersey chartered Episcopal church corporations in 1709-10 and 1718 and a 
Presbyterian church corporation in 1734.100  Churches were granted corporate 
charters in Pennsylvania after 1760 and in Rhode Island in the 1770s.101
3.  Charitable and Benevolent Corporations.
After churches, the most common corporations in the colonies were those 
with charitable or benevolent purposes, many of whose activities were not 
clearly separable from those of churches.102 Among the earliest of these were 
missionary societies, such as “the President and Society for the propagation of 
the Gospell in New England,” incorporated by the English Parliament in 1649 
and known as the New England Company, aimed at evangelizing Native Amer-
94. Albany, New York, received a charter in 1686, and Westchester in 1696; Baltimore, as 
“St. Mary’s City,” in 1667; Philadelphia in 1691; and Germantown, Pa. in 1689. Some twenty-four
municipal corporations were created in the American colonies; sixteen or seventeen survived until 
the Revolution. Id. at 52-54, 59-60.
95. Id. at 75.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 79 (citation omitted).
98. Id. at 76.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 77-78 (noting that New Jersey did not separate from New York until 1738).
101. Id. at 78 (Pennsylvania); id. at 78-79 (Rhode Island).
102. Id. at 82.
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ican populations.103 Organizations charged with administering public charity or 
correction included The Corporation for the Relief of Poor and Distressed Pres-
byterian Ministers, and of the Poor and Distressed Widows and Children of 
Presbyterian Ministers, chartered in 1759 in Pennsylvania;104 Boston’s Overse-
ers of the Poor, established by the Massachusetts General Court in 1772;105 and 
The Contributors to the Pennsylvania Hospital, incorporated by the Pennsylva-
nia General Assembly in 1750 “for the relief of the sick poor of this prov-
ince.”106 The entire colony of Georgia was chartered as a charitable corporation 
in 1732 by King George II and nineteen other trustees.107 Colonial charitable 
corporations also included marine societies, whose purpose was to bring togeth-
er the mariners of a particular port, in order to provide mutual aid and to in-
crease knowledge of navigation;108 libraries;109 and The New York Chamber of 
Commerce, chartered by the governor in 1770.110
4.  Educational Corporations.
Colonial corporations with an educational purpose were typically colleges; 
nine colleges were chartered prior to the Revolution.111 The only one directly 
incorporated by royal charter was the College of William and Mary in Virginia 
in 1693.112 The President and Fellows of Harvard College were initially incor-
porated in 1650 by the Massachusetts General Court.113  Yale College, estab-
lished in 1701 as a “collegiate school” with a governing board on the model of a 
business partnership, in 1745 received the first corporate charter granted by the 
Connecticut assembly.114 A group of Presbyterians were initially denied a cor-
porate charter for Princeton University, then known as The College of New Jer-
sey, by the state’s governor, who refused, probably on ecclesiastical grounds; 
the governor died in 1746, however, and the college obtained a charter in 1748 
103. Id. at 38.
104. Baldwin, supra note, 8 at 457.
105. Maier, supra note 8, at 56; DAVIS, Corporations in the American Colonies, supra note 8, 
at 73.
106. DAVIS, Corporations in the American Colonies, supra note 8, at 83 (citation omitted).
107. Id. at 35.
108. Id. at 101; Baldwin, supra note 8, at 452 (discussing the marine societies chartered in 
Boston in 1754, Salem in 1772, Marblehead in 1773, New York City in 1770, and the Society for 
the Relief of the Poor and Distressed Masters of Ships, their Widows and Children, chartered by the 
Pennsylvania assembly in 1770).
109. See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 8, at 100 (discussing libraries chartered in Philadelphia in 
1742, Rhode Island in 1747, Charlestown, South Caroline in 1757 and New Jersey in 1765).
110. Id. at 102.
111. Id. at 84; cf. Seavoy, Public Service Origins, supra note 8 at 41 (identifying ten such 
colleges).
112. DAVIS, Corporations in the American Colonies, supra note 8, at 45.
113. Id. at 84.
114. Id. at 85.
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from his successor, a “zealous Presbyterian.”115 Five other colleges—Penn, Co-
lumbia, Brown, Rutgers, and Dartmouth—were incorporated between 1750 and 
1770.116
5.  Business Corporations.
Of all the types of corporations in the early American colonies, the least 
common and the least important was the business corporation.117 No consensus 
exists as to how many strictly American business corporations existed in the 
colonies, or exactly which corporations they were.  Samuel Williston describes 
only a single “joint-stock business corporation” chartered in the colonies before 
the Revolution;118 Joseph S. Davis counts seven colonial business corpora-
tions;119 and Simeon Baldwin lists six.120 Only one corporation is agreed on by 
all three commentators, while Davis and Baldwin concur on three more.  In the 
aggregate, the three scholars appear to have identified (but not agreed on) only 
nine or ten colonial business corporations.121
The sole colonial business corporation achieving consensus was the Phila-
delphia Contributionship for the insuring of Houses from Loss by Fire, formed 
in 1752 but first incorporated by the Pennsylvania general assembly in 1768.122
Williston considers the Philadelphia Contributionship the first American busi-
ness corporation and the only one chartered before the Declaration of Independ-
ence.123 Davis calls it the colonial business corporation of the greatest lasting 
significance, noting that it had existed continuously up to Davis’ own time in 
the early 1900s.124 As its name suggests, the company appears to have been a 
115. Id.
116. Id. at 86.
117. DAVIS, Eighteenth Century Business Corporations in the United States, supra note 8, at 
4; DAVIS, Corporations in the American Colonies, supra at 87, 90 (noting that even the demand for 
such charters seems to have been relatively slight); FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 188.
118. Williston, supra note 36, at 165-166. But see, Williston, supra note 36, at 165-66 (de-
scribing five other corporations chartered before 1787).
119. DAVIS, Eighteenth Century Business Corporations in the United States, supra note 8, at 
4-5 (“These [six] comprise the total list of fully American, clearly corporate business associations in 
those English colonies which developed into the United States.”); id. at 24; DAVIS, Corporations in 
the American Colonies, supra note 8 at 85-88.
120. Baldwin, supra note 8, at 452.
121. Regarding nine or ten, see DAVIS, Corporations in the American Colonies, supra note 8 
at 99; DAVIS, Eighteenth Century Business Corporations in the United States, supra note 8, at 4 
(describing but not listing highway corporation); see also Leo E. Strine & Nicholas Walter, 
Originalist or Original: The Difficulties of Reconciling Citizens United with Corporate Law Histo-
ry, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 877, 892-93 n.100 (2016).
122. Williston, History of the Law of Business Corporations Before 1800 II, supra note 118 at 
165; DAVIS, Corporations in the American Colonies, supra note 8, at 88-89; Baldwin, supra note 8,
at 456-57.
123. Williston, supra note 36, at 165; see also Arner, Development of the American Law of 
Corporations to 1832, supra note 8 at 43 (citing Williston).
124. DAVIS, Corporations in the American Colonies, supra note 8, at 88-89.
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kind of mutual fire insurance company, to secure householders against the risk 
of fire; contributors do not appear to have expected any direct return on invested 
capital.125
The New London Society United for Trade and Commerce, incorporated in 
Connecticut in 1732, is described by Davis as “probably” the first American 
business corporation126 and by Baldwin as the first and last “purely trading 
company” chartered in any colony.127 The English Parliament in 1741 extended 
the Bubble Act to the colonies, so that “not even a joint-stock association for 
business purposes of more than six persons, the shares of which were transfera-
ble, could be formed after 1741.”128 The purposes of the New London Society 
were:
. . .for the promoting and carrying on Trade and Commerce to Great Britain and 
His Majesties Islands and Plantations in America, and other of His Majesties Do-
minions, and for encouraging the Fishery, &ca, as well for the common good as 
their own private interests. . .
129
In relatively short order, however, the company’s promoters turned it into a 
“land bank” that issued bills of credit.130 Connecticut authorities apparently 
considered such bills an abuse of the Society’s privileges, and in 1733, the Con-
necticut assembly repealed the act that had created the corporation.131
The other two colonial corporations on which Davis and Baldwin agree 
were the Union Wharf Company in New Haven, chartered in 1760, and the Pro-
prietors of Boston Pier, or the Long Wharf in the Town of Boston in New Eng-
land, chartered in 1772.132 New Haven and Boston had shallow harbors, and at 
a time when water was a primary mode of transport and trade, an adequate 
wharf was essential for a commercial seaport.133 Long wharf companies have 
125. Baldwin, supra note 8, at 456, DAVIS, Corporations in the American Colonies, supra
note 8, at 88-89.
126. DAVIS, Corporations in the American Colonies, supra note 8, at 87, but only if the Free 
Society of Traders is excluded. It is also unclear whether New London Society was actually incor-
porated. See id. at 22-25, 87.
127. Baldwin, supra note 8 at 456; see above on Bubble Act; see also DAVIS, Corporations in 
the American Colonies, supra note 8, at 87.
128. Baldwin, supra note 8, at 456.
129. Cited in DAVIS, Corporations in the American Colonies, supra note 8, at 22 (citation 
omitted). See also id. at 87; DAVIS, Eighteenth Century Business Corporations, supra note 8, at 4.
130. DAVIS, Eighteenth Century Business Corporations, supra note 8, at 24 (citations omit-
ted); Baldwin, supra note 8, at 456.
131. 4 DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF CORPORATIONS supra note 8 at 24 (cita-
tions omitted).
132. 1 DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF CORPORATIONS supra note 8, at 88 (dis-
cussing Union Wharf and Boston Pier); DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF 
CORPORATIONS IV supra note 8, at 4-5; Baldwin, American Business Corporations Before 1789
supra note 8, at 456 (discussing Union Wharf), 457 (discussing Boston Pier).
133. 1 DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF CORPORATIONS, supra note 8, at 87-88; 
Baldwin, American Business Corporations Before 1789, supra note 8, at 456.
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thus been seen as a form of public enterprise.134 The Union Wharf does not ap-
pear to have been a profitable undertaking; up to 1799, at least, it does not ap-
pear ever to have paid a dividend to shareholders.135
The other two corporations listed by Baldwin, but not by Williston or Davis, 
are the New York Company “for Settleing a Fishery in these parts,” chartered in 
New York in 1675,136 and the Free Society of Traders in Philadelphia, chartered 
by Governor William Penn in 1682.137  The objects of the Free Society were 
apparently speculation in land and trade with native and other populations.138
The preface to the Free Society’s articles of settlement describes it as
. . .a very unusual Society, for it is an Absolute Free One, and in a free Country: a 
Society without oppression; wherein all may be concerned that will; and yet have 
the same Liberty of private Traffique, as though there were no Society at all.
139
The Free Society set up a tannery, a gristmill, a sawmill and a glass factory and 
had, among other extraordinary privileges, the right to have three representa-
tives in the provincial assembly.140 The Free Society went out of business in a 
few years, however, and was wound up by the provincial assembly by 1723.141
By Davis’ account, the only other colonial business corporations were ap-
parently water supply companies.142 Davis lists three such “fountain societies”
chartered by the Rhode Island assembly in 1772 and 1773.143 These societies 
built wooden aqueducts to convey fresh water into the towns of Providence and 
East Greenwich, though it is not clear that they intended to furnish water to an-
yone who was not a member, or that they were particularly successful, or that 
their members anticipated any “direct pecuniary profit.”144 Curiously, Davis 
also describes, but elsewhere declines to count, an eighth colonial corporation, 
The Trustees of the Road and Ferries from Newark to the Road Leading from 
134. Baldwin, American Business Corporations Before 1789 supra note 8, at 456.
135. 1 DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF CORPORATIONS, supra note 8, at 88.
136. Baldwin, American Business Corporations Before 1789 supra note 8 at 450, 452.
137. Id. at 453.
138. Id. at 453-54.
139. 1 DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF CORPORATIONS, supra note 8, at 42 (cita-
tion omitted).
140. Baldwin, American Business Corporations Before 1789 supra note 8, at 453.
141. Id. at 455; Davis declines to count the Free Society as an American corporation because 
it was chartered, in his account, by William Penn before he left England and owned chiefly in Eng-
land. See Davis, supra note 8, at 41, 87; Davis, supra note 8, at 4.
142. 1 DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF CORPORATIONS, supra note 8, at 89; but 
see infra text accompanying note 8 on one highway corporation.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 90. A similar company in Conduit Street in Boston was designated a “corporation”
by the Massachusetts General Court in 1652, evidently as another kind of mutual company to pro-
vide water for daily use by members’ families and for protection against fire, but the company 
lacked a corporate name – one of the formal requirements for corporate status – and Davis accord-
ingly declines to recognize it as such. Davis, supra note 8, at 89; DAVIS, supra note 8, at 4; see also
Baldwin, supra note 8, at 451 (who apparently regards it as a “quasi-corporation”).
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Bergen Point to Paulus Hook, a highway company incorporated by the New Jer-
sey assembly in 1765 with the purpose of keeping part of the highway between 
Philadelphia and New York in good condition.145
Most colonial business associations remained partnerships or unincorpo-
rated joint-stock companies.146 Large numbers of such unincorporated associa-
tions existed for a great variety of business purposes, such as fishing and whal-
ing, mining for iron and copper, as so-called “land companies,” and in smaller 
numbers, for manufacture of glass and textiles, banking, insurance, firefighting, 
and erecting bridges, building or repairing roads, and improving navigation of 
small waterways, and other purposes.147 All of these associations probably con-
stituted mere partnerships or tenancies in common under the applicable law.148
Overall, then, alongside the comparative proliferation of municipal, reli-
gious, charitable and educational corporations in the American colonies, there 
appear to have existed fewer than a dozen business corporations.  Their purpos-
es were mutual water supply (three or four); wharfage (two); mutual fire insur-
ance (one); fishing (perhaps one); highways (perhaps one); and trade (one or 
perhaps two).149 The most common purposes thus appear to have involved pub-
lic or quasi-public infrastructure.  With the possible exception of the trading 
companies and a few others, most of these early corporations do not appear to 
have been organized around investor expectations of profits.150 In law and in 
fact, today’s for-profit business corporation was more or less unknown.  No 
classification of the business corporation as a separate type of legal entity had 
been developed.151 Corporations of all sorts were treated alike under the same 
145. 1 DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF CORPORATIONS, supra note 8, at 99. But 
see 4 DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF CORPORATIONS, supra note 8, at 24 (not listing 
any highway corporation). See also 1 DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF CORPORATIONS,
supra note 8, at 48 (describing “more than a dozen corporations” active in the colonies before the 
Revolution, “each of which possessed one or more charters granted in England”).
146. HAMILL, From Special Privilege to General Utility, supra note 8, at 92; HANDLIN &
HANDLIN, supra note 8, at 5; BLAIR, Locking in Capital, supra note 8, at 405, 414; BLAIR, Reform-
ing Corporate Governance, supra note 8, at 9.
147. 1 DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF CORPORATIONS, supra note 8, at 91-98; 4 
DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF CORPORATIONS, supra note 8, at 34 (stating no banks 
of discount and deposit in the colonies).
148. 1 DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF CORPORATIONS, supra note 8, at 91.
149. These corporations were (i) in water supply, the three “fountain societies” in Rhode Is-
land in 1772 and 1773 and perhaps the company set up in Conduit Street in Boston in 1652; (ii) in 
wharfage, the Union Wharf Company in 1760 and the Proprietors of Boston Pier, or the Long 
Wharf in the Town of Boston in New England, in 1772; (iii) in mutual fire insurance, the Philadel-
phia Contributionship for the insuring of Houses from Loss by Fire in 1752; (iv) in fishing, perhaps 
the New York Company “for Settleing a Fishery in these parts” in 1675; (v) in highways, perhaps 
The Trustees of the Road and Ferries from Newark to the Road Leading from Bergen Point to Pau-
lus Hook in 1765; and (vi) in trade, The New London Society United for Trade and Commerce in 
1732 and perhaps the Free Society of Traders in Philadelphia in 1682. See supra text accompanying 
notes 122 to 145.
150. See supra discussion accompanying notes 81 to 125.
151. 4 DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF CORPORATIONS, supra note 8, at 3-4.
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rules, largely without distinction.152 As Davis puts it, “[i]n the eye of the law a 
corporation was a corporation—that was all there was to it.”153
Colonial corporation law was consistent in this respect with English law.  
As previously noted, American courts, jurists, and lawyers relied on available 
English precedents, which involved primarily municipal, charitable, and other 
corporations that were not organized for business or pecuniary purposes.154 The 
extent of the transmission and reception of English corporation law in the colo-
nies, however, remains unclear in several respects.  First, it was not clear that 
English common law, including non-statutory corporation law, applied to the 
colonies.  There was no coherent theory, and the question was never settled by 
English courts, to which, in any event, few colonial appeals were made.155 Sec-
ond, there was no coherent or consistent approach to English law, including 
corporation law, in the colonies, and each colony developed its own legal sys-
tem.156 In different colonies, widely disparate circumstances and attitudes pre-
vailed, and English law was received differently.  English law and English law-
yers were more influential in middle and southern colonies, such as Virginia 
and South Carolina, while the New England colonies, and most significantly 
Massachusetts, tended to go their own way.157 Third, and most importantly, 
much of English corporation law may have been unfamiliar or unavailable.  
English-trained lawyers and judges were few and far between, especially in 
New England.158 Colonial lawyers were almost entirely dependent on materials 
imported from England,159 but no English case reports or treatises were repro-
duced, except for the first American edition of Blackstone’s Commentaries in 
1771-1772,160 and the legal works available appear to have consisted chiefly of 
Coke on Littleton.161 English cases on business corporations decided before 
1800 were therefore probably unknown to American judges and lawyers until 
152. Maier, The Revolutionary Origins of the Business Corporation, supra note 8, at 55 (cita-
tion omitted).
153. 4 DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF CORPORATIONS, supra note 8, at 3-4.
154. But see DODD, supra note 8, at 13, 196; HURST, supra note 8, at 6; See DAVIS, supra
note 8, at 309-10; FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 511.
155. Stoebuck, supra note 78, at 417-418.
156. Id. at 401.
157. See, e.g., id. at 401 (“Massachusetts was always the sulky child, rebellious against all 
things English.”) and 417 (“The New England colonies, of course, were less disposed to pattern 
their affairs upon things English.”).
158. Id. at 413.
159. Id. at 405. The first American legal treatise on corporation law, the Treatise on the Law 
of Private Corporations Aggregate by Joseph K. Angell and Samuel Ames, did not appear until 
1832. See discussion infra accompanying notes 477 to 479.
160. Stoebuck, Reception of English Common Law, supra note 81 at 405.
161. Id. at 406. But see id. at 416 (noting that there may have been far more English law 
books in eighteenth century America than generally supposed).
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long thereafter.162 The first American treatises on corporate law did not appear 
until the 1820s and 1830s.163
In 1780, then, at the inception of the American republic, there was not only 
a paucity of business corporations, but little or no legal precedent, either in Eng-
land or in the colonies, for the business corporation as we know it today.  For 
eighteenth-century American lawyers, jurists and entrepreneurs looking for new 
business tools, there was very little law to borrow. American corporation law 
stood at the beginning.164 In the words of Merrick Dodd, the law of the busi-
ness corporation was as yet an “uncharted sea” through which American legisla-
tors, courts, and lawyers would have to plot their own course, unaided by Eng-
lish precedents.165 American lawyers would need to invent the business 
corporation more or less from scratch.166
III. EARLY AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATIONS 1780-1860
In 1780, the average American in the thirteen former colonies lived and 
worked on a family farm.167 Most Americans were engaged in farming, hunt-
ing, fishing, or seafaring in wind-driven vessels.168 Farms generally aimed at 
self-sufficiency, with any surplus available for barter.169 Towns were few and 
far between; in 1776, in all thirteen colonies, there were fewer than a dozen 
towns with a population greater than five thousand people.170  Transportation 
networks and supply chains were poor. Roads were typically built and main-
tained, if at all, by towns and counties, and were generally bad or nonexist-
ent.171  Commercial trade, including import and export of goods, was largely 
confined to port cities; large-scale transportation of goods overland from the 
162. DODD, supra note 8, at 14, 17, 196.
163. See discussion infra notes 474 to 479.
164. HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION, supra note 8, at 8; Williston, 
History of the Law of Business Corporations Before 1800 II, supra note 118, at 166 (“[N]ot even a 
beginning of this development was made prior to the year 1800.”).
165. DODD, supra note 8, at 196.
166. SEAVOY, ORIGINS, supra note 8, at 46 (“The early commentators on American law ob-
served that the development of American law was almost wholly indigenous, especially in matters 
of corporation creation and contracts. It appears they were correct.”); Wells, Shareholder Power,
supra note 8, at 1040 (citations omitted) (“[T]he American business corporation was, whatever its 
distant ancestry, largely home grown.”) (citation omitted).
167. See generally Blair, Locking in CapitalPublic Service Origins, supra note 8, at 404, n.44 
(citation omitted); Seavoy, Public Service Origins, supra note 8, at 34.
168. DODD, supra note 8, at 6, 7.
169. Hamill, From Special Privilege to General Utility, supra note 8 at 92.
170. Richard D. Brown, The Emergence of Urban Society in Rural Massachusetts, 1760-
1820, 61 J. AM. HIST. 29, 32-33 (1974) (“In Massachusetts, urban society was almost exclusively a 
Boston phenomenon.”).
171. Daniel B. Klein, The Voluntary Provision of Public Goods? The Turnpike Companies of 
Early America, 28 ECON. INQUIRY 788, 789 (1990).
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coast was prohibitively expensive.172  Communication was limited.173  Manu-
facturing was minimal; goods were typically home-produced by artisans in 
small shops or “cottages.”174 “There were no banks, no insurance companies, 
no factories, no canals or railroads, no telegraph lines, no steam-propelled ves-
sels, no gas-lighting, not even a reasonably good road system or bridges across 
the larger rivers.”175 The primary business forms remained the sole proprietor-
ship, partnership, and unincorporated joint-stock company.176 Businesses were 
typically family-owned or closely held, with a small net worth, and identity of 
ownership and control.177 Capital was hard to raise, and small firms, if indeed 
the need ever arose, faced systemic obstacles to scale.
After the Revolution came transformative changes.  Population grew dra-
matically.178 Settlement expanded, large Eastern towns sought improved trade 
routes, and demand for transportation and other infrastructure surged.179 “The 
need for assembling capital for improving inland transportation facilities, for 
supplying cities and towns with water, and for carrying on banking and insur-
ance was one which came to be felt immediately after the close of the Revolu-
tion.”180  Local governments did not generally have the financial or logistical 
wherewithal, nor popular support or historical precedent, to provide such infra-
structure themselves.181 Local tax powers and revenues were severely limited, 
172. Hamill, supra note 8, at 92 (explaining that the undeveloped transportation system made 
hauls beyond 30 or 40 miles more expensive than the goods).
173. Brown, supra note 170, at 43 (noting that in 1760, in all of Massachusetts, for example, 
there were nine print shops and five newspapers, virtually all in Boston).
174. See Hamill, supra note 8, at 92; Brown, supra note 170, at 44; Blair, Reforming Corpo-
rate Governance, supra note 8, at 9.
175. DODD, supra note 8, at 7.
176. See supra note 146.
177. Blair, Locking in Capital, supra note 8, at 404 n.44 (“[U]ntil well after 1840, ‘the family 
remained the basic business unit.’”) (quoting ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE 
MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS, at 16).
178. DODD, supra note 8, at 123 (stating that the population grew from 12,866,020 in 1830 to
31,443,321 in 1860); Brown, supra note 170, at 32 (noting that the population in the American col-
onies grew ninefold from 1776 to 1850); Donald J. Smythe, Shareholder Democracy and the Eco-
nomic Purpose of the Corporation, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1407, 1416 (2006) (stating that the 
population of New York tripled from 1790 to 1820).
179. FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 182 (“[T]he great bulk of farmer-settlers had a desperate 
hunger for transport: bridges, ferries, canals, turnpikes and later railroads. These were necessary to 
carry their goods to market, to bring settlers to their region, to stimulate business, and to raise the 
overall value of their lands.”); KLEIN, supra note 171, at 789; Smythe, supra note 178, at 1416; see 
also 2 DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF CORPORATIONS, supra note 8, at 7 (noting the 
influx of new capital from war, labor from the disbanded colonial army, and a new spirit of enter-
prise and experimentation).
180. DODD, supra note 8, at 367. See also id. at 196; FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 188 (“The 
economy had an unquenchable thirst for infrastructure.”); 2 DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER 
HISTORY OF CORPORATIONS, supra note 8, at 6.
181. FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 185 (“Two pillars of the modern state were missing: a strong 
tax base and a trained civil service.”); Hansmann & Pargendler, supra note 8, at 110; Smythe, supra
note 178, at 1416.
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generally consisting only of property and excise taxes, and municipalities had 
few if any administrative personnel.182 Public infrastructure projects were 
widely opposed for fear of tax increases.183 State and local governments in the 
former colonies thus faced a dilemma.  Public infrastructure—particularly 
transportation—was urgently needed, but without significant revenues, people, 
or expertise, how could public authorities finance, build, and maintain it?
The answer was the business corporation.  After the Revolution, state legis-
latures had assumed the authority to charter corporations.184 Beginning at the 
end of the eighteenth century, state legislatures across the colonies, but particu-
larly in New England and the Middle Atlantic states, began to use state law ag-
gressively to promote economic development by granting corporate charters to 
groups that would finance and manage publicly beneficial transportation and 
other infrastructure projects on their own.185  Such projects typically required 
the ability to aggregate capital, often from a large number of small sources, giv-
en the comparative absence of large fortunes in the colonies,186 in an entity with 
potentially indefinite life.  Unlike the partnership or unincorporated joint-stock 
company, the corporation was ideally suited for this role.187 As an alternative to 
public financing and construction, states increasingly enlisted or encouraged 
corporations—“internal improvement companies”—to perform this function.188
State legislatures often delegated state powers and immunities to such compa-
nies, thus promoting the “volunteer muster” of both capital and managerial tal-
ent at a time when such capital and talent were scarce and the state’s taxing and 
182. FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 185 (stating that state governments depended primarily on 
property taxes supplemented by excise taxes).
183. Smythe, supra note 178, at 1416.
184. Maier, supra note 8, at 51; 4 DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF 
CORPORATIONS, supra note 8, at 8. See supra discussion accompanying notes 22 to 25 regarding 
charters from Crown or Parliament. See also 4 DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF 
CORPORATIONS, supra note 8, at 6.
185. Handlin & Handlin, supra note 8, at 22; HORWITZ, supra note 8, at 109; SEAVOY,
ORIGINS, supra note 8, at 256-57; Hansmann & Pargendler, supra note 8, at 974; Hilt, Corporate 
Governance, supra note 8, at 77; Hilt & Valentine, Democratic Dividends, supra note 8, at 34; Sylla 
& Wright, supra note 8, at 656 (noting that by 1830, New England had only 43% of the nation’s
population but 76% of the corporations created after 1789). See generally John Joseph Wallis, Con-
stitutions, Corporations and Corruption: American States and Constitutional Change, 1842 to 
1852, 65 J. ECON. HIST. 211 (2005).
186. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836-1937, at 24 (1991); 
Maier, supra note 8, at 75.
187. See Hamill, From Special Privilege to General Utility, supra note 8, at 93-94; Maier, 
supra note 8, at 58 (observing that the need to assemble capital from a large number of relatively 
small investors and put it under “firm central direction” has long been accepted as the practical im-
perative that alone can explain triumph of business corporations in the United States (citation omit-
ted) and at 73; HURST, supra note 8, at 25-26; but accord WELLS, supra note 8, at 1042 (citing 
Blair, Locking in Capital, supra note 8). See also KENT, supra note 202, at 219.
188. SEAVOY, ORIGINS, supra note 8, at 50; see also Hilt, Early American Corporations, su-
pra note 8, at 52.
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other powers were insufficient to obtain them.189 Delegated powers and im-
munities were often substantial, including (particularly in the early years) mo-
nopoly rights, eminent domain, power to charge tolls, and immunity from taxa-
tion and civil actions for nuisance.190
Two early commentators on American corporation law, Joseph K. Angell 
and Samuel Ames in their Treatise on the Law of Private Corporations Aggre-
gate, first published in 1832, described this state arrangement with turnpikes,
bridges, canals and railroads as a straightforward “quid pro quo”:
The latter kind [of corporations] have a concern with some of the expensive duties 
of the State, the trouble and charge of which are undertaken and defrayed by them 
in consideration of a certain emolument allowed to their members; and in cases of 
this sort there are the most unquestionable features of a contract, and manifestly a 
quid pro quo.191
The delegation of such powers, and the effective deputizing of business corpo-
rations to serve public or governmental purposes, were not radically new—one 
might recall the colonial water supply corporations in Boston and Rhode Is-
land,192 or even the earlier East India Company and other joint-stock companies 
chartered to advance mercantile policies of the English state in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries—but the scope and scale of new public needs in the 
United States after 1780, and state legislatures’ efforts to charter new business 
corporations to meet them, were unprecedented.
American state legislatures in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centu-
ry proceeded to charter more business corporations than the world had ever 
known.193 According to Davis, the newly independent states chartered three 
hundred twenty-eight new business corporations in the twenty-five years be-
tween 1776 and 1801.194 Massachusetts alone, notes Dodd, chartered over eight 
189. HURST, supra note 8, at 23, 24; HORWITZ, supra note 8, at 116 (on immunities); 
FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 179; Smythe, supra note 178, at 1416; see also Maier, supra note 8, at 
55; Hansmann & Pargendler, supra note 8, at 103.
190. DODD, supra note 8, at 132, 170; 4 DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF 
CORPORATIONS, supra note 8, at 283 (with respect to manufacturers); HOVENKAMP, supra note 186, 
at 22.
191. ANGELL & AMES, supra note 62, at 33. See also NOVAK, supra note 8, at 105 (“The right 
of incorporation as practiced in early America was a special gift (accompanied by special privileg-
es) bestowed by the polity upon select associations as quid pro quo for the performance of special 
duties and obligations.”).
192. See discussion supra accompanying notes 142 to 144.
193. Hilt & Valentine, supra note 8, at 2; Blair, supra note 8, at 8 (“By 1890, there were near-
ly 500,000 chartered business corporations in the United States, far more than in any other coun-
try.”); Maier, supra note 8, at 51-52 (stating that charters in the United States were recognized by 
1830 to be “more frequent . . . than in any other country.”); Sylla & Wright, supra note 8, at 661 
(stating that by 1860, the top five or six U.S. states together appear to have created more corpora-
tions than any of France, the United Kingdom or Prussia).
194. 4 DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF CORPORATIONS, supra note 8, at 22-24.
Cf. Handlin & Handlin, supra note 8, at 4.
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hundred business companies by 1830.195 Similarly, between 1790 and 1825, 
New York chartered more than eight hundred new business corporations.196
Overall, as tabulated by Sylla and Wright, the number of new charters rose from 
the colonial handful to twenty or thirty in the 1780s; two hundred forty-seven in 
the 1790s; seven hundred seventy-nine from 1800 to 1809; more than fifteen 
hundred from 1810 to 1819; and a total of more than twenty-two thousand in 
the period from 1790 to 1860.197
By 1827, James Kent, New York’s Chancellor, was drawn to observe in his 
Commentaries on American Law that civil corporations in the United States 
“have increased in a rapid manner, and to a most astonishing extent.”198 Corpo-
rate charters
. . .occupy by far the largest volumes of the statute law. The demand for acts of in-
corporation is continually increasing, and the propensity is the more striking, as it 
appears to be incurable; and we seem to have no moral means to resist it.
199
Much of this demand was in New England and the Middle Atlantic states; in 
1830, these two regions accounted for forty-three percent of the nation’s popu-
lation but seventy-six percent of the number of corporations chartered since 
1789.200 A majority of the new corporations—more than half in all regions ex-
cept New England, presumably due to its smaller geographic size—were trans-
portation companies, including primarily turnpikes, bridges, and canals.201
Banks, insurance companies, and other financial enterprises were also incorpo-
rated in significant numbers.202
These new transportation and financial ventures were “business corpora-
tions” in the sense that they were privately owned, financed, and managed, for 
the most part without significant state involvement,203 and their shareholders 
195. DODD, supra note 8, at 271.
196. Hilt, Ownership and Control, supra note 8, at 10; Hilt, Early American Corporations,
supra note 8, at 48 (“By 1830, New York alone had incorporated more than a thousand business-
es.”).
197. Sylla & Wright, supra note 8, at 653-54; cf. Wells, Shareholder Power, supra note 8, at 
1041.
198. 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 219 (O. Halstead, 1827).
199. Id. at 220.
200. Sylla & Wright, supra note 8, at 656; see also Handlin & Handlin, supra note 8, at 7.
201. Sylla & Wright, supra note 8, at 656 (on majority in transportation except New Eng-
land), 661 (on breakdown); DODD, supra note 8, at 349 (stating that turnpikes, toll bridges and ca-
nals together accounted for more than half of the corporations chartered in Massachusetts before 
1800); see also 4 DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF CORPORATIONS, supra note 8, at 22-
23. State legislatures did not begin to charter railroads until the 1820s. See infra discussion accom-
panying notes 286 to 291.
202. See Sylla & Wright, supra note 8, at 661; see also 4 DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER 
HISTORY OF CORPORATIONS, supra note 8, at 22-23; Hamill, supra note 8, at 93 (citations omitted).
203. On direct state investments in internal improvement companies, see DODD, supra note 8, 
at 271 (contrasting states such as Pennsylvania and Virginia with Massachusetts). Cf. Hilt, supra
note 8, at 80 (claiming that “much of the early investment was either purely public or a combination 
of public and private funds.”) (citation omitted).
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typically expected some kind of return on their investment.  As will be seen be-
low, that return was less likely to be any kind of profit on their shares, but rather 
an indirect benefit to their farms or trading operations, land values, and cost of 
goods.204 Nonetheless, that the purposes of these new business corporations—
particularly the internal improvement companies—were inherently “public” was 
universally understood.205
Three important points should be noted.  First, the new American business 
corporations were no different in this respect from their colonial American and 
English predecessors; virtually all corporations up to that time had been deemed 
to have a public purpose.  What was novel was not the concept that the corpora-
tion had a public purpose, but the growth of the business corporation into that 
concept in the decades after the Revolution.  The business corporation was new; 
the notion of public corporate purpose was not.  Second, while it may be tempt-
ing to describe the purposes of these early business corporations as “private,” in 
that they were not appendages of the state, the distinction between public and 
private purposes in corporation law did not become broadly meaningful until
204. See infra discussion accompanying notes 239 to 340.
205. See, e.g., Maier, supra note 8, at 55 (“Nowhere were corporations more alike than in the 
requirement, based on English precedent, that they serve a public purpose, which the acts of incor-
poration often specified . . . . Everywhere, in fact, corporations were considered ‘agencies of gov-
ernment . . . for the furtherance of community purposes.’”) (citation omitted) HURST, supra note 8, 
at 15 (“[A]lmost all of the business enterprises incorporated here in the formative generation start-
ing in the 1780s were chartered for activities of some community interest – supplying transport, 
water, insurance, or banking facilities.”); FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 182 (noting that states freely 
lent the power of eminent domain to businesses that served “public” purposes such as canal or turn-
pike companies); SEAVOY, ORIGINS, supra note 8, at 50 (“In the beginning, almost all business cor-
porations had some degree of franchise relationship to the state, or performed services or made 
products that New York wished to encourage as a means of making the state and nation economical-
ly self-sufficient.”); Blair, Locking in Capital, supra note 8, at 428 (“[M]any of these businesses 
might more appropriately be regarded as public works projects, which the states did not want to 
have to use their taxing authority to finance.”); Hamill, supra note 8, at 92, 96 (stating that corpora-
tions, other than those organized strictly for public purposes, were extremely rare); Handlin & Han-
dlin, supra note 8, at 22 (characterizing the corporation as an agency of government, designed to 
serve social function for state); Wells, Close Corporation, supra note 8, at 278 (noting that most 
early corporations performed public functions and provided some kind of public service); David 
Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 207 (1990) (stating that through the mid-
nineteenth century, early corporations were assumed to pursue some public function); D. Gordon 
Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 291 (1998) (“Even the chartering of 
general business corporations, however, was justified on the grounds that these corporations served 
the public interest.”); Smythe, supra note 178, at 1416 (“Profits were not the real objective [of fran-
chise corporations]; the real objective was to provide a public good.”); Liam Séamus O’Melinn, 
Neither Contract Nor Concession: The Public Personality of the Corporation, 74 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 201, 231  (2006) (“Even formal incorporation was justified on the basis of public benefit, and 
the corporation could be seen as a species of state aid intended to benefit manufacturing, worship, 
agriculture, and political endeavor.”). See also Novak, PEOPLE’S WARFARE, supra note 8, at 9 (cit-
ing 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 265 (1826) for the proposition that 
“[p]rivate interest must be made subservient to the general interest of the community.”); DODD, su-
pra note 8, at 158 (noting the tendency of judges even after 1830 to refer to privately owned trans-
portation projects such as turnpikes, toll-bridges, canals and railroads as “public highways”).
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the middle decades of the nineteenth century and was one of the defining char-
acteristics, if not the defining characteristic, of the ensuing transition of the ear-
ly American business corporation to the modern for-profit firm.206  In discus-
sions of late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century American corporation 
law, the term “private” is an anachronism.  Third, as the foregoing suggests, the 
concept of public corporate purpose as used in the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries was not exclusive and did not prevent business corpora-
tions—their public purpose notwithstanding—from being understood to provide 
a pecuniary return or other personal, non-public benefit to their owners.207 The 
absence of any bright line between “public” and “private” purposes—in today’s 
parlance, between nonprofit or charitable purposes and private pecuniary prof-
it—was as typical of the early American business corporation as of its predeces-
sors.208
Early courts and commentators made this understanding clear.  In 1805, in 
Trustees of the University of North Carolina v. Foy, a North Carolina court, in 
examining “the nature of corporations,” declared that corporations were formed 
“for the advancement of religion, learning, commerce, or other beneficial pur-
poses.”209
Indeed, it seems difficult to conceive of a corporation established for merely pri-
vate purposes. In every institution of that kind, the ground of the establishment is 
some public good or purpose to be promoted; but in many, the members thereof 
have a private interest, coupled with the public object.
210
The same understanding was voiced more emphatically by the Virginia Su-
preme Court of Appeals in Currie’s Administrators v. The Mutual Assurance 
Society in 1809:
With respect to acts of incorporation, they ought never to be passed, but in consid-
eration of services rendered to the public. . . . It may often be convenient for a set of 
associated individuals, to have the privileges of a corporation bestowed upon them, 
but if their object is merely private or selfish; if it is detrimental to, or not promo-
206. See supra note 9; infra discussion accompanying notes 422 to 502. Discussion of the 
concession, contract, aggregate entity, artificial entity, real entity, and other theories of the corpora-
tion is beyond the scope of this Article. See generally Mahoney, supra note 42; Liam Séamus 
O’Melinn, supra note 205; see Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Cyclical Transformation of the Corpo-
rate Form: A Historical Perspective on Corporate Social Responsibility, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 767 
(2005).
207. See Maier, supra note 8, at 56, 82.
208. See, e.g., Handlin & Handlin, supra note 8, at 19 (“Neither the division into public and 
private laws nor the distinction between public and private corporations was accepted by eighteen-
century law.”). See also DAVIS, supra note 8, at 3-4 (“[i]n the eye of the law, a corporation was a 
corporation – that was all there was to it.”); Larry D. Thompson, The Responsible Corporation: Its 
Historical Roots and Continuing Promise, 29 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 199, 208 
(2015) (“American law in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries did not draw sharp distinctions 
between the corporation and the state.”).
209. Trustees of the Univ. of N.C. v. Foy, 1 Mur. 58, 84 (1805).
210. Id. at 88-89.
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tive of, the public good, they have no adequate claim upon the legislature for the 
privileges.
211
Even ten years later, in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, which has 
been seen as the origin of the public/private distinction in American corporation 
law,212 Chief Justice John Marshall, writing for the U.S. Supreme Court, ex-
pressed a fundamentally similar view of the public purposes of corporations:
The objects for which a corporation is created are universally such as the govern-
ment wishes to promote. They are deemed beneficial to the country; and this bene-
fit constitutes the consideration, and in most cases, the sole consideration of the 
grant. . .If the advantages to the public constitute a full compensation for the facul-
ty it gives, there can be no reason for exacting a further compensation, by claiming 
a right to exercise over this artificial being, a power which changes its nature, and 
touches the fund, for the security and application of which it was created.
213
In the case of Dartmouth College, in other words, it was not the college’s pur-
pose, but the nature of its assets, which had been endowed and funded by pri-
vate persons,214 that made Dartmouth a “private” corporation, notwithstanding 
it being “an Indian charity school.”215 A public purpose remained coupled with 
a private interest—eleemosynary rather than pecuniary, but “private” nonethe-
less—and the Supreme Court was tasked for the first time with drawing a line 
between the two.  It should be noted, however, that the line the Court drew was 
effectively only around municipal corporations.  In the corporate taxonomy of 
the day, all the other types of lay corporations, whether eleemosynary or civil, 
with what we today would consider their various disparate purposes—
charitable, educational, and professional as well as business—remained com-
prehended, without further distinction, in the same “private” category.216
211. Currie’s Adm’r. V. Mut. Assurance Soc’y., 4 Hen. & M. 315, 347-348 (Va. 1809) (em-
phasis in original); see also HORWITZ, supra note 8, at 112.
212. See, e.g., NOVAK, supra note 8, at 107 (“The classical liberal story begins with the 
Dartmouth College case which initiated the great transformation of the business corporation from 
public into private entity.”); R. Kent Newmyer, Justice Joseph Story’s Doctrine of Public and Pri-
vate Corporations and the Rise of the American Business Corporation, 25 DEPAUL L. REV. 825, 836 
(1975-1976) (“the Dartmouth College decision played a crucial role in the transformation of the 
corporation from an association of individuals vested with a portion of sovereignty designed to ac-
complish public service to an association whose corporate status was a promotional device em-
ployed by the state to facilitate the pursuit of private goals by private individuals.”) See also Terrett 
v. Taylor, 9 Cranch 43, 51-52 (1815) (Story, J.) (distinguishing private and public corporations). On 
the public/private distinction generally, see Morton J. Horwitz, The History of the Public/Private 
Distinction, 130 U. PENN. L. REV. 1423 (1982) [hereinafter Horwitz, Public/Private Distinction].
With regard to the historiography of the public/private distinction, see Joan Williams, The Devel-
opment of the Public/Private Distinction in American Law, 64 TEX. L. REV. 225 (1985). See also 
infra discussion accompanying notes 450 to 458.
213. Trustees of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 637-638 (1819).
214. Id. at 661.
215. Id. at 520. See also Maier, supra note 8, at 80 (referencing Story’s concurring opinion 
for this proposition).
216. D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 292 (1998).
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The understanding that corporations, including business corporations, nec-
essarily had a public purpose survived at least into the 1830s.217  Angell and 
Ames in 1832 describe this understanding as policy and custom, perhaps not 
surprisingly, citing both Currie’s Administrators and Dartmouth College:
. . .it has generally been the policy and custom (especially in the United States) to 
incorporate all associations which tend to the public advantage in relation to munic-
ipal government, commerce, literature, charity, and religion. . . . The public benefit 
is deemed a sufficient consideration of a grant of corporate privileges; and hence, 
when a grant of such privileges is made (being in the nature of an executed con-
tract), it cannot, in case of a private corporation, which involves private rights, be 
revoked. [citing Dartmouth College]. . . . the corporation may, at the same time, be 
established for the advantage of those who are members of it. The principle 
is. . .that the design of the corporation is to provide for some good that is useful to 
the public. “With respect to acts of incorporation,” says one of the judges of the 
Court of Appeals of Virginia [sic], “they ought never be passed, but in considera-
tion of services to be rendered to the public.” [citing Currie’s Admin.]218
This understanding of the corporation as a body with a public purpose, but 
which at the same time provided direct pecuniary or other indirect benefits to its 
members, arguably defines the internal improvement companies and other busi-
ness corporations of the early American era.
A. Transportation.
Transportation companies, comprising turnpikes, toll-bridges and inland 
navigation enterprises, were the most common early business corporations, ac-
counting for nearly two-thirds of all special charters in the period from 1780 to 
1801.219 Organization required a special charter enacted by the state legislature, 
in which the corporation’s purpose—often down to the specific route of the 
turnpike or canal—was set forth in detail.220 Changes in corporate purpose re-
quired a corresponding legislative act.
1.  Turnpikes.
The turnpike corporation was the most common and perhaps the most typi-
cal of the internal improvement companies.  Of all the public infrastructure 
needs after the Revolution, improved overland transport was the greatest.221 In 
some regions, the cost of transporting goods overland for even relatively short 
217. Maier, supra note 8, at 80.
218. ANGELL & AMES, supra note 62, at 6-7; but see id. at 25 (where this understanding 
seems to be weakening significantly); see also Arner, supra note 8, at 53; and see infra discussion 
accompanying notes 443 to 479.
219. HURST, supra note 8, at 17.
220. Hilt, Early American Corporations, supra note 8, at 51; DODD, supra note 8, at 327 
(stating that the Massachusetts act of 1833 required every charter petition in Massachusetts.
221. SEAVOY, ORIGINS, supra note 8, at 41.
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distances exceeded the cost of the goods.222 Turnpikes were perhaps the most 
common form of American business corporation and represented a substantial 
portion, in some states even a majority, of new corporate charters in the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.223 According to Davis, turnpikes 
overall accounted for seventy-two of a total of three hundred twenty-eight, or 
twenty-two percent of, new corporations chartered between 1776 and 1801.224
In New York and Connecticut, approximately half of the corporations chartered 
in the eighteenth century were turnpikes.225 The consequences were dramatic; 
the turnpike “movement built new roads at a rate previously unheard of in 
America.”226
The nation’s first turnpike was chartered in Pennsylvania in 1792 between 
Philadelphia and Lancaster.227 Massachusetts and New York quickly followed 
suit, chartering their first turnpikes in 1796 and 1797, respectively.228 As with 
other corporations of the time, turnpike charters required a special act of the 
state legislature.229 In an era of local trade rivalries, state legislatures used turn-
pikes primarily to extend the trading radius of existing towns.230 State legisla-
tures often wrote detailed regulations into turnpike charters, including not only 
such common provisions as limitations on capital, limited duration, and re-
strictions on voting,231 but precise delineation of the turnpike route, grants of 
222. Hamill, supra note 8, at 92 (explaining that the undeveloped transportation system made 
hauls beyond 30 or 40 miles more expensive than the goods) (citation omitted).
223. SEAVOY, ORIGINS, supra note 8, at 50 (citing DAVIS, supra note 8, at 24-25); Hansmann 
& Pargendler, supra note 8, at 959 (citations omitted); Hilt, Ownership and Control, supra note 8, at 
16, Tbl.2.
224. DAVIS, supra note 8, at 26, tbl.II; cf. Id. at 27, tbl.III (showing total of 317 corporations 
in the eighteenth century); DAVIS, supra note 8, at 27, tbl.III (on 23 turnpikes out of 45 new corpo-
rations in CT). See also SEAVOY, ORIGINS, supra note 8, at 39-40 (stating that turnpikes were the 
most frequently incorporated business in New York for the first fifty years of the nineteenth centu-
ry, with about 500 charters passed between 1797 and 1847); Seavoy, Public Service Origins, supra
note 8, at 45; Sylla & Wright, supra note 8, at 661, tbl. 4 (showing 4831 road corporations, or about 
22 percent, of the total number of business corporations chartered between 1790 and 1860); Hilt, 
Ownership and Control, supra note 8, at 16, Tbl. 2 (showing 304 turnpikes of 812 charters granted 
in New York from 1790 to 1825).
225. DAVIS, supra note 8, at 27.
226. Klein, supra note 171, at 797.
227. Id. at 790; DAVIS, supra note 8, at 218.
228. DODD, supra note 8, at 242 (regarding Massachusetts); Seavoy, Public Service Origins,
supra note 8, at 45 (regarding New York).
229. Some states, such as Massachusetts in 1805 and New York in 1807, where legislators 
were seen to be spending too much time on special charters, passed general regulatory statutes ap-
plying many of these provisions to all turnpike corporations, which continued to be specially char-
tered through a short-form act. See, e.g., Seavoy, Public Service Origins, supra note 8, at 46 (New 
York).
230. SEAVOY, ORIGINS, supra note 8, at 40; Seavoy, Public Service Origins, supra note 8, at 
45; see also Klein, supra note 171, at 790.
231. Hilt, supra note 8, at 6; Millon, supra note 209, at 208. On voting restrictions, see infra
discussion accompanying notes 392 to 408.
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existing trails or public roadbeds, specifics of toll rates, collection, and divi-
dends, and details of construction.232
Privileges granted to turnpike corporations reflected the extent to which 
their purposes were understood to be public.  Such privileges typically included 
the power of eminent domain, with the right to appraise and take land, and 
sometimes monopoly rights against parallel or competing routes.233 States 
sometimes granted immunity from taxation.234 Not infrequently, turnpike and 
other charters provided for subscription by states, counties, and cities to shares 
of the corporation.235 Turnpike charters also frequently included some kind of 
provision for the turnpike reverting to the state, for example after the organizers 
had received their costs plus a specified rate of interest, or after expiration of a 
certain period of time.236 Many turnpikes ultimately reverted to the state 
through abandonment.237 More generally, turnpikes were done in by the com-
petition of the railroads.238
Turnpike shares were almost invariably owned locally.239 The vast majority 
of stockholders in turnpike corporations were local farmers, landowners, and 
merchants along the route of the turnpike.240 At a time when large fortunes 
were scarce, capital markets poorly developed, and government financing gen-
erally not available, local residents may well have been “the most effective 
source of capital.”241 More fundamentally, however, local farmers, landowners, 
and merchants appear to have invested in turnpike corporations to procure for 
themselves the larger indirect benefits of living along a turnpike route, without 
regard to direct return on capital.  As a financial investment, turnpikes were no-
torious money-losers. The “nearly universal and well-documented poverty of 
the turnpikes” has been noted by commentators242 and appears to have been 
232. On turnpike charters generally, see generally DAVIS, supra note 8, at 227-30; Klein, su-
pra note 171, at 790; Seavoy, Public Service Origins, supra note 8 at 40-41; DODD, supra note 8, at 
242, 327; Hilt, supra note 8, at 6.
233. DAVIS, supra note 8, at 227-230; DODD, supra note 8, at 44, 128, 242; Klein, supra note 
171, at 790; Millon, supra note 209, at 208; Seavoy, Public Service Origins, supra note 8, at 40-41; 
Hilt, supra note 8, at 6.
234. DODD, supra note 8, at 132.
235. DODD, supra note 8, at 162, 271; FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 192.
236. DODD, supra note 8, at 245.
237. Klein, supra note 171, at 793; DODD, supra note 8, at 246-47.
238. DODD, supra note 8, at 246.
239. Klein, supra note 171, at 789.
240. See id. at 796; Smythe, supra note 178, at 1417; Hansmann & Pargendler, supra note 8, 
at 112-13.
241. Hansmann & Pargendler, supra note 8, at 103. See also supra discussion accompanying 
notes 184 to 192 regarding the state’s use of the business corporation for this purpose.
242. DODD, supra note 8, at 246; Hansmann & Pargendler, supra note 8, at 960-61; Klein, 
supra note 171, at 791, 794, 796-797; Seavoy, Public Service Origins, supra note 8, at 45-46; see 
also Hansmann & Pargendler, supra note 8, at 960 (“[T]urnpikes were the industry in which the 
interests of shareholders in the firm’s output (the road), rather than in the firm’s profits, were most 
conspicuous.”).
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widely recognized at the time.243 “Turnpikes rarely paid dividends to their in-
vestors, and were not expected to.”244  Turnpike corporation shares were low 
par value and widely held, and many turnpike stockholders made no cash in-
vestment in the corporation; rather, local farmers frequently received their 
shares in exchange for contributions in kind, in the form of labor and equipment 
to help build the turnpike in the first place.245 As Ronald Seavoy notes,
Turnpikes were popular investments, not necessarily because they were expected to 
be profitable but because they raised local land values, improved a community’s
access to markets, and lowered the cost of goods that had to be teamed in.
246
What turnpike investors expected from their contribution was effectively a re-
turn in kind: not company earnings, capital gains, or other pecuniary return to 
shareholders on invested capital, but rather, economic benefits that would inure 
to them indirectly, outside the corporation, in their capacity as members of the 
community served by the turnpike.  As put by Henry Hansmann and Mariana 
Pargendler, “turnpikes were the industry in which the interests of shareholders 
in the firm’s output (the road), rather than in the firm’s profits, were most con-
spicuous.”247 Local residents may also have had a strong investment incentive 
as consumers; by controlling turnpike companies and ensuring that they charged 
competitive tolls, turnpike users may have protected themselves from price ex-
ploitation.248 Turnpike corporations in this respect have been seen to resemble 
a consumer cooperative.249
The paramount importance of the turnpike corporation’s indirect—one is 
tempted to say, social—benefits is widely attested in writings of the time.  One 
essayist from New York in 1795 proclaims that the turnpike “lays open all the 
unexploited resources of the country to come forth to daylight, and to mar-
ket.”250 Another in 1807 avers that turnpikes “encourage settlements, open new 
243. See, e.g., Essex Tpk. Corp. v. Collins, 8 Mass. 292, 296 (1811) (“It is well known that in 
this country enterprises of this description have not been productive of profit to those who have en-
gaged in them; nor is this generally a primary object of consideration with the subscribers. They are 
well aware that the community is benefited by them and they agree to take a share of the burden.”); 
see also DODD, supra note 8, at 79 n. 27 (citing Essex Tpk. Corp.); DODD, supra note 8, at 247 (cit-
ing counsel in Franklin Glass Co. v. White, 14 Mass. 286, 287 (1817), stating that a turnpike is “an 
affair or public concern and public convenience, seldom entered upon or prosecuted for the sake of 
the profits contemplated to arise to the undertakers.”).
244. Hansmann & Pargendler, supra note 8, at 113 (citing Essex Tpk. Corp., 8 Mass. at 297);
see also Blair, supra note 8, at n. 158, citing DODD, supra note 8, at 79, n.27, on Essex Tpk. Corp.
245. SEAVOY, ORIGINS, supra note 8, at 41; Seavoy, Public Service Origins, supra note 8, at 
45.
246. SEAVOY, ORIGINS supra note 8, at 41; Seavoy, Public Service Origins, supra note 8, at 
45; Hansmann & Pargendler, supra note 8, at 113 (citing SEAVOY, ORIGINS, supra note 8, at 41); 
Klein, supra note 171, at 789, 795-797.
247. Hansmann & Pargendler, supra note 8, at 112.
248. Id. at 103, 115 (in connection with voting restrictions).
249. Id. at 103.
250. Klein, supra note 171, at 795 (citing Elkanah Watson [A Friend to Turnpikes], Turnpike 
Roads, in ALBANY GAZETTE, Dec. 27, 1795 reprinted in ALBANY REG., June 13, 1796, at 2).
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channels for the transportation of produce and merchandise, increase the prod-
ucts of agriculture, and facilitate every species of internal commerce.”251  An 
1811 tract from Pennsylvania praises turnpike investment for “enabling you to 
carry your produce and manufactures to every market; and in raising the value 
of your woods as well as your cleared lands.”252 The importance of such bene-
fits was recognized by contemporary courts.  A Massachusetts court in 1811 al-
lowed a subscriber in a turnpike corporation to renege on his subscription be-
cause the legislature had subsequently changed the turnpike’s route.253 The 
subscriber’s counsel argued successfully in his client’s defense that his client
. . .never consented to become a proprietor in the turnpike, as it was in fact located 
and made. He was induced to subscribe originally, on account of the particular 
convenience to him of the turnpike as originally directed. He would perceive no 
such convenience in the other route. He would never have subscribed to aid the lat-
ter. . . .
254
Counsel for another defendant subscriber in Pennsylvania in 1831, though not 
successful in his defense, made the point even more clearly:
It was not at all contemplated that the profits of the road would compensate the in-
dividuals for their money subscribed; it was the facilities and benefits that would 
result to their property; and it was upon this consideration that [defendant] entered 
into the agreement to pay.
255
In short, far from being renters of capital, purchasers of shares in turnpike cor-
porations saw themselves as paying for public road benefits,256 or perhaps even, 
in the words of Hansmann and Pargendler, making a “voluntary payment of 
taxes toward a public good.”257
2. Bridges.
Bridges were another category of transportation infrastructure that was sore-
ly needed after Independence.  In the last decades of the eighteenth century, 
251. Id. at 795-96 (citing Benjamin Dewitt, A Sketch of the Turnpike Roads in the State of 
New York, reprinted in THE NEW AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, VOL. 1 at 215-18 (1972)).
252. Id. at 796 (citing WILLIAM J. DUANE, LETTERS ADDRESSED TO THE PEOPLE OF 
PENNSYLVANIA RESPECTING THE INTERNAL IMPROVEMENT OF THE COMMONWEALTH BY MEANS 
OF ROADS AND CANALS 5 (Jane Aitken, 1811)).
253. See Hansmann & Pargendler, supra note 8, at 962 (citing Middlesex Tpk. Corp., 8 Mass 
267 (1811)).
254. Hansmann & Pargendler, supra note 8, at 114 (citing Middlesex Tpk. Corp., 8 Mass at 
270-71).
255. Hansmann & Pargendler, supra note 8, at 114 (citing Irvin v. Susequehanna & Phillips-
burg Tpk. Corp., 2 Pen. & W. 466, 469 (Pa. 1831); see also DODD, supra note 8, at 247 (citing 
Franklin Glass Co. v. White, 14 Mass. 286, 287); DODD, supra note 8, at 133.
256. Klein, supra note 171, at 789, 796-797 (citation omitted).
257. Hansmann & Pargendler, supra note 8, at 113. English turnpike companies were non-
profit corporations that sold bonds and kept tolls high enough to pay the interest; English turnpikes 
were thus effectively profit-making ventures in nonprofit form, while American turnpikes were es-
sentially nonprofit ventures in profit-making form. Id. at 115, n. 47.
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seventy-three toll bridges were chartered, of which fifty-six were in New Eng-
land and eleven in the Middle Atlantic states.258 In New York, of a total of 
eight hundred and twelve business corporations chartered between 1790 and 
1826, eighty-six, or about eleven percent, were bridge companies.259 Overall, 
according to Sylla and Wright, nearly fourteen hundred bridge companies were 
chartered between 1790 and 1860.260 The greatest number of such corporations 
were created between 1800 and 1820.261
Although privately owned, early bridge corporations show the same pattern 
as the turnpikes of public purposes and public benefits.  Bridge company char-
ters often included grants of state or quasi-state powers.  A number of early 
bridge companies were expressly given monopoly privileges.262 In Piscataqua 
Bridge v. New-Hampshire Bridge, decided in 1834, a New Hampshire court up-
held such monopoly privileges on the grounds that the bridge was “a great pub-
lic highway” and “of great public utility.”263 Courts similarly sustained grants 
of eminent domain.264 Other charter provisions commonly specified toll rates, 
the kind of bridge to be built, and that the bridge would revert to the State after 
the organizers had recouped the cost of constructing the bridge and a specified 
percentage of annual interest.265
The Charles River Bridge Company, chartered by the Massachusetts legisla-
ture in 1785 and the first American toll-bridge corporation,266 was fairly typical.  
Despite being the capital and largest city of Massachusetts, Boston “was situat-
ed on what was then a peninsula nearly surrounded by water and was cut off 
from the towns and countryside to the north by the Charles River and the Back 
Bay.”267 The Charles River Bridge Company was organized to construct a 
bridge to connect Boston to Charlestown.  The charter included detailed gov-
ernance provisions, fixed rates of toll for forty years, prescribed the kind of 
bridge to be built, and provided that the charter would be void if the bridge were 
258. DAVIS, supra note 8, at 26, tbl.II; Id. at 27, tbl.III.
259. Hilt, Ownership and Control, supra note 8, at 16, tbl.2.
260. Sylla & Wright, supra note 8, at 661, tbl.4. This number represented about six percent of 
the total number of business corporations chartered between 1790 and 1860.
261. SEAVOY, ORIGINS, supra note 8 at 43.
262. See DODD, supra note 8, at 161 (citing Piscataqua Bridge v. New Hampshire Bridge, 7 
N.H. 35 (1835).
263. DODD, supra note 8, at 161 (quoting Piscataqua Bridge v. NH Bridge, 7 N.H. 35, 64 
(1834)); See also DODD, supra note 8, at 161 (citing Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 
U.S. 420, 639 (1837) (Story, J., dissenting), where the court declined to find that monopoly privi-
leges were implied in the charter). See also Hansmann & Pargendler, supra note 8, at 117 (citing 
Taylor v. Griswold, 14 N.J.L. 222, 234 (1834) (court emphasized “public nature” of corporations 
operating as turnpikes, bridges and railroads)).
264. See, e.g., DODD, supra note 8, at 160, 238 (citations omitted).
265. See, e.g., id. at 161, 238-40; Hilt, Ownership and Control, supra note 8, at 6.
266. DAVIS, supra note 8, at 187; DODD, supra note 8, at 237 (citing DAVIS, supra note 8, at 
187).
267. DODD, supra note 8, at 236.
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not completed within three years.268 While the charter did not contain an ex-
press grant of monopoly privileges and the U.S. Supreme Court later held in 
Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge that no grant of monopoly privileges 
should be implied, Justice Story, in his dissenting opinion, declared that such 
grants were made “for the common benefit of the people” and contrasted them 
with grants of “a mere corporate privilege for the benefit of the stockhold-
ers.”269 As with the turnpikes, “expectations of improvements in local business 
and in land values played a large part in the promotion [of the bridge], besides 
the prospect of revenues from tolls.”270 In contrast to the turnpikes, however, 
the Charles River Bridge and some other early toll-bridges proved profitable.271
3. Canals and Inland Waterways.
Canals and inland waterways were a third important category of transporta-
tion infrastructure, particularly given the difficulty and expense of overland 
transport in many regions.  Improvement of inland navigation, whether by 
building canals or constructing locks or otherwise, was particularly important in 
the early years of the republic; before 1791, more than half the corporations 
chartered were for improvement of inland navigation.272  As Joseph S. Davis 
observes, “this branch of enterprises called forth more corporate charters, more 
legislative acts, and more state support than any other branch.”273 Massachu-
setts played a leading role, chartering twelve private corporations for canals or 
other inland navigation by 1800, more than any state except Virginia.274 Over-
all, four hundred forty-six canal corporations and six hundred fifty-two naviga-
tion corporations were chartered in the United States between 1790 and 1860.275
New York State itself undertook construction of the Erie Canal beginning in 
1817, after which most canal corporations constructed only short feeder lines.276
268. Id. at 237; see also infra discussion of governance accompanying notes 381 to 404.
269. Charles River Bridge, 36 U.S. at 639 (Story, J., dissenting); see also DODD, supra note 
8, at 161.
270. Hansmann & Pargendler, supra note 8, at 965 (citing DAVIS, supra note 8, at 187).
271. On the profitability of the Charles River Bridge Company, see, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 
8, at 187 (stating that, after financial corporations, toll-bridge companies were the most successful 
of the early corporations); HORWITZ, supra note 8, at 130; and Klein, supra note 171, at 794.
272. DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF CORPORATIONS IV, supra note 8, at 25; see 
also NOVAK, supra note 8, at 131 (emphasizing the importance of rivers in the early American 
economy).
273. DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF CORPORATIONS IV, supra at 184-185 (not-
ing that “[t]he results were entirely disproportionate to the efforts.”) See also DODD, supra note 8, at 
247.
274. DODD, supra note 8 at 248.
275. Sylla & Wright, Corporation Formation in the Antebellum United States, supra note 8 at 
661, tbl.4. These numbers in aggregate represented about five percent of the total number of busi-
ness corporations chartered between 1790 and 1860.
276. Seavoy, Public Service Origins, supra note 8 at 47.
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While canal charter provisions were less uniform than those of turnpike and 
bridge corporations,277 they generally reflected the same public purpose and 
public benefits as the other types of internal improvement corporations.  Most 
early canal charters included grants of eminent domain.278 As with the turnpike 
and bridge companies, courts upheld these state grants of eminent domain as 
takings for public use.279 Unlike turnpike and bridge company charters, howev-
er, canal charters—presumably because of the comparatively greater risk of 
harm from flooding—commonly contained provisions making shareholders lia-
ble for eminent domain damages.280
Canal charters typically included a plan of the proposed route,281 and canal 
company shareholders, as with other internal improvement companies, were 
typically local residents and merchants who stood to benefit from the canal’s 
construction.  The founders of the Middlesex Canal, for example, chartered in 
1793 and the most notable eighteenth-century canal corporation in Massachu-
setts,282 were merchants, landholders and professional men of Medford, the 
endpoint of the canal, who stood to benefit most from the canal, thus “uniting to 
establish a public utility.”283 Commercially, the Middlesex Canal and other ca-
nal corporations generally were unsuccessful.284 By 1830, with the Erie Canal 
completed and the coming of early railroads, canal building in New York, Mas-
sachusetts and other states by business corporations was coming to an end.285
4. Early Railroads.
The earliest American railroads date from the 1820s.286 The first American 
railroad corporations were chartered in Massachusetts in 1826, for transporting 
granite from a quarry into town, and in 1829, for carrying coal from a mine to a 
canal in town.287 New York also chartered a railroad corporation in 1826, Mar-
yland in 1827 and New Jersey in 1831.288 The number of railroad corporations 
277. DODD, supra note 8, at 255.
278. Id. at 44.
279. Id. (citing Chesapeake & Ohio Canal Co. v. Key, 3 D.C. 599 (3 Cranch) (1829)).
280. DODD supra note 8, at 256.
281. See supra note 220.
282. DODD, supra note 8, at 249.
283. Hansmann & Pargendler, supra note 8, at 967 (quoting CHRISTOPHER ROBERTS, THE
MIDDLESEX CANAL 1793-1860, at 45 (HARVARD UNIV. PRESS, HARVARD ECONOMIC SER. NO. 61,
1938)).
284. See DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF CORPORATIONS IV, supra note 8, at 
185; DODD, supra note 8, at 251; Blair, Locking in Capital, supra note 8, at 428.
285. DODD, supra note 8 at 253; Hansmann & Pargendler, supra note 8, at 968.
286. Hansmann & Pargendler, supra note 8, at 969; DODD, supra note 8, at 258-259; 
HORWITZ, supra note 8, at 137.
287. DODD, supra note 8, at 258.
288. HORWITZ, supra note 8, at 137.
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in New York grew from two in 1829 to forty-eight in 1834.289 In New York, 
almost all of these were short lines connecting cities to each other or to naviga-
ble water.290 In Sylla and Wright’s count, more than twenty-six hundred rail-
road corporations, or about twelve percent of the total number of business cor-
porations, were chartered from 1790 to 1860.291
The purposes of early railroad corporations broadly resembled those of oth-
er internal improvement companies, in that they were explicitly public, and 
benefits to investors were primarily indirect and public rather than direct finan-
cial returns on their shares.292  Railroads were viewed as public highways.293
One of the main reasons for chartering early railroad corporations was “the de-
sire to deflect trade from a rival commercial town.”294 Some early railroad cor-
porations were granted monopolies;295 many railroad corporation charters con-
tained grants of eminent domain similar to those of the turnpikes, bridges, and 
canals.296 In a decision from 1830, at least one federal court upheld such a 
grant of eminent domain on the grounds that it was a taking for a public use.297
On similar grounds, railroad corporation property was treated as exempt from 
taxation in some states, even without a charter provision; courts in Massachu-
setts and Pennsylvania, for example, held that railroad property was impliedly 
exempt from taxation by reason of the railroad’s character as a public use.298 In 
addition to grants of monopolies and eminent domain, some state legislatures 
provided in railroad corporation charters for direct investment by state and local 
governments.299  In a case decided in 1852, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
upheld a statute authorizing the city of Philadelphia to issue bonds and invest 
the proceeds in the shares of two railroads; as noted by Merrick Dodd, a majori-
ty of the court held that “although the legislature could not constitutionally cre-
ate a public debt for a mere private purpose, a railroad was a public highway in 
which the public had an interest despite its ownership by a private corpora-
289. Id.
290. SEAVOY, ORIGINS, supra note 8, at 199.
291. Sylla & Wright, supra note 8, at 661.
292. See infra discussion accompanying notes 436 to 442 regarding later development of rail-
roads.
293. DODD, supra note 8, at 333.
294. Hansmann & Pargendler, supra note 8, at 971 (citing WINTHROP M. DANIELS,
AMERICAN RAILROADS: FOUR PHASES OF THEIR HISTORY 3 (1932)).
295. See, e.g., DODD, supra note 8, at 162 (discussing a Massachusetts court decision of 1854 
upholding a railroad monopoly).
296. See, e.g., DODD, supra note 8, at 260.
297. Bonaparte v. Camden & A. R. Co., 3 F. Cas. 821 (C.C.D.N.J. 1830), cited in DODD, su-
pra note 8, at 44.
298. DODD, supra note 8, at 170; but see DODD, supra note 8, at 170 (noting Rhode Island’s
refusal to exempt railroad property); FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 193.
299. DODD, supra note 8, at 162; see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 192-93.
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tion.”300 Like those of other internal improvement companies, railroad corpora-
tion charters also contained provisions reserving to the Commonwealth the right 
to purchase “the road” after a specified period of time for a price equal to cost 
plus a certain amount of interest per annum.301 “By 1853, the Commonwealth 
had loaned or otherwise contributed over $6,000,000 to Massachusetts rail-
roads.”302
Most early New England railroad financing, however, came from individual 
investors rather than from the state.303 As with other internal improvement 
companies, railroad charters typically were required to include a plan of the 
proposed route,304 and early railroad corporation investors were “commonly an-
imated by the prospect of indirect benefits stemming from improved means of 
communication.”305 Early railroad promoters generally pitched the “incidental 
advantages” rather than the profitability of the railroad;306 shareholders agreed 
to subscribe for the stock of one railroad corporation despite “a certainty of no 
direct profits,”307 and another promoter stressed that subscriptions were not 
meant to be “an investment” for “financial return,” but rather “to secure the 
benefits for himself and community.”308 Early railroads were closely connected 
to local communities; as late as 1850, New England railroads covered an aver-
age distance of thirty-six miles,309 and most of the shareholders of many early 
railroads—in some cases, more than ninety-five percent—lived along the 
route.310 The organizers of the Boston and Lowell railroad, for example, were 
owners of Lowell textile mills who were dissatisfied with the Middlesex Canal 
300. DODD, supra note 8, at 162 (citing Sharples v. Mayor of Philadelphia, 21 Pa. St. 147, 
168 (1853)).
301. See, e.g., DODD, supra note 8, at 260.
302. Id. at 338.
303. Hansmann & Pargendler, The Evolution of Shareholder Voting Rights, supra note 8 at 
121 (noting that “domestic and foreign finance capital, which became important financing sources 
in later decades, did not play a major role in funding early railroad construction”); see also Sylla & 
Wright, Corporation Formation in the Antebellum United States, supra note 8 at 661 (stating that 
about half of all minimum authorized capital of all corporations formed in the period 1790-1860 
was for railroads, which did not appear and begin to attract investment until late 1820s).
304. See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
305. Hansmann & Pargendler, supra note 8, at 969; SEAVOY, ORIGINS, supra note 8, at 206-
07.
306. Hansmann & Pargendler, supra note 8, at 969 (citation omitted).
307. Hansmann & Pargendler, supra note 8, at 970 (citation omitted), THELMA H. KISTLER,
THE RISE OF RAILROADS IN THE CONNECTICUT RIVER VALLEY 81 (1938).
308. Id.
309. WINTHROP M. DANIELS, AMERICAN RAILROADS: FOUR PHASES OF THEIR HISTORY 4
(1932) (cited in Hansmann & Pargendler, supra note 8, at 971).
310. Hansmann & Pargendler, supra note 8, at 971 (noting that 95% of Western Railroad’s
Massachusetts shareholders, holding 96.6% of its total stock, resided along the route); see also
SEAVOY, ORIGINS, supra note 8, at 199 (stating with respect to railroads in New York through 1833 
that “[m]ost were built with local capital”).
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as a transportation link between their mills and Boston.311 “All in all, the vast 
majority of early railroad promoters and shareholders were local merchants, 
manufacturers, or landowners who expected to benefit from the railroad’s oper-
ations.”312
B. Financial Corporations.
In addition to transportation infrastructure, financial infrastructure—
consisting primarily of banks and to a lesser degree insurance companies—had 
been lacking in the colonies and was greatly needed after Independence.313
1. Banks.
Following the Revolution, in most states, two key pieces of banking infra-
structure were missing: sound paper currency and reliable sources of credit for 
merchants.314 Currency in use typically consisted, among other things, of paper 
notes issued by banks, sometimes from other regions.315 In Boston, for exam-
ple, and New England as a whole, most currency was paper notes issued by 
country banks, “which passed from hand to hand because of the difficulty of 
presenting them to the issuing bank for payment.”316 Sources of credit for mer-
chants were scarce; prior to the Revolution, such credit had generally been pro-
vided, if at all, by English merchants or individual capitalists.317 The colonies 
had no banks of discount and deposit.318
Again, it was the business corporation that provided the necessary vehicle.  
Thirty-four charters were issued to American banking corporations in the eight-
eenth century, including eighteen in New England (of which seven were in 
Massachusetts) and nine in the Middle Atlantic states (of which four were in 
New York).319 Of the more than eight hundred business corporations chartered 
in New York from 1790 to 1826, forty-three, or about five percent, were 
311. DODD, supra note 8, at 263.
312. Hansmann & Pargendler, supra note 8, at 971 (citation omitted).
313. The long, complex, and well-covered history of banking in the early United States is 
outside the scope of this Article. See generally DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF 
CORPORATIONS II, supra note 8,; Joseph H. Sommer, The Birth of the American Corporation of 
Banks, Corporate Governance, and Social Responsibility, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 1011 (2001).
314. SEAVOY, ORIGINS, supra note 8, at 259; Hamill, From Special Privilege to General Util-
ity, supra note 8 at 93; Seavoy, Public Service Origins, supra note 8, at 49.
315. See, e.g., DODD, supra note 8, at 216; SEAVOY, ORIGINS, supra note 8, at 55, 259 (listing 
five types of currency).
316. DODD supra note 8, at 217.
317. 2 DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF CORPORATIONS, supra note 8, at 34; see 
also DODD, supra note 8, at 205 (noting that banking in Massachusetts prior to the incorporation of 
the Massachusetts Bank in 1784 had been done by individuals, partnerships or unincorporated asso-
ciations).
318. 2 DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF CORPORATIONS, supra note 8, at 34.
319. Id. at 37. The remaining five were in Virginia and Maryland.
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banks.320 Boston merchants secured a charter for the Massachusetts Bank in 
1784;321 the Bank of New York, which had opened as an unincorporated com-
pany in April 1784 only a few months after the British left New York, was in-
corporated in 1791;322 and the four chief mercantile cities of the nascent repub-
lic—Philadelphia, New York, Boston and Baltimore—were provided with 
banking facilities by 1790.323 By 1827, there were fifteen banking corporations 
in Boston and sixty in Massachusetts.324 Overall, in the period between 1790 
and 1860, more than 2,400 banks were incorporated, representing about eleven 
percent of the business corporations chartered in that period in the United 
States.325
Early bank charters varied from state to state and were sometimes based on 
national precedents,326 but they differed in other important ways from the char-
ters of other early business corporations.  Banks resembled the internal im-
provement companies in that banks also typically served public or quasi-public 
purposes;327 grants of exclusive or monopoly banking rights, for example, were 
considered, if not enacted, in some state legislatures.328 As Davis notes, “[t]he 
functions of discount, deposit, and issue were exercised almost solely by these 
incorporated institutions.”329 Banking corporations thus “played a prominent 
role in supplying credit to the nation’s rapidly growing business economy 
through the circulation of bank notes, which served as a medium of exchange 
within the nation’s currency.”330
320. Hilt, supra note 8, at 16.
321. 2 DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF CORPORATIONS, supra note 8, at 47.
322. Hilt & Valentine, supra note 8, at 8-9.
323. 2 DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF CORPORATIONS, supra note 8, at 49.
324. DODD supra note 8, at 214 (stating that the Mass. Bank charter a verbatim copy of Con-
gressional charter of Bank of North America).
325. Sylla & Wright, supra note 8, at 661; see also HURST, supra note 8, at 17.
326. 2 DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF CORPORATIONS, supra note 8, at 105; 
DODD, supra note 8, at 201.
327. See, e.g., Hilt & Valentine, supra note 8, at 8-9 (stating that the Bank of New York in 
1791 was typical in serving a quasi-public purposes); SEAVOY, PUBLIC SERVICE ORIGINS, supra
note 8, at 50 (stating that the Massachusetts Bank was conceived as a public service institution); 
Edward L. Symons, The ‘Business of Banking’ in Historical Perspective, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
676, 686 (1983) (“Generally, these banks were considered governmental or quasi-governmental 
entities, because their most important function was issuance of notes, which served as money”). See 
also DODD, supra note 8, at 217 (observing that, as late as 1851, the Massachusetts Board of Bank 
Commissioners described savings banks in Massachusetts as charitable rather than business corpo-
rations).
328. 2 DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF CORPORATIONS, supra note 8, at 69-70 
(with respect to Massachusetts); DODD, supra note 8, at 208.
329. 2 DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF CORPORATIONS, supra note 8, at 102.
330. Hamill, supra note 8, at 93 (citation omitted).
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Perhaps more significantly, however, unlike many other early business cor-
porations, banks were known to be profitable enterprises.331  In general, bank 
charters—rather than providing for delegation of state or quasi-state powers to 
banking corporations in order to enable banks to operate and sustain them-
selves—often instead required the bank to provide special rights to the state as a 
shareholder or borrower.  Many early bank charters reserved to the state the 
right to subscribe to a significant portion of the bank’s shares or required the 
bank to loan the state a specified sum of money.332 Others required state funds 
to be deposited with the bank, or the bank to make advances for carrying out 
state works, or the directors to make reports directly to the state governor, in 
some cases approaching the creation of “state” banks.333
Union Bank, chartered in Massachusetts in 1792, was typical.  The charter 
gave the Commonwealth the right to subscribe to one-third of the bank’s shares; 
required the bank to lend the Commonwealth one hundred thousand dollars at a 
specified rate of interest; authorized a legislative committee to examine the 
bank’s “doings”; and if the charter’s terms were violated, authorized the Com-
monwealth to have it forfeited.334 State funds were to be deposited with the 
bank.335 The Commonwealth indeed wound up holding one-third of the bank’s 
stock, giving the bank a “semi-official” character in Massachusetts.336
Notwithstanding the profitability of banking enterprises, much of the de-
mand for the creation of early banks, like other early business corporations, 
came not from would-be investors seeking profits on bank shares, but from po-
tential borrowers and other parties who hoped to receive the indirect or public 
benefits of the bank’s services.337 Local merchants were both the principal 
owners and the principal customers of most early banking corporations.338 The 
“primary purpose” of the Bank of New York, for example, was “to provide 
331. 2 DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF CORPORATIONS, supra note 8, at 60-61, 
66; Hilt, supra note 8, at 60.
332. See, e.g., DODD, supra note 8, at 203, 207-208; DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER 
HISTORY OF CORPORATIONS II, supra note 8, at 75, 95-97.
333. DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF CORPORATIONS II, supra note 8, at 96-97 
(stating that the Bank of Pennsylvania in 1793, the first “state” bank, was required by charter to loan 
the state $500,000; the state required the state’s funds and other funds over which state had control 
to be deposited with the bank; the bank came increasingly into the control of the state, held most 
state loans negotiated, made advances for carrying on state works, and defrayed state expenses out 
of its dividends; and was the largest “state” bank of this century.); DODD, supra note 8, at 203 (not-
ing that the Nantucket Bank of 1795 was required to make semi-annual reports directly to gover-
nor).
334. DODD, supra note 8, at 203.
335. DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF CORPORATIONS II, supra note 8, at 75.
336. Id. at 74-75; see also DODD supra note 8, at 211-212 (describing similar provision in 
Massachusetts general act of 1829 prescribing powers of all  banks).
337. DODD, supra note 8, at 214; see also SEAVOY, ORIGINS, supra note 8, at 53.
338. See, e.g., Sommer, supra note 313, at 1028 (“[T]he mercantile banks could be considered 
merchants’ utilities, chartered perhaps as public corporations, but operated as private credit clubs.”); 
Hansmann & Pargendler, supra note 8, at 127.
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commercial credit to the merchants who organized it.”339 New York’s Citibank, 
first established in 1812, “was intended to be a kind of credit union for its mer-
chant-owners.”340
Banks rapidly became the most important and commercially successful of 
the early business corporations.341 By the second or third decade of the nine-
teenth century, the profitability of the banking business was demonstrated so 
thoroughly that state investment in banking corporations declined and was 
largely supplanted by private capital.342 The Commonwealth of Massachusetts 
acquired no further holdings in banks after 1820.343
2.  Insurance Companies.
Many of the earliest American insurance corporations were mutual compa-
nies, organized to hold property for the benefit of their members, and were ac-
cordingly difficult at times to distinguish from early charitable corporations.344
The corporation—whether for benevolent or other risk management purposes—
offered a sustainable means of aggregating property to be held in trust.  Insur-
ance underwriting in the former colonies had previously been done by individu-
als and partnerships.345
The earliest insurance products were marine insurance, followed by fire in-
surance.346 Corporations offering marine and fire insurance “functioned as pub-
lic service franchises in urban areas where they protected businessmen from the 
dangers of bankruptcy caused by fire and marine disasters.”347 As with other 
early business corporations, a financial return on investment was often a sec-
ondary consideration.348 Overall, in the period between 1790 and 1860, more 
than 2,100 insurance companies were incorporated, representing about nine per-
cent of the business corporations chartered in that period in the United States.349
339. Seavoy, Public Service Origins, supra note 8, at 50.
340. HAROLD VAN B. CLEVELAND & THOMAS F. HUERTAS, CITIBANK 1812-1970, at 8 (cited 
in Hansmann & Pargendler, supra note 8 at 975).
341. DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF CORPORATIONS II, supra note 8, at 108.
342. See, e.g., DODD, supra note 8, at 213 (with respect to Massachusetts).
343. Id.
344. Hansmann & Pargendler, supra note 8, at 984 (on mutual companies); see, e.g., Seavoy, 
Public Service Origins, supra note 8, at 47 (describing the Corporation for the Relief of Widows 
and Children of Clergymen in the Communion of the Church of England, chartered in 1769 simul-
taneously in New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania, which was effectively both a charity and a 
mutual insurance corporation, deriving and distributing most of its income from income on donated 
real property).
345. DODD, supra note 8, at 218.
346. Id.
347. Seavoy, Public Service Origins, supra note 8, at 47.
348. Hansmann & Pargendler, supra note 8, at 984; see also Seavoy, Public Service Origins,
supra note 8, at 48 (stating that the New York legislature incorporated early insurance companies 
“with no discernable distinction regarding their profit or benevolent motives.”).
349. Sylla & Wright, supra note 8, at 661 tbl. 4; see also Hilt, supra note 8, at 16 tbl. 2.
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C. Early Manufacturing.
At the close of the Revolution, there were virtually no American manufac-
turing corporations.  Manufacturing in this early period was generally done in 
households, on a small scale, by artisans organized as sole proprietors or part-
nerships.350 Economic conditions for the manufacturing corporation had not yet 
developed.351
In the early nineteenth century, economic conditions changed very rapidly.  
Power-driven machinery, particularly spinning equipment in the cotton-textile 
industry, was introduced in Rhode Island in 1790.352 The use of machinery in-
creasingly required a factory system of organization and greater aggregation of 
capital.353 The United States entered into the embargo of 1807 and the War of 
1812, resulting in acute shortages of textiles and other consumer goods formerly 
imported from England.354 The business corporation was quickly taken up as a 
form of organization for manufacturing enterprises, becoming unexceptional for 
manufacturers after 1809.355 In 1809, Massachusetts adopted a general incorpo-
ration act for textile and certain other manufacturers.356 In 1811, New York 
adopted a general incorporation act for manufacturers, one of the first such acts 
for business corporations.357 Under the general incorporation statute, a special 
act of the legislature was no longer required; five or more persons engaged in 
manufacturing textiles, glass, bar iron, steel, and certain other products were al-
lowed to self-incorporate.358 The New England states, too, adopted a policy of 
350. DAVIS, supra note 8, at 255-56; DODD, supra note 8, at 365; see also HURST, supra note 
8, at 17 (stating that general business corporations other than internal improvement, bank and insur-
ance, and public service corporations from 1780-1801 were only four percent of charters).
351. DAVIS, supra note 8, at 255.
352. DODD, supra note 8, at 367.
353. Id. at 365, 367; Seavoy, Public Service Origins, supra note 8, at 55; SEAVOY, ORIGINS,
supra note 8, at 63; see also Hilt, Corporate Governance, supra note 8, at 95, 99.
354. Seavoy, Public Service Origins, supra note 8, at 55; Seavoy, Laws to Encourage Manu-
facturing, supra note 8, at 87.
355. DODD, supra note 8, at 368.
356. Massachusetts Manufacturing Corporation Act of 1809; Blair, supra note 8, at 425-6; see 
also Seavoy, Laws to Encourage Manufacturing, supra note 8, at 90 (calling the New York act of 
1811 “the first effective general incorporation statute for business corporations passed by any 
state.”).
357. See Act Relative to Incorporations for Manufacturing Purposes, Ch. LXVII, 1811 N.Y. 
Laws 34; Seavoy, Laws to Encourage Manufacturing, supra note 8, at 90; Hilt, supra note 8, at 54; 
see also Seavoy, Public Service Origins, supra note 8 at 56; DODD, note 8, at 263–64 (stating that 
the general Aqueduct Act of 1799 enacted in Massachusetts may be regarded as the earliest general 
act of incorporation for business enterprises in Anglo-American law). On general incorporation, see 
also infra discussion accompanying notes 480 to 496.
358. SEAVOY, ORIGINS, supra note 8, at 65; Blair, Locking in Capital, supra note 8, at 426 
(noting that the act provided for “any five or more persons who shall be desirous to form a company 
for the purpose of manufacturing woolen, cotton or linen goods, or for the purpose of making glass, 
or for the purpose of making from ore bar-iron, anchors, millirons, steel, nail rods, hoop-iron and 
ironmongery, sheet copper, sheet lead, shot, white lead and red lead.”).
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granting or encouraging charters for manufacturing enterprises in large num-
bers.359 By 1815, Massachusetts alone had chartered one hundred fifteen textile 
companies and a considerable number of other manufacturing corporations.360
This number grew to nearly five hundred and fifty new manufacturing corpora-
tions in Massachusetts by 1850.361 Cotton textiles went from being a nascent 
American industry in 1800 to employing an estimated forty million dollars in 
capital and a hundred thousand workers by 1815.362 In New York, more than 
two hundred manufacturing companies, or about twenty-seven percent of all 
business corporations, were chartered between 1790 and 1826.363 Overall, more 
than three thousand three hundred manufacturing corporations, or about fifteen 
percent of all business corporations, were chartered in the United States be-
tween 1790 and 1860.364
Notwithstanding these and other later developments, early manufacturing 
corporations—like the internal improvement, early bank and early railroad cor-
porations—were considered to have a public purpose.365 The corporate charter 
or general incorporation act specified the types of products the corporation was 
allowed to manufacture.366 A majority of early manufacturing corporations were 
textile companies.367 On a purely local level, the stated purpose of many early 
textile or spinning corporations was to employ the poor.368  More broadly, in 
states such as Massachusetts and New York, the incorporation of textile and 
other early manufacturers was part of a public policy of making the state and 
359. DODD, supra note 8, at 365; See Hamill, supra note 8, at 97-98; HURST, supra note 8, at 
18.
360. DODD, supra note 8, at 368.
361. Hilt, Corporate Governance, supra note 8 at 77.
362. DODD, supra note 8, at 368.
363. Hilt, Ownership and Control, supra note 8, at 16 tbl.2.
364. Sylla & Wright, supra note 8, at 661 tbl.4.
365. See, e.g., Seavoy, Public Service Origins, supra note 8, at 55-56; SEAVOY, ORIGINS,
supra note 8, at 64; Seavoy, Laws to Encourage Manufacturing, supra note 8, at 90–93 (noting, 
however, that entrepreneurs found New York’s 1811 statute convenient because they did not have to 
“relate their business to a narrow definition of public service . . . .”); Hilt & Valentine, Democratic 
Dividends, supra note 8, at 8 (characterizing the Society for the Establishment of Manufactures as 
typical in serving a “quasi-public purpose”).
366. Hilt, Corporate Governance, supra note 8 at 6.
367. SEAVOY, ORIGINS, supra note 8, at 67 (noting that 226 of 362 charters granted under the 
New York general incorporation act of 1811 from 1811-1848 were for textile manufacturers).
368. See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 8, at 264–65 (citing the constitution of the Pennsylvania 
Society for the Encouragement of Manufacture, which provided “[f]or better employment of the 
industrious poor, . . .” and noting that the legislature subscribed for 100 shares); Id. at 270–71 (de-
scribing the Beverly Cotton Manufactory of 1789 and “the importance of employment to great 
number of women and children, many of whom would otherwise be useless or burden to society.”)
(internal quotation marks omitted); Id. at 275 (describing the New York Manufacturing Society, 
formed in 1789 “for the purpose of establishing useful manufactures . . . and furnishing employment 
for the honest industrious poor.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Hilt & Valentine, 
Democratic Dividends, supra note 8, at 9 (noting that the New York Manufacturing Society was a 
spinning company).
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the nation self-sufficient in the production of basic manufactured goods.369 The 
1789 incorporating act for the Beverly Cotton Manufactory in Massachusetts, 
notes Pauline Maier, provided that
. . . “the promotion of useful manufactures, and particularly such as are carried on 
with materials of American produce within this Commonwealth,” would advance 
“the happiness and welfare thereof, by increasing the agriculture and extending the 
commerce of the country.”
370
The New York general incorporation act of 1811 was an “emergency statute”
designed to promote manufacture of textiles and other consumer goods to re-
place foreign imports.371 In the context of wartime shortages and emergencies, 
American manufacturing in general was seen as a public service.372
To promote these public purposes, many state legislatures again delegated 
state or quasi-state powers to early manufacturers.  The Society for Establishing 
Useful Manufactures (“S.U.M.”), for example, was incorporated in New Jersey 
in 1791 as a large textile manufactory.373 Its charter contained an exceedingly 
broad purpose clause authorizing it to carry on “the Business of Manufacture in 
this State” and to engage in “Manufacturing or making all such Commodities or 
Articles as shall not be prohibited by Law.”374 The charter exempted the corpo-
ration’s employees from taxes and military duties (except in case of invasion); 
allowed the corporation to raise funds through a public lottery; granted the right 
to construct canals and take private land and materials in doing so; to charge 
tolls for the use of those facilities; and, curiously, to incorporate the future town 
of Paterson.375 The legislative grants to S.U.M. were not unusual.  As Joseph S. 
Davis observes,
Time and again, in nearly every state, legislative “encouragement” in one form or 
another was granted to manufacturers. Bounties were granted. . . . Taxes on proper-
ty or on the polls of workmen were abated. Lottery privileges were granted. . . .
Loans were given at low rates of interest or without any. National laws established 
protective duties. Patents were granted. And in several instances, as in the case 
of. . .The New York Manufacturing Society, and the “S.U.M.,” subscriptions were 
made by the state to the shares of corporations.
376
Early manufacturing corporations differed sharply, however, in one key re-
spect from the internal improvement companies, early banks and early railroads: 
shareholders in early manufacturing corporations were usually investors rather 
369. SEAVOY, ORIGINS, supra note 8, at 74.
370. Maier, supra note 8, at 55 (citation omitted).
371. SEAVOY, ORIGINS, supra note 8, at 74; see also Seavoy, Public Service Origins, supra
nota 8, at 56.
372. Seavoy, Public Service Origins, supra note 8, at 55–56.
373. See Maier, The Revolutionary Origins of the Business Corporation, supra note 8, at 67.
374. 1 DAVIS, supra note 8, at 380; see also Hansmann & Pargendler, supra note 8, at 980 
fn.138 (citing Davis).
375. Maier, supra note 8, at 67.
376. 4 DAVIS, supra note 8, at 283.
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than local merchants, farmers, landowners, or consumers.377 Factory machinery 
required comparatively greater capital and more pooling of funds.  The S.U.M., 
for example, was a New Jersey corporation, but most of its subscribers were 
New York capitalists and speculators.378 Operationally as well as financially, 
manufacturers essentially de-localized.  Manufacturing corporations were likely 
to be part of a larger, competitive market with dispersed consumers.379 Textile 
mills with new equipment, which would produce far more thread than local 
communities could weave into cloth, had to sell their products on a broad anon-
ymous market.380 Other than perhaps employment, manufacturing offered 
comparatively few local public benefits.
D. Governance.
The public purposes and public benefits of the internal improvement com-
panies, early banks and early railroads—though less so for early manufacturing 
corporations381—were reflected in important ways in the corporate governance 
provisions of their charters.  Differences may be noted initially on the level of 
terminology.  In corporate documentation, until the 1830s, the term “member”
appeared more often than the new term “shareholder.”382  The earliest use of 
“shareholder” appears to be from the late 1820s, with “stockholder” appearing 
in the 1750s, apparently in connection with the joint-stock company.383
More significantly, as the foregoing suggests, early governance norms put 
much less weight on the amount of investment.384  English company law had 
regarded each shareholder as a member of the corporation rather than the owner 
of a portion of the company’s capital.385 Rights tended to be allocated per 
shareholder rather than per share.  This principle was forcefully enunciated in 
1834 by Chief Justice Joseph Hornblower of the New Jersey Supreme Court in 
Taylor v. Griswold:
To my mind, the answer to this question is perfectly plain, whether it is considered 
upon general and common law principles, or upon the terms of the charter it-
377. Hansmann & Pargendler, supra note 8, at 987.
378. Id. at 986.
379. Id. at 987.
380. SEAVOY, ORIGINS, supra note 8 at 63.
381. See infra discussion accompanying notes 365 to 380.
382. Wells, supra note 8, at 1042 (citing ANGELL & AMES, supra note 62, at 62).
383. Wells, supra note 8, at 1042, n.51 (citation omitted).
384. Colleen A. Dunlavy, From Citizens to Plutocrats: Nineteenth Century Shareholder Vot-
ing Rights and Theories of the Corporation, in CONSTRUCTING CORPORATE AMERICA 66, 67.
385. Id. at 73 (citations omitted); Maier, The Revolutionary Origins of the Business Corpora-
tion, supra note 8 at 77.
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self. . . . Every corporator, every individual member of a body politic, whether pub-
lic or private, is, prima facie, entitled to equal rights.386
Perhaps not surprisingly, in many respects, early American corporate gov-
ernance was in some respects a step closer to partnership.  Early business corpo-
rations typically had only a single class of common stock.387 Merger, dissolu-
tion, and other major corporate transactions required—in addition to legislative 
action—unanimous shareholder approval.388 Corporations were chartered for 
specific purposes, subject to geographic, capital and ultra vires restrictions, and 
for a limited period of time.389 Shareholders typically had preemptive rights,390
and corporations were required to pay out profits in regular dividends.391
Most importantly, early American business corporation charters tended to 
impose schemes of restricted or graduated voting.  Graduated voting schemes 
fell in between the “democratic” partnership model of one vote per partner and 
the “plutocratic” approach of one vote per share.392 As outlined by Colleen 
Dunlavy, graduated voting limited the management power of larger investors by 
diminishing voting power relative to shareholdings as shareholdings increased; 
for example, a shareholder with one or two shares might get one vote; for the 
next eight shares, one vote for every two shares; for the next twenty shares, one 
vote for every four shares; and so forth, up to a fixed cap on the total number of 
possible votes, regardless of the total number of shares owned.393 The effect of 
graduated voting, in other words, was to limit the role of capital in determining 
management of the company, particularly when many small shareholders were 
present.394
Graduated voting schemes were thus well-suited to enterprises where share-
holders’ primary interests were in the company’s public purpose and benefits 
rather than in protecting or securing a financial return on their shares395—in 
386. Taylor v. Griswold, 14 N.J.L. 222, 237 (1834); see also Dunlavy, supra note 384 at 78; 
Hansmann & Pargendler, supra note 8, at 117.
387. DODD, supra note 8, at 269; see also Hilt, supra note 8, at 75–77.
388. BERLE & MEANS, supra 17, at 132 (citing ANGELL & AMES, supra note 62); Hilt, Cor-
porate Governance, supra note 8, at 79; Wells, Shareholder Power, supra note 8, at 1046.
389. See, e.g., Hilt, Early American Corporations, supra note 8 at 51; Wells, Shareholder 
Power, supra note 8, at 1046, 1051.
390. Wells, Shareholder Power, supra note 8, at 1046.
391. Hilt, Corporate Governance, supra note 8, at 84; Wells, Shareholder Power, supra note 
8, at 1046; see also Guenther, supra note 3, at 450 ff. (discussing the doctrine of shareholders’ equi-
table right to dividends).
392. Dunlavy, supra note 384, at 73-74 (noting that one shareholder, one vote was the com-
mon law rule); see also Wells, Shareholder Power, supra note 8, at 1049 (citing Dunlavy, supra
note 384, at 73); Maier, supra note 8, at 77, note 74.
393. Dunlavy, supra note 384, at 74-75. In Dunlavy’s example of the first Bank of the United 
States, chartered in 1791, the maximum vote cap was set at thirty votes.
394. Analysis of separation of ownership and control is beyond scope of this Article. See, e.g.,
BERLE & MEANS, supra note 17; Hilt, Corporate Governance, supra note 8, at 7 ff.
395. Smythe, supra note 178, at 1417-18.
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Hansmann and Pargendler’s words, where shareholders were more interested in 
the firm’s output than its profits.396 Graduated voting was particularly prevalent 
in turnpikes; according to Hansmann and Pargendler’s multistate analysis, from 
1790 to 1859, sixty-five percent of turnpike and plank road corporations had 
graduated voting charters.397 Graduated voting was also common in charters of 
bridge corporations (almost thirty-eight percent);398 canal corporations (more 
than forty-two percent);399 banks (fifty-three percent);400 insurance corporations 
(almost thirty-eight percent);401 and even early railroads (more than twenty-
seven percent, down from forty-eight percent in the 1820s).402 Graduated vot-
ing provisions were also more common in some states (Massachusetts, New 
York, and New Jersey)403 than others (Connecticut).404
Once again, manufacturing corporations were the outlier.  In sharp contrast 
to virtually all other early American business corporations, “one vote per share 
was from the outset the dominant voting rule in U.S. manufacturing corpora-
tions.”405 Of the manufacturing corporations chartered in New York from 1790 
to 1825, only two percent had graduated voting provisions in their charters.406
Percentages were similarly miniscule in New Jersey and Connecticut.407 In-
deed, one vote per share was the rule in New York’s general incorporation act 
of 1811 for manufacturing companies, which set the precedent for the many 
other states that subsequently enacted general incorporation statutes for manu-
facturing.408
396. Hansmann & Pargendler, supra note 8, at 960; cf. DUNLAVY, supra note 384, at 74 (ar-
guing that graduated voting was intended to make corporations more democratic); Wells, Share-
holder Power, supra note 8, at 1050. See generally Hansmann & Pargendler, supra note 8, at 951–
54.
397. Hansmann & Pargendler, supra note 8, at 960, 1012 tbl.1; see also Smythe, supra note 
178, at 1417.
398. Hansmann & Pargendler, supra note 8, at 964, 1012 tbl.1; see also Smythe, supra note 
178, at 1417.
399. Hansmann & Pargendler, supra note 8, at 966–67, 1012 tbl.1; see also DODD, supra note 
8, at 255.
400. Hansmann & Pargendler, supra note 8, at 1012 tbl. 1; id. at 126; DODD, supra note 8, at 
215; Maier, supra note 8 at 77-78; but cf. IV DAVIS, supra note 8, at 69.
401. Hansmann & Pargendler, supra note 8, at 1012, tbl. 1; id. at 981-982; Hilt, Corporate 
Governance, supra note 8, at 84 tbl. 1.
402. Hansmann & Pargendler, supra note 8, at 1012 tbl. 1; see also id. at 970 (noting that 
graduated voting most present in early railroad charters).
403. Id. at 116 (citations omitted).
404. See id. at 966 (citations omitted).
405. Id. at 985.
406. Id.
407. Id. (noting that the thirty-one percent figure from their multistate analysis is “. . .almost 
certainly, misleadingly high.”).
408. Id. at 986. See also Dunlavy, supra note 384, at 74; Hilt, Corporate Governance, supra
note 8, at 12.
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Perhaps even more tellingly, in many jurisdictions, most notably Massachu-
setts, charters of early manufacturing corporations did not provide shareholders 
with limited liability.  At English common law, the rule had long been that 
shareholders of stock companies in general did not have limited liability.409
The common law rule does not appear to have been followed in the United 
States, where from the inception of the business corporation in the late eight-
eenth and early nineteenth centuries, state legislatures were generally willing to 
include limitations on shareholder liability in corporate charters; where the 
charter was silent, limited liability was ordinarily implied.410 Nonetheless, lim-
ited liability was not universal, and there were significant exceptions.411 Manu-
facturing in the northeastern U.S. states, where manufacturing first developed, 
was the most significant exception.  Legislative policy with respect to granting 
limited liability to manufacturing corporations “differed radically” in these 
states from the policy toward other types of business corporations.412 The same 
state legislatures in New England, New York and Pennsylvania that were will-
ing to include broad grants of limited liability to shareholders in charters for 
turnpikes, bridges, canals, and banks refused in the early years of the nineteenth 
century to include such provisions in manufacturing charters.413 In particular, 
the Massachusetts state legislature followed a policy of unlimited shareholder 
liability for manufacturing corporations from 1809—when the state’s Manufac-
turing Corporation Act expressly imposed full personal liability on shareholders 
if debts against the corporation could not be satisfied out of corporate proper-
ty414—until 1830, when the state’s new Manufacturing Corporation Act abol-
ished personal liability of shareholders, but only after the whole amount of the 
corporation’s capital stock had been actually paid in and certified.415  Massa-
chusetts—the very state where factory-based manufacturing arose most rapidly, 
until Massachusetts became the leading cotton-textile state in the country—was 
the first state to adopt and, except for Rhode Island, the last to abolish, unlim-
ited shareholder liability for manufacturers.416
No consensus appears to exist as to why Massachusetts and other states im-
posed unlimited liability on early manufacturing corporations.417 Even early on, 
409. DODD, supra note 8, at 364 n.1 (noting that the privilege of limited liability was not 
granted to registered joint-stock companies in England until Companies Act of 1855); Handlin & 
Handlin, supra note 8, at 11 (“Early English law knew nothing of limited liability.”).
410. DAVIS, supra note 8, at 317; DODD, supra note 8, at 365.
411. See DODD, supra note 8, at 373-77; see also infra text accompanying notes 521 to 524.
412. DODD, supra note 8, at 365.
413. Id.
414. Id. at 376.
415. Id. at 381; see also Hilt, Corporate Governance, supra note 8, at 77.
416. DODD, supra note 8, at 365.
417. See, e.g., DODD, supra note 8, at 369 (noting that even in England, evidence on what 
people of the eighteenth century thought on the subject of limited liability is extremely meager and 
in the United States almost nonexistent); HOVENKAMP, supra note 186, at 49 (“Voluminous writ-
ings on the history of American corporate law have not adequately explained either the evolution of 
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the public purpose in manufacturing corporations may have been perceived to 
be not as strong as in the internal improvement companies.  Shareholders in 
such corporations may have been deemed to be “co-adventurers” for their own 
profit—as opposed to providing a public service in the “quid pro quo” of the 
internal improvement companies, in the words of Angell and Ames418—who 
therefore deserved to bear some personal risk.  Ultimately, however, the policy 
against limited liability may have been less significant than it appears in hind-
sight.  As the Handlins note:
Until well into the eighteenth century in England, and through the whole period of 
origins in the United States, the internal organization of the corporation made un-
likely the raising of the question. Generally, there was no specific capital stock and 
no par value for shares. Funds were collected by assessments against the share-
holder, and there was, at first, no legal limit to the total number of assessments.
419
Under such circumstances, limited liability may have been, on a practical level, 
something of an illusion.  Even if shareholders’ personal assets were not ex-
posed to creditors of the corporation, if such creditors could compel an assess-
ment, shareholders might have wound up in the same position.420 Acceptance 
of limited liability for shareholders in 1830 did not, in any event, have an ap-
preciable effect on the rate of incorporation of manufacturing corporations in 
Massachusetts.421
IV. TRANSITION TO THE MODERN FIRM.
The period after 1780, as I have argued above, saw the dramatic rise of the 
business corporation out of its all-purpose predecessor.  A second gradual but 
equally historic transformation occurred, beginning in about the 1830s, with the 
rapid growth and industrialization of the American economy.  The purpose of 
limited liability in the nineteenth century or its meaning.”); Thompson, supra note 208, at 211 (“In 
1830, the Massachusetts legislature declared that petitioners for corporate charters no longer had to 
be engaged in public works to be awarded the privilege of limited liability.”). See also SEAVOY,
ORIGINS, supra note 8, at 104 (stating that the New York legislature’s revised statutes of 1828 
granted full limited liability to all corporation stockholders provided their shares were fully paid in; 
the great exception was banks).
418. ANGELL & AMES, supra note 62, at 33; see supra discussion accompanying notes 191 to 
192.
419. Handlin & Handlin, Origins of the American Business Corporation, supra note 8, at 12-
13; see also id. at 10 (“In the first thirty years of Massachusetts development no grant or petition for 
an act of incorporation mentioned [limited liability].”); DODD, AMERICAN BUSINESS 
CORPORATIONS UNTIL 1860, supra note 8 at 369 ff.; Hilt, Corporate Governance, supra note 8 at 
78.
420. See, e.g., Handlin & Handlin, supra note 8, at 13 ff.; DODD, supra note 8, at 369.
421. DODD, supra note 8, at 383; Hilt, Corporate Governance, supra note 8, at 78-79; Han-
dlin & Handlin, supra note 8, at 17. See also DODD, supra note 8, at 376 (noting that unlimited lia-
bility in 1809 Act “did not prevent large numbers of Massachusetts industrialists from seeking in-
corporation”); Hilt, Corporate Governance, supra note 8, at 78 (noting that in spite of unlimited 
shareholder liability, manufacturing enterprises sought to incorporate in Massachusetts at very high 
rates).
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the American business corporation shifted from fundamentally public to private 
goals.422  The special charter granting quasi-state powers for improvement of 
public infrastructure, with primarily indirect public benefits to shareholders, 
gave way to general incorporation and an increasing shareholder focus on direct 
financial returns on shares.  The American understanding of the purpose of the 
corporation gradually transitioned from the pronouncement of the court in Trus-
tees of the University of North Carolina v. Foy in 1805 that “[i]ndeed, it seems 
difficult to conceive of a corporation established for merely private purpos-
es,”423 to the confident assertion a little more than a century later in Dodge v. 
Ford that “[a] business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the 
profit of the stockholders.”424 The first transformation in corporate purpose 
created the American business corporation; the second transformation gave rise 
to the modern American profit-maximizing firm.425
Over the first half of the nineteenth century, the importance of early turn-
pike, toll-bridge, canal, and other local improvement corporations was gradually 
eclipsed by capital-intensive regional and national private concerns, particularly 
in banking, manufacturing, and railroads.  Banking, manufacturing and railroad 
corporations, in turn, gradually ceased to be seen as having a public purpose.426
As noted above, the profitability of banks had been manifest since the early 
decades after the Revolution.427 In the early nineteenth century, state legisla-
tures steadily increased the number of chartered banks.428 Other forms of credit 
institutions arose.429 Bank finance became the realm of primarily private capi-
tal.430 Banks may have been the earliest American business corporations to 
422. See HORWITZ, supra note 8, at 136-37; see also id. at 111-12 (“The change in the con-
ception of the corporation marks one of the fundamental transitions from the legal assumptions of 
the eighteenth century to those of the nineteenth. The archetypical American corporation of the 
eighteenth century is a municipality, a public body charged with carrying out public functions; in 
the nineteenth, it is the modern business corporation, organized to pursue private ends for individual 
gain.”); HOVENKAMP, supra note 186, at 43 (“The classical business corporation became a device 
for managing capital and investment, not a special privilege from the state.”); but see MAYER, supra
note 8, at 83 (asserting that “[i]t is only as we move into the twentieth century. . .that we find the 
corporation progressively losing its public sense of purpose. . . .”).
423. Trs. of the Univ. of North Carolina v. Foy, 5 N.C. (1 Mur.) 58, 88 (1805).
424. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1 919). See also Maier, supra note 
8, at 81 (noting that the view that the purpose of the corporation was primarily for private profit was 
accepted in Massachusetts only after 1900).
425. See, e.g., BERLE & MEANS, supra note 17, at 127 (“Briefly, the last century has seen the 
corporate mechanism evolve from an arrangement under which an association of owners controlled 
their property on terms closely supervised by the state to an arrangement by which many men have 
delivered contributions of capital into the hands of a centralized control.”).
426. See, e.g., SEAVOY, ORIGINS, supra note 8, at 74-76.
427. See, e.g., DODD, supra note 8, at 213; see also supra discussion accompanying notes 331 
to 343.
428. Symons, supra note 327, at 689.
429. Id. at 688.
430. See, e.g., DODD, supra note 8, at 213; SEAVOY, ORIGINS, supra note 8, at 76. See also 
supra discussion accompanying notes 341 to 343.
56 Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review [Vol. 9:1
shift in the public perception from serving the public interest to pursing strictly 
private profit-seeking goals.431
From the second or third decade of the 1800s, manufacturing corporations 
proliferated.  By 1848, in Massachusetts, the average annual number of manu-
facturing corporation charters had come to greatly exceed that of any other type 
of business corporation.432 In the New England states overall, more than two 
thousand six hundred manufacturing and mining corporations were chartered in 
the period from 1831 to 1862, representing about forty percent of all corpora-
tions chartered.433 Nationwide, more than seventeen thousand manufacturing 
corporations were created in the ten years between 1849 and 1859.  With the 
resumption of English imports after 1815 and the rise of well-established do-
mestic industries, the perceived urgency of public purpose of many American 
manufacturers had waned, so that manufacturing as such no longer seemed vital 
to public welfare, and manufacturing purposes seemed increasingly profit-
oriented in a broad anonymous market.434 Manufacturing corporations may 
best illustrate the transition from public service to private gain.435
Perhaps the most decisive influence, however, on the changing conception 
of the American business corporation was the railroad.436 Beginning in the 
1830s, railroads rapidly replaced turnpikes and canals as principal arteries of 
inland transport.437 In 1830, there existed thirty miles of railroad track in the 
United States; by 1860, this number had grown to more than thirty thousand.438
Investors in railroad shares were no longer local residents, but rather, financial 
renters of capital.  According to Sylla and Wright, about half of all the mini-
mum authorized capital of American business corporations from 1790 to 1860 
was for railroads, even though railroads did not begin to attract investment until 
the late 1820s.439 “Railroading was the key industry that accelerated industrial 
growth into the self-sustaining stage.”440 The expansion of local railroads into 
large fast-changing interstate systems posed particular problems for state legis-
431. See SEAVOY, ORIGINS, supra note 8, at 76 (stating that “with the multiplicity of banks, 
the franchise relation was obscured”).
432. DODD, supra note 8, at 315.
433. Id. at 123.
434. SEAVOY, ORIGINS, supra note 8, at 74-75; see also Hilt, Early American Corporations,
supra note 8, at 54 (“[M]anufacturing firms . . . were among the least controversial corporations . . .
because they served no major public purpose, . . . were perceived to have only localized effects . . .
[and] produced . . . [largely] homogenous goods . . . .”).
435. SEAVOY, ORIGINS, supra note 8, at 74.
436. HORWITZ, supra note 8, at 137; see also BERLE & MEANS, supra note 17, at 12; Blair, 
Locking in Capital, supra note 8, at 442.
437. DODD, supra note 8, at 134, 349; SEAVOY, ORIGINS, supra note 8, at 213.
438. DODD, supra note 8, at 123.
439. Sylla & Wright, supra note 8, at 661, 661 tbl.4; see also Avi-Yonah, supra note 206, at 
793 (noting the “massive amounts” of capital were required with the rise of railroads, steel and oil 
companies, and other large corporate enterprises).
440. SEAVOY, ORIGINS, supra note 8, at 214.
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latures, which could not keep up with demand for legislative amendments to 
special charters every time a route changed or two companies merged.441 The 
rise of the railroads increasingly drove fundamental changes to state incorpora-
tion law.442
Early signs of this transition in corporate purpose are already apparent in the 
first decades of the nineteenth century.  In 1809, in Currie’s Administrators v. 
The Mutual Assurance Society, the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals still ad-
vances a solidly eighteen-century view of the corporation as necessarily having 
a public purpose.  As noted above, in the court’s estimation, “merely private or 
selfish” purposes had “no adequate claim” upon the privilege of incorpora-
tion.443 Importantly, Currie’s Administrators involved an issue fundamentally 
similar to the one raised ten years later in Dartmouth College.  In 1805, the Vir-
ginia General Assembly had amended the original 1794 charter of the Mutual 
Assurance Society, a Virginia mutual fire insurance corporation.  Based on the 
amendment, the corporation levied an assessment on certain members, one of 
whom challenged the assessment on the grounds, among others, that it was 
made not under the original charter, but a subsequent amendment without his 
consent.444 While the facts of the Virginia case are different from those of 
Dartmouth College,445 in Currie’s Administrators, the court expressly declined 
to recognize the corporation’s charter as a contract:
A charter is not a compact between the state and the grantee of the charter. On the 
part of the state there is no contract express or implied. The state is not bound ei-
ther to give to, or to receive, to do, or to abstain from doing, any thing. On the part 
of the society, there is no obligation to the state. On what ground, then, can it be 
said that there is a contract, when neither of the parties enter into any sort of obliga-
tion. The idea is absurd.
446
To the contrary, the court declared, “the contract is only between the individual 
subscribers.”447 The charter of incorporation was not a contract, but a “law”:
The real character of the act of 1794, is this: it is in truth a charter of incorporation; 
a grant of certain rights for the benefit of the grantees only; a law authorizing cer-
tain persons to become insurers for each other. . . .
448
441. DODD, supra note 8, at 134-35.
442. See, e.g., HORWITZ, supra note 8, at 137.
443. Currie’s Adm’rs v. Mut. Assurance Soc’y, 14 Va. (4 Hen. & M.) 315, at 347-48 (1809).
444. Id. at 315-16.
445. The Society’s bylaws, adopted under authority of the original act of incorporation of 
1794, provided that fourteen directors and a president would manage the Society’s business. The 
General Assembly’s amendment in 1805 provided for only three directors, out of whom a president 
was to be elected. Per the Society’s charter, however, the members of the Virginia General Assem-
bly were also, ex officio, the representatives of the unrepresented shareholders of the corporation, so 
that, in the view of the court, the 1805 amendment was made “at the prayer and application of the 
incorporated body.” Id. at 323, 329.
446. Id. at 329.
447. Id. at 333.
448. Id. at 329.
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Since the corporate charter was a law rather than a contract, and since—in light 
of the relevant factual circumstances—the corporation had arguably assented to 
the 1805 amendment anyway, the Virginia court held that “the Constitution of 
the United States does not prohibit the legislature of a state from changing the 
fundamental laws of a corporation, with its assent, given in its corporate char-
ter.”449
Only ten years later in 1819, from a similar beginning, the U.S. Supreme 
Court in Dartmouth College arrived at a very different conclusion.  Chief Jus-
tice Marshall’s statement that corporate purposes were inherently public has 
been noted above.450 Notwithstanding this statement, Marshall distinguishes 
“public” from “private” purposes:
This is the point on which the cause essentially depends. If the act of incorporation 
be a grant of political power, if it create a civil institution, to be employed in the 
administration of the government, or if the funds of the college be public property, 
or if the state of New Hampshire, as a government, be alone interested in its trans-
actions, the subject is one in which the legislature of the state may act according to 
its own judgment. . . .
But if this be a private eleemosynary institution, endowed with a capacity to take 
property, for objects unconnected with the government, whose funds are bestowed 
by individuals, on the faith of the charter; if the donors have stipulated for the fu-
ture disposition and management of those funds, in the manner prescribed by them-
selves, there may be more difficulty in the case. . . .
451
In his concurring opinion, Justice Story appears to go a step further:
Another division of corporations is into public and private. Public corporations are 
generally esteemed such as exist for public political purposes only, such as towns, 
cities, parishes and counties. . . . But a bank, whose stock is owned by private per-
sons, is a private corporation, although it is erected by government, and its objects 
and operations partake of a public nature. The same doctrine may be affirmed of 
insurance, canal, bridge and turnpike companies. In all these cases, the uses may, in 
a certain sense, be called public, but the corporations are private.
452
Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, famously held that Dartmouth College’s
charter was a contract, the obligations of which could not be impaired by the 
New Hampshire legislature without violating the U.S. Constitution.453 As noted 
above, the Court’s holding was based on the private nature of the college’s as-
sets rather than its eleemosynary purpose.454 In eighteenth-century law, no such 
distinction between public and private law or public and private corporations 
449. Id. (emphasis added).
450. See supra discussion accompanying notes 212 to 216.
451. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 629-30 (1819).
452. Id. at 668-69.
453. Id. at 650.
454. Id. at 661. See also Maier, supra note 8, at 80; supra discussion accompanying notes 212 
to 216.
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was accepted.455  Only ten years after Currie’s Administrators, then, the pub-
lic/private distinction in Dartmouth College, and particularly Justice Story’s ex-
plicit division of corporations into public and private, therefore appear compara-
tively novel.456 As one historian notes:
Armed with Story’s concurrence, the Dartmouth College decision played a crucial 
role in the transformation of the corporation from an association of individuals 
vested with a portion of sovereignty designed to accomplish public service to an 
association whose corporate status was a promotional device employed by the state 
to facilitate the pursuit of private goals by private individuals.
457
That the Court in Dartmouth College bases the public/private distinction and the 
contractual nature of the college’s charter on the private status of the corpora-
tion’s assets, specifically, the funds donated by the college’s founder—i.e. the 
corporation’s aggregated capital—seems significant.  At its inception in the 
1810s, the public/private distinction appears to reflect a new but already widen-
ing divide between, on the one hand, public powers, privileges, and obligations, 
granted by the state through enactment of laws for public purposes, and on the 
other hand, private resources, organized largely without such public power, 
privilege, or obligation, to be managed and controlled for private purposes by 
private contract—in other words, between state power and private property.458
The public/private distinction becomes increasingly prominent in other ear-
ly nineteenth-century cases.  In Taylor v. Griswold in 1834, the New Jersey Su-
preme Court, in considering whether a bridge corporation could adopt bylaws 
providing for voting by proxy and a one-share one-vote rule, appears to have 
wrestled with the question.  The court cited Dartmouth College for the proposi-
tion that
There is, no doubt, a plain and obvious distinction, important for many purposes, 
between public and private corporations; between such as are created for political 
and municipal purposes; and such as are instituted for the government of particular 
societies, or the management and protection of private property.
459
455. Handlin & Handlin, supra note 8, at 19; see also supra note 211; supra discussion ac-
companying note 9, notes 206 to 208.
456. See Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43, 51-52 (1815) (Story, J.) (distinguishing 
between private and public corporations); Newmyer, supra note 212, at 834 (discussing Terrett); see 
also DODD, supra note 8, at 25 (discussing Story’s opinion in Terrett as the “earliest judicial affir-
mation” of the division of corporations into two classes, public and private); Horwitz, Pub-
lic/Private Distinction, supra note 212, at 1425 (describing the separation between public and pri-
vate corporations in Dartmouth College as “entirely novel”); Williams, supra note 212, at 240 
(describing Dartmouth College as helping introduce into American constitutional law the “New 
England [tradition]” of “bifurcat[ing] corporations in particular, and the world in general, into di-
chotomous public and private spheres”).
457. Newmyer, supra note 212, at 836; see also O’Melinn, supra note 206, at 245 (describing 
the shift from special to general incorporation as “a transfer of sovereignty from the government to 
the corporation”).
458. See infra discussion accompanying notes 542 to 544.
459. Taylor v. Griswold, 14 N.J.L. 222, 234 (1834).
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As in Justice Story’s opinion, the public/private distinction—now “plain and 
obvious”—appears to be based directly on the corporation’s purpose rather than 
its assets.  In the “class of private corporations,” the court includes “canal, rail 
road, bridge, turnpike, banking, manufacturing and trading companies.”460 The 
court then appears to retreat from this conclusion, arguing, with Justice Story:
But public good, is the avowed object of all such institutions; and however private 
property and emolument may be involved, the public have a deep and important in-
terest in the government and success of every one of them. In short, they are all, in 
an important sense, public institutions. A bank, whose stock is exclusively owned 
by individuals, is in legal sense, a private corporation, but its objects and opera-
tions, partake of a public nature, and the same may be affirmed of insurance, canal, 
bridge, turnpike and rail road companies. Per Story, Just. 4 Wheat. 669. If, howev-
er, the right of voting by proxy, is to be conceded to banking, insurance and mer-
cantile companies, upon the ground that they are strictly private corporations, the 
same cannot be predicated of bridge, nor perhaps, of canal, turnpike and rail road 
companies. They certainly partake more of a public nature; and the public have a 
more direct and immediate interest in their management.
461
While all corporations are concerned with the public good, banks and insurance 
companies appear in the court’s view to be less public, and more private, than 
bridges, canals, turnpikes and railroads, since the latter cannot discontinue, but 
rather, are obligated by their charters to maintain, their operations for the bene-
fit of the public.462 In the court’s thinking, a public/private spectrum is thus be-
ginning to emerge, with political and municipal corporations on the public end, 
banks and insurance companies on the “strictly” private end, and internal im-
provement companies in the hybrid middle.  Ultimately, the court considers, but 
declines to follow—at least for purposes of upholding a proxy bylaw—the dis-
tinction previously drawn in State v. Tudor463 between incorporated societies 
“whose object is the acquisition of property” and those which are “instituted for 
the public good, either for the good of the whole state, or of a particular town or 
society”:464
With all due deference to that very able and learned court, I cannot follow in their 
steps, in a path so newly trod, and upon a line so undefined and undefinable as the 
one they have attempted to mark out. In this day of corporations, it is not easy to 
point out so distinctly, the separating line between such as are created merely for 
the acquisition of property, and such as are instituted purely for the public good, or 
the good of a particular district of country, as to render it a safe and certain criteri-




462. Id.; see also Hansmann & Pargendler, supra note 8, at 117 (citing Taylor, 14 N.J.L. at 
234).
463. State v. Tudor, 5 Day 329 (Conn. 1812).
464. Taylor, 14 N.J.L. at 232 (citing State, 5 Day at 333).
465. Id. at 232-33, 235.
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In 1834, then, the public/private distinction—even though it had become “plain 
and obvious” since Dartmouth College—remained in its specifics “newly trod”
and ill-defined.
In Charles River Bridge in 1837, the U.S. Supreme Court accepted a largely 
similar distinction between banks, insurance companies, and manufacturers on 
the one hand, and internal improvement companies on the other.  Some time 
ago, the Court noted,
[T]he difference was pointed out in argument, between such grants as involve pub-
lic duties and public matters for the common benefit of the people, and such as are 
for mere private benefit, involving no such consideration. If a bank, or insurance 
company, or manufacturing company, is established in any town, by an act of in-
corporation; no one ever imagined that the corporation was bound to do business, 
to employ its capital, to manufacture goods, to make insurance. The privilege is a 
mere private corporate privilege, for the benefit of the stockholders, to be used or 
not, at their own pleasure; to operate when they please; and to stop when they 
please. Did any man ever imagine, that he had a right to have a note discounted by 
a bank, or a policy underwritten by an insurance company? Such grants are always 
deemed privati juris. No indictment lies for a non-user. But in cases of ferries 
and bridges, and other franchises of a like nature (as has been shown), they are af-
fected with a jus publicum. Such grants are made for the public accommodation; 
and pontage and passage are authorized to be levied upon travellers (which can on-
ly be by public authority); and in return, the proprietors are bound to keep up all 
suitable accommodations for travellers, under the penalty of indictment for their 
neglect.466
The Court here draws a bright line between a “mere corporate privilege, for the 
benefit of the stockholders,” which was private law, and grants to ferries and 
bridges “made for the public accommodation,” which were affected by a jus 
publicum.  Already in 1837, the Court is approaching a clear public/private dis-
tinction based primarily on corporate purpose.467
In 1852, the public/private distinction was articulated in great detail in a 
Michigan Supreme Court case.  Swan v. Williams involved a challenge to a rail-
466. Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. 420, 639 
(1837); see also HOVENKAMP, supra note 186, at 57 (citing ANGELL & AMES, supra note 62, at 510, 
on the obligation of the incorporators to fund and build the public improvement contemplated by the 
charter).
467. See DODD, supra note 8, at 161 (noting that the court does not controvert Story’s conten-
tion that toll-bridge companies differ substantially from purely private corporations); Horwitz, Pub-
lic/Private Distinction, supra note 212, at 134 (“As public service corporations were transformed 
into private, profit-making organizations, the historic legal categories were no longer practical 
guides for determining the course of public policy.”); id. at 136 (“This recognition of the private 
nature of business corporations goes as far back as the Dartmouth College decision and reflects the 
changing nature of economic relationships.”); Wells, Shareholder Power, supra note 8, at 1043 
(stating that in the 1830s, only a blurry line existed between business and other kinds of corpora-
tions, until sharper legal distinctions were drawn in the 1840s and 1850s).
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road taking by eminent domain.468 In upholding the railroad’s taking, the court 
declares it “most certain” that “three grand classes of corporations exist”:469
1st. Political or municipal corporations, such as counties, towns, cities and villages, 
which, from their nature, are subject to the unlimited control of the Legislature; 2d. 
Those associations which are created for public benefit, and to which the govern-
ment delegates a portion of its sovereign power, to be exercised for public utility, 
such as turnpike, bridge, canal, and railroad companies; and 3d. strictly private 
corporations, where the private interest of the corporators is the primary object of 
the association, such as banking, insurance, manufacturing and trading companies; 
and in this class may also be included eleemosynary corporations, generally. . . .
The object, defines the character of these associations. . . .
The object of strictly private associations is to aggregate the capital, the talents, 
and the skills of individuals, to foster industry and encourage the arts. Private ad-
vantage is the ultimate, as well as the immediate object of their creation, and such 
as results to the public is incidental. . .
But the object and the origin of that class of corporations represented by the de-
fendants in this case, and which might with far more propriety be styled public ra-
ther than private corporations, are of an altogether different nature and character. 
Their very existence is based upon the delegation to them of the sovereign power to 
take private property for public use, and upon the continued exercise of that power 
in the use of the property for the purposes for which it was condemned. . . . That 
private property can be taken by the government from one and bestowed upon an-
other for private use, will not for a moment be contended, and these corporations 
can be sustained only upon the assumption that the powers delegated, are to a pub-
lic agent, to work out a public use. . . .
Nor can it be said that the property when taken is not used by the public, but by the 
corporators for their own profit and advantage. It is unquestionably true that these 
enterprises may be, and probably always are, undertaken with a view to private 
emolument on the part of the corporators, but it is none the less true that the object 
of the government in creating them is public utility, and that private benefit, instead 
of being the occasion of the grant, is but the reward springing from the service.
470
For our purposes, this opinion is remarkable in several ways.  First, the court 
has moved decisively away from the rationale of Dartmouth College; it is no 
longer the source of the assets of the corporation, but expressly the corporate 
“object”—i.e. its purpose—that defines the corporation’s character.  Second, 
based on the types of corporate purposes then existing, the implicit three-part 
spectrum of Taylor v. Griswold has been made explicit, with municipal corpora-
tions at the wholly public end, internal improvement companies created “for 
public benefit” (for the time being still including railroads) in the middle, and 
banking, insurance, manufacturing, trading, and eleemosynary corporations at 
468. Swan v. Williams, 2 Mich. 427 (1852); see also DODD, supra note 8, at 159.
469. Swan, 2 Mich. at 434; see also DODD, supra note 8, at 159.
470. Swan, 2 Mich. at 434-35 (emphasis in original); see also DODD, supra note 8, at 161 
(citing Swan).
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the “strictly private” end.471 Third, banking, insurance, and manufacturing cor-
porations have lost all meaningful trace of the public purpose with which they 
were formerly seen to be endowed; their purpose is now only “private ad-
vantage,” and any public benefit is “incidental.”472 Conversely, the pursuit of 
“private emolument” does not render railroads and other internal improvement 
companies private; rather, their purpose is public utility, and any private benefit 
received is merely “the reward springing from the service”—the “quid pro quo”
of Angell and Ames.473 Finally, it may be observed that as the antebellum 
American economy developed and the internal improvement companies faded 
away, the two segments that remained in the spectrum of corporate purpose—
wholly public and strictly private, at opposite ends—increasingly resembled the 
conventional binary universe of the twentieth century, consisting of nonprofit 
and for-profit corporations with nothing in between.
Similar developments are reflected in American corporation law treatises of 
the time.  James Kent, in his Commentaries of 1827, applies largely the same 
corporate taxonomy as Coke, Blackstone and Kyd before him, classifying cor-
porations into aggregate and sole, ecclesiastical and lay, and within the latter, 
eleemosynary and civil.474 But unlike his English predecessors, Kent further 
divides civil corporations into public and private, perhaps not surprisingly along 
the same general lines as in Dartmouth College:
Civil corporations are established for a variety of purposes, and they are either pub-
lic or private. Public corporations, are such as exist for political purposes only, such 
as counties, cities, towns, and villages. They are founded by the government, for 
public purposes, and the whole interest in them belongs to the public. But if the 
foundation be private, the corporation is private, however extensive the uses may 
be to which it is devoted by the founder, or by the nature of the institution. A bank, 
created by the government, for its own uses, and where the stock is exclusively 
owned  by the government, is a public corporation. . . . But a bank, whose stock is 
owned by private persons, is a private corporation, though its objects and opera-
tions partake of a public nature. The same thing may be said of insurance, canal, 
bridge and turnpike companies. The uses may, in a certain sense, be called public, 
but the corporations are private. . . .
475
Kent’s distinction in 1827 does not advance much further, however: in banking, 
insurance, and internal improvement corporations, public and private purposes 
still coincide.476
471. Eleemosynary corporations also remain, somewhat anomalously, in the “strictly private”
category, apparently out of deference to Dartmouth College.
472. See DODD, supra note 8, at 160 (noting that the strictly private character of the incorpo-
rated manufacturing or insurance company had become well-established in mid-nineteenth century 
thinking).
473. See supra discussion accompanying note 191.
474. See supra discussion accompanying notes 51 to 74.
475. KENT, supra note 198, at 304-06; see Newmyer, supra note 212, at 838 (observing that 
Story’s distinction was presented as established law in KENT, supra note 198).
476. See DODD, supra note 8, at 24; Blair, Locking in Capital, supra note 8, at 424.
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Only five years later in 1832, however, Angell and Ames, in their Treatise 
on the Law of Private Corporations Aggregate—the first American legal trea-
tise dedicated to corporate law—appear to demonstrate in the course of their 
own work the transformation in American thinking on corporate purpose.  They 
begin their “Introduction” by reciting a fairly standard late eighteenth-century 
view of corporate purpose as inherently public, even if accompanied by private 
gain:
The object in creating a corporation is, in fact, to gain the union, contribution and 
assistance of several persons for the successful promotion of some design of public 
utility, though the corporation may, at the same time, be established for the ad-
vantage of those who are members of it. The principle is. . .that the design of a cor-
poration is to provide for some good that is useful to the public.
477
In their first chapter on “Meaning, Several Kinds, and History of Private Corpo-
rations,” they proceed to lay out the rule of Dartmouth College:
The main distinction between public and private corporation is, that over the for-
mer, the legislature, as the trustee or guardian of the public interest, has the exclu-
sive and unrestrained control. . . . Such institutions are the auxiliaries of the gov-
ernment in the important business of municipal rule. . . . Private corporations, on 
the other hand, are created by an act of the legislature, which, in connection with its 
acceptance, is regarded as a compact, and one which, so long as the body corporate 
faithfully observes, the legislature is constitutionally restrained from impair-
ing. . . .
478
Only a page later, however, perhaps building on Justice Story, they then draw a 
sharp distinction between public and private corporate purposes:
Private corporations are indisputably the creatures of public policy, and, in the 
popular meaning of the term, may be called public; but yet, if the whole interest 
does not belong to the government (as if the corporation is created for the admin-
istration of civil or municipal power), the corporation is private. A bank, for in-
stance, may be created by the government for its own uses; but, if the stock is 
owned by private persons, it is a private corporation, although it is erected by the 
sanction of public authority, and its objects and operations partake of a public na-
ture. Railroads are private corporations, and “generally speaking,” say the 
court. . .”public corporations are towns, cities, counties, parishes, existing for pub-
lic purposes; private corporations are for banks, insurance, roads, canals, bridges, 
&c., where the stock is owned by individuals, but their use may be public.” In all 
the last named, and other like corporations, the acts done by them are done with a 
view to their own interest, and if thereby they incidentally promote that of the pub-
lic, it cannot reasonably be supposed that they do it from any spirit of liberality 
they have beyond that of their fellow citizens. Both the property and the sole object 
477. ANGELL & AMES, supra note 62, at 7-8; see also Maier, supra note 8, at 80-81 (citing 
this principle as evidence that the assumption that the corporation served some public good outlived 
the 1830s).
478. ANGELL & AMES, supra note 62, at 21-22 (citing Dartmouth College).
Fall 2019] A Brief History of Corporate Purpose 65
of every such corporation are essentially private, and from them the individuals 
composing the company corporate are to derive profit.
479
Initially, the spectrum of corporate purpose in this passage also appears to be 
tripartite—as it does thereafter in Taylor v. Griswold and Swan v. Williams—
with municipal corporations at the public end, private corporations existing for 
a “public use” in the middle, and profit-seeking private corporations at the pri-
vate end.  Upon closer examination, however, the distinction here between pri-
vate corporations whose “use may be public” and strictly private corporations 
arguably collapses.  Private corporations with a “public use” cannot be said to 
have a public “purpose”; indeed, the acts done by them are “with a view to their 
own interest.” Any benefit to the public is incidental, rather than from “any 
spirit of liberality,” and the “sole object” of every such corporation is ultimately 
to derive profit.  As early as 1832, then, Angell and Ames seem to be approach-
ing the modern bright-line divide between public or “nonprofit” corporations 
and private “for-profit” firms.
Perhaps nowhere was the transformation in the American understanding of 
corporate purpose more clearly reflected than in the shift from special to general 
incorporation in the 1840s and 1850s.  The advent of general incorporation has 
been described as “perhaps the major event” in American corporation law in the 
second half of the nineteenth century.480 General incorporation constituted a 
sea change from the early years of the business corporation.  To incorporate,
political influence, and a special act of the (increasingly overburdened) state 
legislature, were no longer required; grants of public or quasi-public powers 
from the state to the incorporators were no longer presumed; public utility was 
no longer the implicit purpose of the corporation; and private profit was no 
longer a “reward” for public service, but a legitimate end in its own right.  With 
general incorporation, the purpose of the corporation had arguably privatized.481
General incorporation statutes typically allowed a small number of individuals 
to self-incorporate for any purpose allowed under the statute.482  All that was 
required was generally to file with a state government office and record a certif-
icate.483 Incorporation became a routine and inexpensive procedure outside the 
479. Id. at 25-26; see also Newmyer, supra note 212, at 838 (“Story’s definition was accepted 
as a starting point . . . [by Angell and Ames], the standard work on corporate law for the period.”).
480. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 512 (describing the advent of general incorporation 
as perhaps the major event in corporation law 1850-1900); BERLE & MEANS, supra note 17, at 137 
(describing the changes brought about by general incorporation “revolutionary in corporation law”); 
O’Melinn, supra note 205, at 244 (stating that the shift from special to general corporation “brought 
about a change in the fundamental theory under which incorporation was granted”).
481. Hilt, Open Access, supra note 8, at 1.
482. See, e.g., SEAVOY, ORIGINS, supra note 8 at 65 (discussing the New York act of 1811).
483. Hilt, Open Access, supra note 8, at 1; but see Wells, Shareholder Power, supra note 8 at 
1059 (noting the ways in which general incorporation laws continued to restrict corporations); 
Lamoreaux & Novak, supra note 487, at 12 (“most early general incorporation laws were full of 
regulations that imposed strict limits on what corporations could do, how big they could grow, how 
long they could last, and what forms their internal governance could take.”).
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realm of political influence.484 In Jacksonian fashion, general incorporation 
statutes made the opportunity to participate in business corporations with lim-
ited liability available on a broadly democratic basis.485
The earliest general incorporation acts were for charitable and religious cor-
porations.486  General incorporation acts for business corporations were mod-
elled directly on such charitable and religious precedents.487 The first general 
incorporation act for business corporations appears to have been the Massachu-
setts Aqueduct Act of 1799.488 New York enacted the first general incorpora-
tion act for manufacturing companies in 1811.489 Massachusetts followed suit 
in 1830,490 Pennsylvania in 1836,491 and Connecticut in 1837.492 New York 
adopted a general incorporation act for railroads in 1848493 and Massachusetts 
in 1851 for banks.494 Enactment of general incorporation statutes for a wide va-
riety of business corporations accelerated nationwide in the 1840s and 1850s.495
By 1859, twenty-four of thirty-eight states, and by 1875, forty-four of forty-
seven states or territories, offered general incorporation.496
484. Id.
485. SEAVOY, ORIGINS, supra note 8, at 182; Hamill, supra note 8, at 103; Hilt, Early Ameri-
can Corporations, supra note 8 at 38; Hilt, Open Access, supra note 8, at 12; see also SEAVOY,
ORIGINS, supra note 8, at 258.
486. DAVIS, supra note 8, at 16-17 (citations omitted).
487. SEAVOY, ORIGINS, supra note 8, at 64; Lamoreaux and Novak, supra note 483, 1, 10. 
The term “trustee” in the New York act of 1811 was borrowed from the 1784 general incorporation 
act for religious congregations. Id. at 65. See also Seavoy, Public Service Origins, supra note 8, at 
38 (observing that the 1784 New York statute “was designed to prevent political interference in an 
activity (religious worship) that a large portion of the population considered a matter of private con-
cern,” and that the same pattern was repeated with general incorporation statutes for business corpo-
rations in the 1840s and 1850s); Hilt, Open Access, supra note 8 at (manuscript at 6).
488. DODD, supra note 8, at 264.
489. Hamill, supra note 8, at 101; Seavoy, Laws to Encourage Manufacturing, supra note 8, 
at 90; Lamoreaux & Novak, supra note 483, at 12; see also Seavoy, ORIGINS, supra note 8, at 64-
65; Hilt, Open Access, supra note 8 (manuscript at 6-7).
490. DODD, supra note 8, at 310.
491. Hamill, supra note 8, at 314. n.22 (“Pennsylvania . . . did not have a general manufactur-
ing corporations act of importance until 1849 . . . .”).
492. Hamill, supra note 8, at 101; see also Lamoreaux & Novak, Corporations and American 
Democracy: An Introduction, supra note 487, at 12 (noting that by 1850, fourteen states, and by 
1860, twenty-seven states had adopted general incorporation statutes for manufacturing); BERLE &
MEANS, supra note 17, at 136 (characterizing the Connecticut statute, which permitted incorpora-
tion “for any lawful business,” as “the first really modern type of statute”).
493. SEAVOY, ORIGINS, supra note 8, at 201.
494. DODD, supra note 8, at 284 n.65; see also Hilt, Early American Corporations, supra note 
8, at 39 n. 9, (commencing on New York’s general incorporation law of 1838 for banks).
495. Hilt, Open Access, supra note 8, at 5; see also SEAVOY, ORIGINS, supra note 8, at 191-
192 (listing the general incorporation statutes passed from 1847 to 1855); SEAVOY, ORIGINS, supra
note 8, at 265.
496. Hamill, From Special Privilege to General Utility, supra note 8, at 103, 105. See gener-
ally HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, supra note 186.
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At the same time, state legislatures gradually withdrew from direct in-
volvement in private corporations, particularly those such as manufacturing that 
lacked an obvious public purpose.497 After about 1840, state governments re-
fused to participate in further internal improvement company projects.498 Many 
states affirmatively prohibited direct investment in private enterprise; by 1874, 
sixteen state constitutions provided that the state could not own stock in private 
corporations, and in twenty states, providing state credit to corporations was 
banned.499 Many states with general incorporation statutes no longer allowed 
special charters.500 In New York, for example, a new state constitution was 
adopted in 1846 that in most circumstances prohibited special charters and for-
bade the state to lend its credit to any corporation or individual.501 The effect of 
these provisions, notes Ronald Seavoy, was to reverse New York’s earlier state 
policy of encouraging internal improvement projects and to complete “the radi-
cal separation of the state government from all business corporations.”502
Governance of business corporations gradually aligned with the new private
corporate purpose.503 Statutory limits on corporate capital and duration and 
other restrictions eroded.504 Limited liability for shareholders became the gen-
eral rule, even for manufacturing corporations with no public purpose, after 
about 1830.505 In the 1840s and 1850s, graduated voting became increasingly 
rare, and by the 1880s, one-share, one-vote—Colleen Dunlavy’s “plutocratic 
voting”—became the norm.506  General incorporation laws typically specified 
one vote per share.507 A Massachusetts act of 1848 allowed for the first time for 
the issuance of a senior class of shares;508 another Massachusetts statute in 1851 
497. Wells, supra note 8, at 1043 (citations omitted). See generally BERLE & MEANS, supra
note 17 at 141 ff.
498. SEAVOY, ORIGINS, supra note 8 at 180, 181. See also Smythe, supra note 178, at 1418 
(“As the nineteenth century proceeded, state and local governments increasingly began to displace 
franchise corporations as the providers of local infrastructure.”).
499. FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 512-13.
500. FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 512; Hamill, supra note 8, at 123.
501. SEAVOY, ORIGINS, supra note 8, at 182-183; Hamill, From Special Privilege to General 
Utility, supra note 8, at 125.
502. SEAVOY, ORIGINS, supra note 8, at 183, 266-267.
503. See generally BERLE & MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY,
supra 17, at 138 ff.; Wells, Shareholder Power, supra note 8, at 1053 ff.; but see Lamoreaux & No-
vak, Corporations and American Democracy: An Introduction, supra note 487 at 12 (“most early 
general incorporation laws were full of regulations that imposed strict limits on what corporations 
could do, how big they could grow, how long they could last, and what forms their internal govern-
ance could take.”).
504. Maier, supra note 8, at 80.
505. See, e.g., Massachusetts Manufacturing Corporation Act, ch. 53, 1831 Mass. Acts 325 
(1830); ANGELL & AMES, supra note 62, at 34.
506. Dunlavy, From Citizens to Plutocrats, supra note 384 at 79, 82; Wells, Shareholder 
Power, supra note 8 at 1050.
507. Wells, supra note 8, at 1050-1; Hansmann & Pargendler, supra note 8, at 970.
508. DODD, supra note 8, at 335.
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authorized the first issuance of railroad bonds;509 and in 1855 the Massachusetts 
legislature authorized Massachusetts corporations to carry on business outside 
the state.510 Further liberalization of corporate charters followed.511
By 1860, the stage had been set for the advent of the modern profit-
maximizing firm.  The corporation had become the business organization of 
choice not just for manufacturing enterprises, but for all enterprises.512  With 
general incorporation, “[m]ore business corporations were organized in the dec-
ade of the 1850s than during the whole previous history of business corpora-
tions in the United States.”513 The most visible interstate business corporations 
were railroads, followed by banks and textile manufactories.514 “Late nine-
teenth-century railroads came to be seen as the paradigm of the modern, large-
scale business corporation requiring massive amounts of capital, specialized 
management, and dispersed ownership.”515 The purpose of the corporation was 
increasingly understood to be private and pecuniary, until in 1919, in a case 
about a manufacturing company not paying dividends, the Michigan Supreme 
Court famously declared, as if it had always been true, that “[a] business corpo-
ration is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockhold-
ers.”516
V. CONCLUSIONS.
I have argued in this Article that three distinct periods may be discerned in 
the history of the early American corporation: (i) what I call the pre-corporate 
period prior to about 1780, when corporations in England and the American 
colonies were rare and served as an all-purpose vehicle for associations of any 
kind, whether municipal, religious, charitable, educational, or pecuniary; (ii) a 
second period from 1780 to the 1830s, particularly in New England, marked by 
the rapid and unprecedented rise of the American business corporation in the 
form of specially chartered turnpike, bridge, canal, early railroad, early banking, 
and early manufacturing corporations, whose purposes were all understood to 
be fundamentally public, with public powers granted by the state for the pur-
pose of building urgently needed local transportation and finance infrastructure, 
and private gain (if any) to investors only incidental; and (iii) a third period be-
ginning in the 1820s and continuing beyond 1860, particularly in manufactur-
509. Id. at 337.
510. Id. at 324.
511. See generally BERLE & MEANS, supra note 18.
512. Hamill, supra note 8, at 103 (citation omitted).
513. SEAVOY, ORIGINS, supra note 8 at 249.
514. SEAVOY, ORIGINS, supra note 8 at 249.
515. Hansmann & Pargendler, The Evolution of Shareholder Voting Rights, supra note 8, at 
122; Blair, Locking in Capital, supra note 8, at 442 (citing ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE 
HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS 41 (1977)).
516. Dodge, 170 N.W. at 684. See infra discussion Part III.
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ing, railroads and banking, during which the private corporation emerged, 
which was chartered under a general incorporation statute, and whose purpose 
was almost wholly pecuniary return on investment to the corporation’s share-
holders, with any benefit to the public only incidental.517 These last corpora-
tions were the immediate forerunners of the profit-maximizing modern firm.
What, then, does this brief history tell us about the purpose of the corpora-
tion? First, I would argue, this history demonstrates that the essential or intrinsic 
characteristics of the American business corporation are only two: (i) separate 
legal personality518 and (ii) the ability to aggregate financial and informational 
capital.519 From the earliest days of the common law corporation, the ability of
the corporate form to outlive its members and to aggregate economic and in-
formational assets in an enduring vehicle have been recognized by commenta-
tors, courts, investors and entrepreneurs alike.520 These two characteristics 
517. See Reuven Avi-Yonah, The Cyclical Transformation of the Corporate Form, supra note 
206, at 770-771 (outlining four major transformations in the corporation since the Roman era). My 
second and third periods would be sub-components of Professor Avi-Yonah’s second transfor-
mation.
518. See Blair, Reforming Corporate Governance, supra note 8, at 21 (“I regard legal sepa-
rateness as the singular accomplishment of corporate law, the characteristic that provided the benefit 
business organizers so eagerly sought.”). Other traditional characteristics of the corporation such as 
perpetual succession, the ability to sue and be sued, the power to make bylaws, and the right to have 
a seal arguably flow from, and are only incidents or elaborations of, separate legal personality.
519. On informational and organizational capital, see generally Blair, Locking in Capital,
supra note 8, at 393 (creation of a governance mechanism or “organizational capabilities” as a sec-
ond critical contribution of corporation law as it evolved in the nineteenth century) (citation omit-
ted); Alfred D. Chandler, Organizational Capabilities and the Economic History of the Industrial 
Enterprise, 6 J. ECON. PERSP. 79, 79 (1992) (identifying four attributes of the firm: a legal entity, an 
administrative entity, a “pool of physical facilities, learned skills and liquid capital,” and the prima-
ry instrument for the production and distribution of goods and services and for planning and alloca-
tion for future production and distribution); and R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA
386 (1937).
520. See, e.g., COKE ON LITTLETON, supra note 25, at *250a; 1 Blackstone, supra note 25, at 
475; 1 KYD, supra note 25, at 10; ANGELL & AMES, supra note 62, at 92, 120, 121; KENT, supra
note 202, at 219, 224; Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 at 636; FRIEDMAN, supra
note 8, at 198 (discussing “the concept of the corporation as an occasion for aggregating capital to-
ward a single venture or purpose”); HURST, supra note 8, at 25 (“capacity for indefinite life, unin-
terrupted by change of shareholders, was an enterprise-continuity value peculiar to the corporate 
form”) and 26 (“from the outset, the corporation was an instrument to provide firm central direction 
for the enterprising use of pooled assets”); Seavoy, Public Service Origins, supra note 8, at 31 
(‘[t]he principal advantages of incorporation were the right to own real property in the name of an 
organization that had a perpetual legal existence and to defend this property at law”); Hamill, supra
note 8, at 91 (“At that time, the principal legal benefits offered by the corporation. . .revolved 
around the corporation’s ability to exist beyond the natural life of the shareholders, to pool large 
amounts of capital, and to own property.”)(citation omitted); DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER 
HISTORY OF CORPORATIONS IV supra note 8, at 283 (discussing “[t]he advantages in the raising of 
capital and the greater possibility of continuous life”); Blair, Locking in Capital, supra note 8, at 
387, 389, 413 (“The central hypothesis of this Article is that demand for the corporate form surged 
in the mid-nineteenth century United States because this form of entity uniquely facilitated the es-
tablishment of lasting enterprises that could accumulate substantial enterprise-specific physical as-
sets, and form extensive specialized organizational structures.”); HERBERT HOVENKAMP,
70 Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review [Vol. 9:1
were vital to virtually all corporations in the period from 1780 to 1860 without 
regard to their particular corporate purpose.  Furthermore, contrary to the stand-
ard view, as Oscar and Mary Handlin have argued, a third characteristic—
limited liability for shareholders—was not clearly among the key attributes of 
the early American corporation.521 As discussed above, manufacturing corpora-
tions in Massachusetts—in which “the birth of the American business corpora-
tion” may be located522—were governed in their formative period from 1809 to 
1830 by a statute that expressly provided for unlimited shareholder liability.523
The establishment of limited liability as a standard corporate characteristic after 
1830 should perhaps be seen less as a precondition than a consequence of the 
success of manufacturing and other pecuniary corporations.524 Beyond these 
two enduring characteristics (separate legal personality and the ability to aggre-
gate capital), I would argue that the corporation per se has no inherent purpose, 
least of all an obligation to maximize—or for that matter, to prohibit private in-
urement of—corporate profits to shareholders.525
I accordingly conclude that the profit maximization doctrine, pursuant to 
which corporate directors today are held to have a fiduciary duty to maximize 
profits to shareholders, is merely a historical development, and not an intrinsic 
or indispensable characteristic of the for-profit corporation.526 For at least the 
ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, supra note 186, at 12 (“[T[he corporation became nothing more 
than a device for assembling large amounts of capital so it could be controlled efficiently by a few 
managers.”); MAYER, supra note 8, at 82; and Gower, Some Contrasts Between British and Ameri-
can Corporation Law, supra note 42, at 1375. As a linguistic matter, the corporation is a body (cor-
pus) in need of a head (caput, the root of “capital” – “pertaining to the head”). THE OXFORD 
DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH ETYMOLOGY, ed. C.T. Onions (Oxford University Press: 1966) 143.
521. Handlin & Handlin, supra note 8, at 2, 21, 22; Blair, Locking in Capital, supra note 8, at 
437-38; Arner, supra note 8, at 45-46 (discussing Handlins).
522. Handlin & Handlin, supra note 8, at 22.
523. See, e.g., Blair, Locking in Capital, supra note 8 at 437 ff.; see also discussion supra
accompanying notes 409 to 416.
524. The topic of limited liability in early American business corporations is beyond the 
scope of this Article. For now, in addition to the Massachusetts 1809 statute, other important differ-
ences from today’s concept of limited liability may be noted: (i) subscriptions for shares were not 
generally paid in up front, but rather, only when assessed, so that shareholders even with limited 
liability remained liable for unpaid amounts on their shares; (ii) even after 1830 in Massachusetts 
and other states, limited liability was available only after all shareholder had been capital fully paid 
in and a certificate filed to that effect; (iii) there were initially no limitations on the corporation’s
ability to assess shareholders for more capital, and it was also not clear that creditors could not 
compel a corporate assessment for the purpose of paying out a corporate debt to creditors; (iv) 
shareholders were typically liable for double the amount of their shares in some industries; and (v) 
shareholders had unlimited liability for particular kinds of debts. See, e.g., Handlin & Handlin, su-
pra note 8, at 8 ff.; Blair, Locking in Capital, supra note 8 at 437 ff.; Mahoney, Contract or Conces-
sion?, supra note 42, at 893 (“Limited liability. . .never mattered much in a world without products 
liability, class actions, and other twentieth-century legal innovations.”).
525. Obligations may of course be imposed by statute, but – assuming the demise of the ultra 
vires doctrine – I contend that such statutory obligations are not intrinsic to the corporate form.
526. See Guenther, supra note 3, at 427 (analyzing the profit maximization doctrine in Amer-
ican corporation law today).
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first fifty years of the American business corporation’s existence, no such doc-
trine existed.  Thousands of business corporations were organized and operated 
in the United States for avowedly public purposes and public benefits, as well 
as private profits, without conceiving of any such duty to maximize such private 
profits.  The purposes of these corporations were set forth in their charters and 
upheld for many decades with regularity by American courts.527 Indeed, ac-
cording to Merrick Dodd, before 1830, there does not appear to have been a 
single case “in which the principles of fiduciary law were applied to the direc-
tors or officers of business corporations.”528
To be clear, this is by no means to say that a fiduciary duty to maximize 
profits cannot or should not be applied to directors and officers of for-profit 
corporations—only that it need not be so applied, and for long periods was not
applied, presumably because no one considered it applicable or important.  Ra-
ther, directors’ fiduciary duty to maximize profits arose only gradually over the 
course of the nineteenth century as business conditions changed, most notably 
in the context of large capital-intensive manufacturing corporations, whose 
shareholders—numerous, dispersed, de-localized, and largely anonymous, in 
sharp contrast to the resident farmers and merchants who hoped primarily to 
benefit from a new turnpike or railroad in their immediate locale—understood 
themselves to be renters of capital, interested primarily, if not exclusively, in 
profits.  The profit-maximization doctrine arose only late in what I have called 
the third period of the American corporation.
This Article is not intended as a normative critique of profit-maximization 
as a corporate purpose.  Businesses change, and corporation law must change 
with them, and if shareholders’ purpose in investing in a business corporation is 
to maximize the dividends on their shares, then, I would argue, the corporate 
directors should, indeed must, remain loyal to that (perfectly legitimate) corpo-
rate purpose.  By the same token, however, if investors’ purpose is not primarily 
maximization of profits, but—in addition to some measure of profit—a public 
or social or environmental benefit of some kind, I would argue based on this 
history that there is nothing inherent in the American business corporation, not 
in 1800 and not today, to make that shareholder purpose unlawful.529 If, as a 
527. See, e.g., supra discussion accompanying notes 253 to 255.
528. DODD, supra note 8, at 70; Harwell, supra note 8, at 1047 (citing Dodd). See also D. 
Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. at 296 (“[T]he shareholder primacy 
norm was not developed by courts until the 1830s.”)(1998). For a broader critique of the application 
of the profit-maximization view to early nineteenth-century American corporations, see William J. 
Novak, Public Economy and The Well-Ordered Market: Law and Economic Regulation in 19th-
Century America, 18 L. & SOCIAL INQ. 1 (1993).
529. See Guenther, The Strange Case of the Missing Doctrine, supra note 3. See also Hilt, 
Early American Corporations, supra note 8, at 40 (discussing critics of modern corporations who 
have claimed that “the legal regime of the early American republic forced early corporations to 
serve the public good and offers a model that should be reintroduced today to restrain corporate 
power.”)(citation omitted). The focus of this Article is not on reintroduction of the early American 
model by U.S. state legislatures, but rather, on the freedom of corporate shareholders to choose such 
a model for themselves, without compulsion or prohibition by the state.  But see Avi-Yonah, The 
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matter of law, the purpose of the American business corporation can change, 
then the purpose of the American business corporation can change. If that pur-
pose can shift from public to private, it can also shift back. The American cor-
poration is a remarkably effective and maneuverable vehicle; like most vehicles, 
it does not come with a built-in destination.  It will move in whatever direction 
the directors, at the behest of shareholders, point it.  If that direction is unlawful, 
so be it—the drivers should be liable.  But plaintiffs should not be heard to 
claim that the unlawfulness arises from the nature of the corporation itself, any 
more than one should receive a traffic ticket for driving the wrong direction on 
the grounds that the one-way obligation, while not a rule of the road, is built in-
to the vehicle.  As long as the driver obeys the posted traffic laws, driving the 
vehicle in any direction on the compass should not be held to constitute an un-
lawful act “beyond the powers” of the driver.530 With respect to corporate pur-
pose, the doctrine of ultra vires should be declared—or redeclared, or certified 
by the applicable legal coroner—to be permanently and truly dead.531  Given 
sufficient manifestation of shareholder intent in the corporate charter, American 
courts should uphold non-profit maximizing purposes of American business 
corporations.
Based on this brief history, I also conclude that many social enterprises to-
day strongly resemble early American business corporations, particularly inter-
nal improvement companies in the hybrid middle.  Many social enterprises to-
day are using business corporations—”for-profits” with “nonprofit” missions, or 
nonprofits using for-profit tools to be sustainable—in the same ways, for the 
same reasons, and with the same corporate purposes as early American entre-
preneurs.532 Social enterprises today are typically organized to pursue some so-
Cyclical Transformation of the Corporate Form, supra note 206, at 768 (2005) (“Thus, an important 
question arises: given that corporations are frequently in the best position to help human develop-
ment, should they be permitted to do so when there is no clear benefit for their shareholders? This is 
a question which has been frequently addressed by academics in the last half century, and over-
whelmingly they have answered in the negative.”).
530. Cf. eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1; see also Lyman P.Q. John-
son, Unsettledness in Delaware Corporate Law: Business Judgment Rule, Corporate Purpose, 38 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 405, (“In effect, in eBay the crafty investor was fortuitously saved by a modern 
rendition of the slumbering ultra vires doctrine.”) (citation omitted); Guenther, supra note 3 at 479 
(arguing that the holding in eBay is best understood as a version of the ultra vires doctrine).
531. On the ostensible demise of the ultra vires doctrine, see Guenther, supra note 3 at 445 ff.
532. This statement is based in part on the author’s experience as the Director of the Interna-
tional Transactions Clinic at the University of Michigan Law School working with social enterprises 
operating in Africa, India, Latin America and other jurisdictions outside the United States. See, e.g.,
David Guenther, Doing Good by Doing Deals: How Law Students Help Social Entrepreneurs Help 
Small Farmers, NEXT BILLION (Nov. 7, 2016), https://nextbillion.net/doing-good-by-doing-deals-
how-law-students-help-social-entrepreneurs-help-small-farmers/; David Guenther & David W.
Koch, International Microfranchising: The International Transactions Clinic’s Experience, MICH.
B.J., Oct. 2017, at 34-38; Lori Atherton, Michigan Law Student-Attorneys Gain Transactional Ex-
perience in Ethiopia, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN (May 30, 2019),
https://www.law.umich.edu/newsandinfo/features/Pages/Michigan-Law-Student-Attorneys-Gain-
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cial, environmental, or other public purpose; in many parts of the world, those 
purposes revolve around building or improving local transportation, financial, 
agricultural, healthcare, energy, and other urgently needed economic infrastruc-
ture; social enterprises are frequently active in developing economies where lo-
cal governments do not have tax revenues, civil servants, or expertise to under-
take such projects themselves; and social entrepreneurs and their shareholders—
while nonetheless pursuing financial returns to be sustainable or even for per-
sonal gain—are frequently more interested in the public benefit they can thus 
create, i.e., the firm’s output, than its profits.533 Rather than being seen in to-
day’s corporation law as controversial outliers, whose directors are potentially 
liable for violating their fiduciary duties to shareholders, or which need special 
new statutes to authorize their public purposes to avoid such liability, social en-
terprises today should be understood to stand squarely within the historical and 
legal traditions of the American business corporation.  No change in American 
corporation law should be required.  The proliferation of manufacturing and 
other pecuniary corporations in the nineteenth century did not thereby effectuate 
a ban on earlier internal improvement corporations, nor, and as I have argued 
elsewhere, did the rise of the profit-maximization doctrine prohibit business 
corporations from having a public purpose.534
I therefore suggest that the plethora of new statutes enacted since 2008 in 
jurisdictions across the United States and, increasingly, Europe creating new 
forms of legal entity—benefit corporations, low-profit limited liability compa-
nies, flexible purpose corporations, social purpose corporations, and so forth—
are unnecessary.535 These new statutes resemble nothing so much as the early 
nineteenth-century regulatory statutes adopted as precursors to general incorpo-
ration laws.536 These nineteenth-century regulatory statutes were incorporated 
as a kind of legislative shorthand into the charters of all corporations specially 
organized in a particular industry and prescribed standard terms relating to capi-
Transactional-Experience-in-Ethiopia_053019.aspx. See generally Acha Leke & Saf Yeboah-
Amankwah, Africa: A Crucible for Creativity, HARV. BUS. REV. (Nov. – Dec. 2018) at 116-25.
533. Hansmann & Pargendler, supra note 8, at 112; see supra discussion accompanying notes 
239 to 376.
534. Guenther, supra note 3.
535. See, e.g., the Vermont Low-Profit Limited Liability Companies Act, H.0775, 2007-08 
Leg. Sess. (Vt. 2008) (enacted), codified at Vt. Stat. Ann. § 3001(27) (LexisNexis Supp. 2010); the 
Maryland Benefit Corporation Act of Apr. 13, 2010, ch. 97, 2010 MD. LAWS 980, (codified as 
amended at MD Code, Corps. & Ass’ns §§ 5-6C-01-08 (2012)); https://1.next.westlaw.com/
Link/Document/FullText?findType=L&pubNum=1000250&cite=MDCRPASSS5-6C-01
&originatingDoc=I66a98febfb3b11e79bf099c0ee06c731&refType=LQ&originationContext=
document&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search); Delaware Public Benefit 




536. See supra note 232; see generally Wells, supra note 8, at 1059.
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talization, duration, voting and so forth.537 They continued to be used for some 
period after the spread of general incorporation laws but gradually faded away 
as corporate charters liberalized and states increasingly regulated corporations 
by means of independent statutes rather than provisions of the corporate char-
ter.538  The new legal entity statutes being enacted today, which typically re-
quire specific provisions in the corporate charter, are a throwback to these nine-
teenth-century regulations—an attempt, as it were, to build a purpose back into 
the corporate vehicle, rather than to regulate the vehicle’s direction by means of 
regulatory street signs.539 What is more, while special charters in the nineteenth 
century typically granted important public or quasi-public powers and privileges 
to business corporations, as discussed above, the new legal entity statutes grant 
little or nothing from the state—largely only the (in my view already existing) 
right to pursue a social mission in a for-profit corporate form.540 In the words 
of Angell and Ames, there is little or no state quid given for the social enterprise
quo.541 From a nineteenth-century perspective, for social entrepreneurs, the 
new legal entity statutes are weak tea indeed.
More broadly, this brief history alludes to the deeper historical tension not 
only between public and private corporate purposes, but between public power 
and private property in the United States.542  This tension is evident from the 
537. See, e.g., Naomi R. Lamoreaux, Revisiting American Exceptionalism: Democracy and 
Regulation of Corporate Governance in Nineteenth-Century Pennsylvania, [Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper 20231 1, 9 (2014) (“[M]ost of the early general incorporation laws im-
posed strict limits on what corporations could do, how big they could grow, how long they could 
last, and what forms their internal governance could take.”).
538. Hilt, supra note 8, at 53 (discussing “general regulating acts” that specified the terms of 
all charters).
539. In this respect, the new legal entity statutes arguably constitute an attempt to resuscitate 
the ultra vires doctrine.
540. Some state statutes creating new for-profit legal entities may be seen to grant minor state 
powers or privileges to such entities. In comparison to nineteenth-century charters, these provisions 
do not seem like significant delegations of state power. Those state statutes that are based on the 
Model Benefit Corporation Act, for example, often exclude monetary damages in the event of cer-
tain shareholder suits against the corporation and limit the standing of benefit corporation share-
holders to sue the corporation. See, e.g, Model Benefit Corporation Legislation, April 17, 2017, 
§ 305(b) (eliminating the corporation’s liability for monetary damages for failing to pursue a public 
benefit) and § 305(c) (limiting shareholder standing to sue the corporation), https://benefitcorp.net/
sites/default/files/Model%20benefit%20corp%20legislation%20_4_17_17.pdf (last visited August 
20, 2019).
541. This is not to argue that the state powers or privileges delegated to today’s new for-profit 
legal entities need to be the same as those granted to business corporations in the early nineteenth 
century – only that today’s delegations are comparatively insubstantial.
542. See, e.g., Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 at 572-573 (1819) (“Indi-
viduals have a right to use their own property for purposes of benevolence, either towards the public 
or towards other individuals. They have a right to exercise this benevolence in such lawful manner 
as they may choose; and when the government has induced and excited it, by contracting to give 
perpetuity to the stipulated manner of exercising it, to rescind this contract, and seize on the proper-
ty, is not law, but violence.”); O’Melinn, Neither Contract Nor Concession, supra note 205, at 249 
(“the feeling that corporate behavior must be regulated is tempered by the fear that true government 
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earliest days of the American corporation, first surfacing in Dartmouth College,
with respect to an eighteenth-century eleemosynary corporation, and becoming 
increasingly conspicuous over the course of the nineteenth century.543 At bot-
tom, I suggest, this tension is not a feature of the corporation at all, but rather of 
changing socio-economic conditions and public policy in society at large.  His-
torically speaking, the acceptable level of state control over corporations ap-
pears to be a function of the perceived extent of the state powers and privileges 
granted to the corporation.  In the internal improvement companies, where 
grants of state power and privilege were significant, so were the corporation’s 
public obligations, and corporations were understood to be legally obligated to 
deliver the quid pro quo described by Angell and Ames.544 In the absence of 
such grants, however, in the succeeding era of general incorporation for manu-
facturers and other pecuniary corporations, the corporation was increasingly 
understood to be a matter of “strictly private” contract, for purposes of private 
pecuniary gain, unaffected by the public interest.  As the state quid waned, so 
did the corporate quo.
Since 1860, multitudinous other arguments have been raised as to the privi-
leges, powers, and proper public obligations versus private rights of business 
corporations.545 Such arguments are beyond the scope of this Article.  My con-
clusions here are only two: first, the public/private tension is socio-historical 
and political rather than intrinsic to the corporate form.  Ultimately the question 
is who decides how to allocate—who controls—private wealth.  This question 
would not seem to arise from, or be solvable by means of, corporate law.  Sec-
ond, the indeterminacy surrounding this question—the boundary between public 
and private, law and contract, the sovereign state and the individual—not only 
has been negotiated for two hundred years, but continues to be negotiated in 
American corporate law today and will likely continue to be negotiated in the 
future, so long as entrepreneurs and investors, courts and commentators, and 
politicians and the public attempt to move the corporation back and forth be-
regulation amounts to the violation of the social compact by treating a constituent as if it were mere-
ly a creature of the state.”); Horwitz, Public/Private Distinction, supra note 212, at 1428 (“Private 
power began to become increasingly indistinguishable from public power precisely at the moment, 
late in the nineteenth century, when large-scale corporate concentration became the norm.”).
543. See WILLIAMS, supra note 212, at 240 (describing Story’s opinions in Terrett v. Taylor
and Dartmouth College as “exaggerated” and suggesting that “the result read into the Constitution 
the twin Federalist obsessions of protecting private property and limiting the role of government.”).
544. See ANGELL & AMES, supra note 191, at 33.
545. See e.g., William J. Novak, Public Economy and The Well-Ordered Market: Law and 
Economic Regulation in 19th-Century America, 18 L. & SOCIAL INQ. at 1 (“The relationship of law, 
state and economy in America has been at the center of legal-historical research for almost 50 years 
now.”); Michael DeBow & Dwight R., Lee, Shareholders, Nonshareholders and Corporate Law: 
Communitarianism and Resource Allocation, 18 DEL. J. CORP. L. 393, 393 (1993) (“For years now, 
debates over the proper scope and content of corporate behavior and corporate law have exhibited 
one regularity: they almost always involve a clash between those who treat corporations as contrac-
tually-based, profit-maximizing entities, and those who wish corporations could be made to be 
something else.”); see generally MAYER, supra note 8.
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tween the opposing poles of public and private corporate purpose.  In the mean-
time, we should not mistake mutable public policies for intrinsic components of 
the corporate form.
Finally, based on this brief history, I suggest that there may be limitations 
on social enterprise.  The internal improvement companies, for example, typi-
cally sought to build transportation and financial infrastructure rather than man-
ufacturing, which required comparatively more capital, attracted more financial-
ly oriented investors, and was not long perceived to have a public purpose.  If 
history is any guide, the manufacturing sector may not be well-suited for social 
enterprise.  The same may be said of banking.  After the Revolution, early 
American banks quickly became profitable and were among the first American 
business corporations to start down the path from public to private purpose. Pri-
vate capital may crowd out more public-minded investors.
Large-scale national or regional enterprises may also be ill-suited for social 
enterprise.  The internal improvement companies and early banks, railroads and 
manufacturers were all comparatively small local enterprises that were able to 
raise sufficient capital from the immediately neighboring public, which in turn 
understood itself to benefit economically from the firm’s (local) public goals.  
Where local benefits are small, or an enterprise’s customers are geographically 
dispersed, the enterprise’s owners, employees, suppliers and customers seem 
less likely to be motivated by non-financial concerns—i.e. to be interested pri-
marily in the firm’s output rather than its economic performance–-in turn mak-
ing  a public purpose or social or environmental mission more difficult to sus-
tain.
By the same token, social enterprises with an insufficient profit motive may 
not be viable. It is important to note that even where shareholders of early 
American corporations were not interested in company profits, the benefits they 
received from their investments remained largely economic, in the form of the 
public-purpose turnpike, bridge or canal that, once built, would advance their 
other local business interests as farmers, merchants, or landowners.  Business 
corporations that sought to provide no economic benefit to their shareholders, 
either directly or indirectly, are not well-represented in early America and are 
likely to be difficult to sustain today.
Overall, then, business enterprises that are capital-intensive, regional or na-
tional in scale, or potentially highly profitable seem least likely to sustain a pub-
lic or other non-profit-maximizing purpose. Historically, American railroads 
may be the best example.  From their humble origins as local internal improve-
ment companies in the 1820s, railroads grew by the late nineteenth-century into 
the capital-intensive backbone of the robber-barons’ relentlessly profit-seeking 
empires.546 Social enterprises that grow significantly in geographic scope or 
capitalization—i.e., social enterprises that dramatically succeed?—may thereby 
546. See, e.g., In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 484 F.2d 323, 326 (citing M. JOSEPHSON, THE 
ROBBER BARONS 66-74 (1962); see also Hamill, supra note 8, at 147 (commenting on the railroads’
high profile and “potential for enormous profits”).
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cease to be social enterprises.  The public mission of a booming social enter-
prise may drift right out of the company, or the company out of the public mis-
sion into pecuniary territory.
Social enterprise may accordingly not be suitable at either extreme of the 
profit spectrum.  Social enterprise may best succeed where some, but not too 
much, profit can be returned to shareholders, directly or indirectly—where eco-
nomic gain is neither too little nor too much.  If the public/private dynamic were 
a dialectical process, one might see in the early all-purpose pre-corporation a 
kind of public/private synthesis, whose inherent contradictions gave rise to the 
thesis of the public-purpose corporation, then the antithesis of the profit-
maximizing modern firm.  Is a new synthesis, or at least some détente, possible 
in the for-profit corporation with a (shareholder-chosen) public purpose, i.e. the 
social enterprise?
Alternatively, social enterprise itself may be only a transition or historical 
phase in the longer development of the business corporation.  In that case, stu-
dents of American corporate history may be left to wonder, with nineteenth and 
twentieth-century theoreticians, whether ontogeny indeed recapitulates phylog-
eny.547
547. See, e.g., SIGMUND FREUD, TOTEM AND TABOO (1913).
78 Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review [Vol. 9:1
